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Preface
This thesis is the result of my first four years as a researcher in game theory. Nonetheless, my
devotion for games, specially the zero-sum ones, is much older than that. I would say that it
really began when I first saw my eldest brother playing chess with my father; by that time I was
six years old. Both of them passed me the love for this game, which I still practice. Apart from
chess, I have also wasted part of my leisure time over the last few years playing computer games,
cards, and many other board and table games with my family and friends. It was not before
the fifth year of my undergraduate studies in Mathematics that I realized that the scope of the
theory of games goes far beyond simple (and not so simple) diversions.
My first formal approach to game theory was during a course taught by Ignacio García Jurado.
After Ignacio’s course, games were not just a hobby anymore. Hence, after finishing the degree, I
joined the PhD program of the Department of Statistics and Operations Research with the idea
of writing my thesis in game theory. Soon after that, Ignacio became my advisor. He is the one
who has helped me most during these four years, not only because of his academic guidance, but
also for being the main responsible for the fruitful years I have spent as a game theorist so far.
Many thanks, Ignacio, for the time you have spent on me.
Many thanks, too, to my other advisor, Estela, for all the time she has devoted to this thesis;
mainly through her co-authorship in Chapters 5, 6, and 7. Thanks for all the discussions, so
central to the core of this thesis.
Joint research with different people has helped me to deepen into game theory and to un-
derstand many other aspects of a researcher’s life. Hence, I am grateful to all my co-authors:
Ignacio, Estela, Peter, Henk, Ruud, Marieke, and Antonio. Besides, special thanks to my ad-
vanced mathematics consultants: Roi and Carlitos for their helpful discussions that contributed
to most of the Chapters of this thesis, mainly through Chapters 5 and 6.
I have also had the possibility of visiting some prestigious universities during these years.
These stays have substantially influenced my formation not only as a researcher, but also in
many other aspects of life. Because of this, I am indebted to Peter, Henk, Ruud, Arantza,. . . and
all the people at CentER for the pleasant atmosphere I had during my three-month visit to
Tilburg University. I am also indebted to Inés and Jordi for having invited me to visit the Unit
of Economic Analysis of the Universitat Autònoma de Barcelona, and to the other members of
the Department for their reception; I am specially grateful to the PhD students at IDEA for their
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warm welcome, where Sergio and Joan deserve a special mention. Finally, I am deeply indebted
to William for inviting me to visit the Department of Economics of Rochester University. My
gratitude to all the members of the Department, to the PhD students, to Diego, Paula, Ricardo,
Cagatay, and many others.
Moreover, William’s influence on this thesis goes further than just the invitation to visit
Rochester University. He has taught to me some of the secrets of correct (scientific) writing, and
I have tried to follow his credo throughout this thesis. Unfortunately, it was already too late to
implement his principles in some of the chapters of this thesis (in the others just blame me for
my inaptitude).
I deeply appreciate the kind support from the group of Galician game theorists and from the
people in the Department of Statistics and Operations Research.
I am also grateful to my two officemates, Rosa and Manuel. Because of them I have developed
my research in a very comfortable environment. Also, thanks Manuel for your countless LaTeX
recommendations.
Finally, I want to mention all the other PhD students at the Faculty of Mathematics for
the enjoyable conversations and discussions during the daily coffee breaks. Thanks to Marco,
Carlitos, Tere, Bea,. . . .
Last, but not least, I have to render many thanks to my family and to my friends. They have
provided me with a very pleasant and relaxed atmosphere during all these years.
Julio González Díaz
April 2005, Santiago de Compostela
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Notations
Since many of the chapters within this thesis do not bear any relation to each other, all of them
are self-contained. In order to do this, it can be the case that the same piece of notation is
introduced in more than one chapter. Even though, the following symbols and notations are
common for all the chapters.
N The set of natural numbers
R The set of real numbers
RN The set of vectors whose coordinates are indexed by the elements of N
R+ The set of non-negative real numbers
R++ The set of positive real numbers
T ⊆ S T is a subset of S
T ( S T is a subset of S and T is not equal to S
2N The set of all subsets of N
|S| The number of elements of S
co(A) The convex hull of A
vii
Part I
Noncooperative Game Theory
3Introduction to Noncooperative Game Theory
This first Part of the dissertation deals with noncooperative game theoretical models. It consists
of four Chapters, and in each of them we present and discuss a different issue.
Chapter 1 presents a noncooperative situation in which timing plays an important role. That
is, not only the chosen strategies are relevant to obtain the payoffs of a given profile, but also
the moment in which they are played influences the outcome. The games we define model the
division of a cake by n-players as a special class of timing games. Our main result establishes
the existence and uniqueness of a Nash equilibrium profile for each of these games. This Chapter
is based on the paper González-Díaz et al. (2004) and generalizes to the n-player situation the
2-player results described in Hamers (1993).
Both Chapters 2 and 3 describe models within the scope of the repeated games literature.
In Chapter 2, which is based on the paper González-Díaz (2003), we elaborate a little bit more
on the extensively studied topic of the folk theorems. More specifically, we present a generalized
Nash folk theorem for finitely repeated games with complete information. The main result in this
Chapter refines the sufficient condition presented in Benoît and Krishna (1987), replacing it by
a new one which turns out to be also necessary. Besides, this result also corrects a small flaw in
Smith (1995). Moreover, our folk theorem is more general than the standard ones. The latter look
for conditions under which the set of feasible and individually rational payoffs can be supported
by Nash or subgame perfect equilibria. Our folk theorem also looks for such conditions, but we
also characterize the set of achievable payoffs when those conditions are not met. On the other
hand, in Chapter 3 we deepen in the topic of unilateral commitments; the research on this issue
follows the lines in García-Jurado et al. (2000). We study the impact of unilateral commitments
in the assumptions needed for the various folk theorems, showing that, within our framework,
they can always be relaxed. These results imply that, when unilateral commitments are possible,
we can support “cooperative” payoffs of the original game as the result of either a Nash or a
subgame perfect equilibrium profile in situations in which they could not be supported within the
classic framework. Chapter 3 is based on García-Jurado and González-Díaz (2005).
We conclude this first Part with Chapter 4. This Chapter deals with bankruptcy problems.
We associate noncooperative bankruptcy games to bankruptcy situations and then we study the
properties of the equilibria of such games. We show that each of these games has a unique Nash
equilibrium payoff, which, moreover, is always supported by strong Nash equilibria. Besides, we
show that for each bankruptcy rule and each bankruptcy situation, we can define a bankruptcy
game whose Nash equilibrium payoff corresponds with the proposal of the given bankruptcy rule.
This Chapter is based on García-Jurado et al. (2004).
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6 Chapter 1. A Silent Battle over a Cake
1.1 Introduction
There are many strategic situations in which some agents face a decision problem in which timing
is important. The literature on timing games has been devoted to analyze these situations and
provide theoretical models to study the underlying strategic problem. A first approach to timing
games appears in Karlin (1959) in the zero sum context. More recent contributions are Baston
and Garnaev (2000) and Laraki et al. (2003). A classic example of timing game is the war of
attrition, introduced in Smith (1974) and widely studied, for instance, in Hendricks et al. (1988).
More specifically, consider the following war of attrition game. Two rival firms are engaged in
a race to make a patentable discovery, and hence, as soon as one firm makes the discovery, all
the previous effort made by the other firm turns out to be useless. This patent race model has
been widely studied in literature (see, for instance, Fudenberg et al. (1983)). In this model it is
assumed that, as soon as one of the firms leaves the race, the game ends. The motivation for
this assumption is that, once there is only one firm in the race, the game reduces to a decision
problem in which the remaining firm has to optimize its resources. Hence, the strategy of each
firm consists of deciding, for each time t, whether to leave the race or not. Most of the literature
in timing games models what we call non-silent timing games, that is, as soon as one player
acts, the others are informed and the game ends.1 In this Chapter, on the contrary, we provide
a formal model for the silent situation. We use again the patent race to motivate our approach.
Consider a situation in which two firms are engaged in a patent race and also in an advertising
campaign. Suppose that one of the two rival firms, say firm 1, decides to leave the patent race.
Then, it will probably be the case that firm 1 does not want firm 2 to realize that 1 is not in
the race anymore; and therefore, firm 1 can get a more advantageous position for the advertising
campaign. Moreover, if firm 2 does not realize about the fact that firm 1 has already left the
race, it can also be the case that, having already firm 1 left the race, firm 2 leaves the race before
making the discovery, benefiting again firm 1.
Next, we introduce our silent timing game. We consider the situation that n players have to
divide a cake of size S. At time 0 player i has the initial right to receive the amount αi, where
it is assumed that
∑
i∈N αi < S. If player i claims his part at time t > 0 then he receives the
discounted part δtαi of the cake, unless he is the last claimant in which case he receives the
discounted remaining part of the cake δt(S −∑j 6=i αj). We refer to this game as a cake sharing
game.
Hamers (1993) showed that 2-player cake sharing games always admit a unique Nash equilib-
rium. In this Chapter we consider cake sharing games that are slightly different from the games
introduced in Hamers (1993). We first provide an alternative, but more direct, existence and
uniqueness result for 2-player cake sharing games and we generalize this result to cake sharing
games with more players.
It is worth to mention the similarities between our results and some well known results in all-
1An exception is Reinganum (1981), although her model is very different from ours.
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pay auctions (Weber, 1985). At first glance, our model seems quite different from that of all-pay
auctions, but it turns out to be the case that they have many similarities. Indeed, in this Chapter
we show that the same kind of results obtained for the all-pay auction (Hilman and Riley, 1989;
Baye et al., 1996) can be obtained for our timing game. Anyhow, even when both the results and
also the arguments underlying some of the proofs are very similar, the two models are different
enough so that our results can not be derived from those in the all-pay auctions literature.
This Chapter is organized as follows. In Section 1.2 we introduce the cake sharing games.
In Sections 1.3 and 1.4 we deal with 2-player cake sharing games and more player cake sharing
games, respectively.
1.2 The Model
In this Section we formally introduce the cake sharing games.
Let N = {1, . . . , n} be a set of players with n ≥ 2, let S > 0, let α = (α1, . . . , αn) ∈ RN+
be such that α1 + · · · + αn < S, and let δ ∈ (0, 1). Throughout this Chapter we assume that
0 < α1 < α2 < · · · < αn. The number S is called the size of the cake, the vector α the initial
right vector and δ the discount factor.
The cake sharing game with pure strategies associated with S, α, and δ, is the triple ΓpureS,α,δ :=
(N, {Ai}i∈N , {πi}i∈N ), where
Ai := [0,∞) is the set of pure strategies of player i ∈ N ,
πi is the payoff function of player i ∈ N , defined by:
πi(t1, . . . , tn) :=


(S −
∑
j 6=i
αj)δ
ti ti > max
j 6=i
tj
αiδ
ti otherwise.
Hence, if there is a unique last claimant, then he receives the discounted value of the cake that
remains after that other players have taken their initial rights. If there is not a unique last
claimant, then all players receive the discounted value of their initial rights. Note that the payoff
functions defined above differ slightly from the payoff functions introduced in Hamers (1993),
where, in case there is not a unique last claimant, the discounted value of the remaining cake is
shared equally between the last claimants. This change in the model does not affect the results,
but it helps to have cleaner proofs. 2
One easily verifies that ΓpureS,α,δ has no Nash equilibria. If there is a unique last claimant,
then this player can improve his payoff by claiming a little bit earlier (and remaining the last
2Let us make some comments concerning the relation between the cake sharing game (CS) and the all-pay
auctions model (AP ). For simplicity, we think of the two player case. Setting aside the issue of timing, note the
following differences: (i) Initial rights: in CS they depend on the player (αi), in AP they are 0; (ii) in CS each
player wants to get 1− (α1+α2), in AP the valuation of the object depends on the player; and (iii) In CS waiting
till time t, each player is “paying” αi − (αi)δ
t, i.e., it depends on the player, in AP bidding v, each player is
“paying” v. All the other strategic elements are analogous in the two models.
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claimant). If there is no unique last claimant, then one of the last claimants can improve his
payoff by claiming a little bit later (becoming the unique last claimant in this way). Hence, for
an appropriate analysis of cake sharing games we need to consider mixed strategies.
Formally, a mixed strategy is a function G : [0,∞)→ [0, 1] satisfying:
G(0) = 0,
G is a nondecreasing function,
G is left-continuous,
limx→∞G(x) = 1.
For a mixed strategy G we can always find a probability measure P on [0,∞) such that:3
for each x ∈ [0,∞), G(x) = P ([0, x)). (1.1)
On the other hand, every probability measure P on [0,∞) defines by formula (1.1) a mixed
strategy G. Hence, the set of mixed strategies coincides with the set of probability measures on
[0,∞).4 Let G denote the set of all mixed strategies. We introduce now some other notations
related to mixed strategy G:
for each x ∈ [0,∞), we denote limy↓xG(y), the probability of choosing an element in the
closed interval [0, x], by G(x+).
if there is x > 0 such that for each pair a, b ∈ [0,∞), with a < x < b, we have G(b) > G(a+)
(i.e., the probability of choosing an element in (a, b) is positive), then x is an element of
the support of G. If for each b > 0, G(b) > 0 (i.e., the probability of choosing an element
in [0, b) is positive), then 0 is an element of the support of G. Let S(G) be the support of
the distribution function G. One easily verifies that S(G) is a closed set.
the set of jumps (discontinuities) of G is J(G) := {x ∈ [0,∞) : G(x+) > G(x)}, i.e., the
set of pure strategies which are chosen with positive probability.
If player i chooses pure strategy t and all other players choose mixed strategies {Gj}j 6=i then the
expected payoff for player i is
πi(G1, . . . , Gi−1, t, Gi+1, . . . , Gn) =
∏
j 6=i
Gj(t) δ
t(S −
∑
j 6=i
αj) + (1−
∏
j 6=i
Gj(t)) δ
tαi
= δt(αi + (S −
∑
j∈N
αj)
∏
j 6=i
Gj(t)).
3See Rohatgi (1976) for more details.
4An alternative way of defining mixed strategies G is as a nondecreasing, right-continuous function from [0,∞)
to [0, 1] with limx→∞G(x) = 1. For such a function we can always find a probability measure P on [0,∞) such
that for each x ∈ [0,∞), G(x) = P
 
[0, x]

, i.e., G is the (cumulative) distribution function corresponding to
P . Although this equivalent approach seems more natural, it would lead to technical problems when computing
Lebesgue-Stieltjes integrals later on.
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If player i also chooses a mixed strategy Gi, whereas all other players stick to mixed strategies
{Gj}j 6=i, then the expected payoff for player i can be computed by use of the Lebesgue-Stieltjes
integral:
πi(G1, . . . , Gn) =
∫
πi(G1, . . . , Gi−1, t, Gi+1, . . . , Gn)dGi(t). (1.2)
Note that, with a slight abuse of notation, the functions πi do not only denote payoffs to players
when pure strategies are played, but also when mixed strategies are used.
The cake sharing game associated with S, α, and δ, is defined by the triple ΓS,α,δ :=
(N, {Xi}i∈N , {πi}i∈N ), where
Xi := G is the set of mixed strategies of player i ∈ N ,
πi, defined by (1.2), is the (expected) payoff function of player i ∈ N .
Given a strategy profile G = (G1, G2, . . . , Gn) ∈ Gn, let πGi (t) be the corresponding payoff
πi(G1, . . . , Gi−1, t, Gi+1, . . . , Gn). Hence, πGi (t) is the expected payoff for player i when he plays
the pure strategy t and all the other players act in accordance with G.
1.3 Two Players
In this Section we provide an alternative proof of the result of Hamers (1993) for 2-player cake
sharing games. Our incentives for doing this job are threefold. First of all we want to recall
that our model is slightly different from the model of Hamers (1993), and hence, a new proof is
required. Secondly, our proof is more direct than Hamers’ proof. Finally, our proof forms the
basis for the results in Section 1.4 for cake sharing games with three or more players.
First, we derive a number of properties for Nash equilibria of n-player cake sharing games.
The following Lemma shows that in a Nash equilibrium players do not put positive probability
on a pure strategy t > 0.
Lemma 1.1. Let ΓS,α,δ be an n-player cake sharing game and let the profile G = (Gi)i∈N ∈ GN
be a Nash equilibrium of ΓS,α,δ. Then, for each i ∈ N , J(Gi) ∩ (0,∞) = ∅.
Proof. Let i ∈ N . We show that J(Gi) ∩ (0,∞) = ∅. Assume, without loss of generality, that
i = 1. Suppose that u ∈ J(G1) ∩ (0,∞). If there is i 6= 1 such that Gi(u+) = 0, then, for each
t ∈ [0, u], πG1 (t) = δtα1. Since the function πG1 (·) is strictly decreasing on [0, u], player 1 would
be better off moving the probability in u to 0. Hence, for each i ∈ N , Gi(u+) > 0. Now, for each
i ∈ N\{1}, consider the functions
πGi (t) = δ
t(αi + (S −
∑
j∈N
αj)
∏
j 6=i
Gj(t)).
Since G1 is discontinuous at u, i.e., G1(u+) > G1(u), there are u1 < u, u2 > u, and ε > 0 such
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that for each i 6= 1 and each t ∈ [u1, u],
πGi (u2)− πGi (t) ≥ ε.
If player i ∈ N\{1} puts positive probability on [u1, u], i.e., if Gi(u+) > Gi(u1), then he can
increase his payoff by at least ε(Gi(u
+) − Gi(u1)) by moving all this probability to u2. Hence,
for each i ∈ N\{1}, we have Gi(u+) = Gi(u1) and, for each t ∈ [u1, u], Gi(t) = Gi(u). Hence,
the function
πG1 (t) = δ
t(α1 + (S −
∑
j∈N
αj)
∏
j 6=1
Gj(t))
is strictly decreasing on [u1, u]. Now, player 1 can improve his payoff by moving some probability
from u to u1.
Lemma 1.1 implies that, in a Nash equilibrium G, the players use mixed strategies which are
continuous on (0,∞). Hence, for each i ∈ N and each t > 0, we can write Gi(t+) = Gi(t).
Moreover, the functions πGi (·) are continuous on (0,∞).
Lemma 1.2. Let ΓS,α,δ be an n-player cake sharing game and let the profile G = (Gi)i∈N ∈ GN
be a Nash equilibrium of ΓS,α,δ. Let i ∈ N and t ∈ S(Gi). Then, there is j ∈ N\{i} such that
t ∈ S(Gj).
Proof. Suppose that t /∈ ∪j 6=iS(Gj). We distinguish between two cases:
Case 1: t > 0.
There are t1, t2 > 0, with t1 < t < t2, such that for each j 6= i, Gj(t2) = Gj(t1).5 Hence, for
each u ∈ [t1, t2] and each j 6= i, Gj(u) = Gj(t2). Hence, the function
πGi (u) = δ
u(αi + (S −
∑
j∈N
αj)
∏
j 6=i
Gj(u))
is strictly decreasing on [t1, t2]. Since t ∈ S(Gi), we have Gi(t2) > Gi(t+1 ), i.e., player i puts
positive probability on (t1, t2). Now, player i can strictly improve his payoff by moving all this
probability to t1.
Case 2: t = 0.
Let b > 0 be the smallest element in ∪j 6=iS(Gj) (recall that all the S(Gj) are closed). Clearly,
for each j 6= i, Gj(b) = 0. Again, if Gi(b) > Gi(0+), i.e., if player i puts positive probability on
(0, b), then similar arguments as in Case 1 can be used to show that player i can strictly improve
his payoff by moving this probability to 0. Hence, Gi(b) = Gi(0
+) and hence, since 0 ∈ S(Gi),
we have Gi(0
+) > 0. Moreover, for each t ∈ (0, b], Gi(t) = Gi(b) (this is relevant only for the
5For each j ∈ N\{i} there are tj1, t
j
2 > 0, with t
j
1 < t < t
j
2, such that Gj(t
j
2) = Gj(t
j
1). Hence, we take
t1 = maxj∈N\{i} t
j
1 and t2 = minj∈N\{i} t
j
2.
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case n = 2). Hence, for each j ∈ N\{i}, the function
πGj (t) = δ
t(αj + (S −
∑
k∈N
αk)
∏
k 6=j
Gk(t))
is strictly decreasing on (0, b].
Let a ∈ (0, b) and let j ∈ N\{i} be a player such that b ∈ S(Gj). Let ε := πGj (a)−πGj (b) > 0.
Since the function πGj (·) is continuous on (0,∞), we have that, for δ > 0 sufficiently small,
for each t ∈ [b, b+ δ], πGj (a)− πGj (t) >
1
2
ε.
Since b ∈ S(Gj), Gj(b + δ) > 0 = Gj(b). Hence, player j can improve his payoff by moving the
probability he assigns to [b, b+ δ) to a. Contradiction.
The following Lemma shows that if some pure strategy t does not belong to the support of
any of the equilibrium strategies, then no pure strategy t′ > t belongs to the support of any of
the equilibrium strategies either.
Lemma 1.3. Let G = (Gi)i∈N be a Nash equilibrium of the n-player cake sharing game ΓS,α,δ.
Let t ∈ [0,∞) be such that for each j ∈ N , t /∈ S(Gj). Then, for each j ∈ N , (t,∞)∩S(Gj) = ∅.
Proof. Let K := ∪j∈NS(Gj). Clearly, K is closed and t /∈ K. We have to show that K ∩ (t,∞) =
∅. Suppose that K ∩ (t,∞) 6= ∅. Let t∗ := min{u ∈ K : u > t}. Let j∗ ∈ N be such that
t∗ ∈ S(Gj∗). Since for each j ∈ N , [t, t∗) ∩ S(Gj) = ∅, then we have that, for each j ∈ N ,
Gj(t) = Gj(t
∗). Hence, the functions Gj are constant on [t, t∗]. Now, since for each u ∈ [0,∞),
πGj∗(u) = δ
u(αj∗ + (S −
∑
j∈N
αj)
∏
j 6=j∗
Gj(u)),
then, the function πGj∗(·) is strictly decreasing on [t, t∗]. By the continuity of πGj∗(·) at t∗, for each
u ∈ [t∗, t∗ + ε], with ε > 0 sufficiently small, we have πGj∗(t) > πGj∗(u). Hence, Gj∗ is constant on
[t∗, t∗ + ε] as well, contradicting the fact that t∗ ∈ S(Gj∗).
Now, we provide specific results for 2-player cake sharing games. The following Lemma shows
that, in a Nash equilibrium, the players use mixed strategies of which the supports coincide.
Lemma 1.4. Let ΓS,α,δ be a 2-player cake sharing game and let (G1, G2) ∈ G × G be a Nash
equilibrium of ΓS,α,δ. Then, S(G1) = S(G2).
Proof. This result is just a consequence of Lemma 1.2.
In the following Lemma we show that the supports of the strategies in a Nash equilibrium are
compact intervals.
Lemma 1.5. Let ΓS,α,δ be a 2-player cake sharing game and let G = (G1, G2) ∈ G×G be a Nash
equilibrium of ΓS,α,δ. Let k := logδ
α2
S−α1 . Then, S(G1) = S(G2) = [0, k].
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Proof. First, we show that S(G1) = S(G2) ⊆ [0, k]. For each t ∈ (k,∞), we have
πG2 (t) = δ
t(α2 + (S − α1 − α2)G1(t))
≤ δt(α2 + (S − α1 − α2))
= δt(S − α1)
< δk(S − α1)
= α2
= πG2 (0).
IfG2(k) = G2(k
+) < 1, i.e., if player 2 puts positive probability on (k,∞), then he can improve his
payoff strictly by moving all this probability to 0. Hence G2(k) = 1 and S(G1) = S(G2) ⊆ [0, k].
Let k∗ be the largest element in the closed set S(G1). Clearly, k∗ ≤ k. If k∗ = 0, then (G1, G2)
would be an equilibrium in pure strategies, a contradiction. Hence, k∗ > 0. Now, by Lemma 1.3,
S(G1) = S(G2) = [0, k
∗].
The only thing which remains to be shown is that k∗ = k. Suppose that k∗ < k. Now, for
each τ ∈ (0, k − k∗),
πG1 (k
∗ + τ) = δk
∗+τ (α1 + (S − α1 − α2)G2(k∗ + τ))
= δk
∗+τ (α1 + (S − α1 − α2))
= δk
∗+τ (S − α2)
> δk(S − α2)
=
α2(S − α2)
S − α1
≥ α1
= πG1 (0),
where at the weak inequality we used that α2(S−α2) ≥ α1(S−α1). Hence, if G1(0+) > 0, i.e., if
player 1 plays pure strategy 0 with positive probability, then he can improve his payoff by moving
some probability from 0 to pure strategy k∗ + τ . Hence, G1(0+) = 0. Now, there is t ∈ (k∗, k)
such that
πG2 (t) = δ
t(α2 + (S − α1 − α2)G1(t))
= δt(α2 + (S − α1 − α2))
= δt(S − α1)
> δk(S − α1)
= α2
= πG2 (0).
Since 0 ∈ S(G1) and πG2 (·) is continuous at 0 (because G1(0+) = 0), player 2 can strictly improve
his payoff by moving some probability from the neighborhood of 0 to t. Contradiction. Hence,
k∗ = k.
Now, we are ready to prove the main theorem of this Section.
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Theorem 1.1. Let ΓS,α,δ be a 2-player cake sharing game and k := logδ
α2
S−α1 . Define G
∗ =
(G∗1, G
∗
2) ∈ G × G by
G∗1(t) :=


α2 − α2δt
δt(S − α1 − α2) 0 ≤ t ≤ k
1 t > k,
G∗2(t) :=


0 t = 0
α2(S − α2)− α1(S − α1)δt
δt(S − α1)(S − α1 − α2) 0 < t ≤ k
1 t > k.
Then, G∗ is the unique Nash equilibrium of ΓS,α,δ. Moreover, the equilibrium payoffs are
π1(G
∗
1, G
∗
2) =
α2(S − α2)
S − α1 ,
π2(G
∗
1, G
∗
2) = α2.
Proof. One easily verifies that
πG
∗
1 (t) =


α1 t = 0
α2(S − α2)
S − α1 0 < t ≤ k
δt(S − α2) t > k,
and
πG
∗
2 (t) =
{
α2 0 ≤ t ≤ k
δt(S − α1) t > k.
Hence,
π1(G
∗
1, G
∗
2) =
α2(S − α2)
S − α1 and π2(G
∗
1, G
∗
2) = α2.
Since for each t ∈ [0,∞),
π1(t,G
∗
2) ≤
α2(S − α2)
S − α1 and π2(G
∗
1, t) ≤ α2,
we have that G∗ is a Nash equilibrium of ΓS,α,δ.
In order to show that there are no other Nash equilibria, let (G1, G2) be a Nash equilibrium of
ΓS,α,δ. By Lemma 1.1, the strategies G1 and G2 are continuous on (0,∞). In the same way as in
the proof of Lemma 1.5, we can show that G1(0
+) = 0. Hence, the function πG1 (·) is continuous
on (0,∞) and the function πG2 (·) is continuous on [0,∞). By Lemma 1.5, S(G1) = S(G2) = [0, k].
Hence, there are constants c and d such that
for each t ∈ (0, k], c = πG1 (t) = δt(α1 + (S − α1 − α2)G2(t)),
for each t ∈ [0, k], d = πG2 (t) = δt(α2 + (S − α1 − α2)G1(t)).
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Since G1(0) = 0, d = π
G
2 (0) = α2. Hence, for each t ∈ [0, k],
G1(t) =
α2 − α2δt
δt(S − α1 − α2) = G
∗
1(t).
Now, for each t > k, G1(t) = 1 = G
∗
1(t). Hence, G1 = G
∗
1. Moreover, since G2(k) = 1,
c = πG1 (k) = δ
k(S − α2) = α2(S−α2)S−α1 . Hence, for each t ∈ (0, k]
G2(t) =
α2(S − α2)− α1(S − α1)δt
δt(S − α1)(S − α1 − α2) = G
∗
2(t).
Now, G2(0) = 0 = G
∗
2(0) and, for each t > k, G2(t) = 1 = G
∗
2(t). Hence, G2 = G
∗
2. This finishes
the proof.
1.4 More Players
In this Section we consider cake sharing games with more than two players. Again, we show that
such games admit a unique Nash equilibrium.
First, we show that mixed strategies in a Nash equilibrium have a bounded support.
Lemma 1.6. Let ΓS,α,δ be an n-player cake sharing game, with n ≥ 3. Let G = (Gi)i∈N ∈ GN
be a Nash equilibrium of ΓS,α,δ. For each i ∈ N , let
ki := logδ
αi
1−∑j 6=i αj .
Then, k1 > k2 > · · · > kn and, for each i ∈ N , S(Gi) ⊂ [0, ki]. Moreover, S(G1) ⊂ [0, k2].
Proof. Let i, j ∈ N be such that i > j. Let γ :=
∑
l 6=i,j
αl. Then,
αi(S − γ − αi)− αj(S − γ − αj) = αi(S − γ − αi)− αiαj + αiαj − αj(S − γ − αj)
= (αi − αj)(S −
∑
l∈N
αl)
> 0.
Now,
δki
δkj
=
αi
S − γ − αj
αj
S − γ − αi
=
αi(S − γ − αi)
αj(S − γ − αj) > 1, (1.3)
and hence, ki < kj .
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Now, for each i ∈ N and each t ∈ (ki,∞),
πGi (t) = δ
t(αi + (S −
∑
j∈N αj)
∏
j 6=iGj(t))
≤ δt(αi + (S −
∑
j∈N αj))
= δt(S −∑j 6=i αj)
< δki(S −∑j 6=i αj)
= αi
= πGi (0).
Repeating the reasoning in Lemma 1.5, if Gi(ki) = Gi(k
+
i ) < 1, then player i can strictly improve
his payoff by moving all the probability in (ki,∞) to 0. Hence, for each i ∈ N , Gi(ki) = 1.
Now, for each j ∈ N\{1}, k2 ≥ kj . Hence, Gj(k2) ≥ Gj(kj) = 1. Hence, Gj(k2) = 1 and
S(Gj) ⊂ [0, k2]. Now, by Lemma 1.2, we have S(G1) ⊂ [0, k2] as well.
In the following Lemma we show that pure strategy 0 belongs to the support of every equi-
librium strategy. Moreover, players 2, . . . , n play this strategy with positive probability.
Lemma 1.7. Let ΓS,α,δ be an n-player cake sharing game. Let G = (Gi)i∈N ∈ GN be a Nash
equilibrium of ΓS,α,δ. Then, for each j ∈ N , 0 ∈ S(Gj). Moreover, for each j ∈ N\{1},
Gj(0
+) > 0.
Proof. Suppose that there is i ∈ N such that 0 /∈ S(Gi). Let s > 0 be the smallest element in
the closed set S(Gi). Then, [0, s) ∩ S(Gi) = ∅. Hence, for each t ∈ [0, s], Gi(t) = 0. Hence, for
each j ∈ N\{i} the function
πGj (t) = δ
t(αj + (S −
∑
k∈N
αk)
∏
k 6=j
Gk(t)) = αjδ
t
is strictly decreasing on [0, s]. Hence, for each j ∈ N\{i}, (0, s) ∩ S(Gj) = ∅. Let s∗ ∈ (0, s).
Then, for each j ∈ N , s∗ /∈ S(Gj). By Lemma 1.3, we have (s∗,∞) ∩ S(Gi) = ∅. Contradiction
with s ∈ S(Gi). Hence, for each j ∈ N , 0 ∈ S(Gj).
Now suppose i ∈ N\{1} is such that Gi(0+) = 0. This implies that the function
πG1 (t) = δ
t(α1 + (S −
∑
j∈N
αj)
∏
j 6=1
Gj(t))
is continuous at 0. Let k2 := logδ
α2
S −∑j 6=2 αj . By Lemma 1.6, for each j ∈ N , Gj(k2) = 1.
Hence,
πG1 (k2) = δ
k2(S −
∑
j 6=1
αj) =
α2
S −∑j 6=2 αj (S −
∑
j 6=1
αj) > α1 = π
G
1 (0).
By the continuity of πG1 (·) at 0, for each t ∈ [0, ε] with ε > 0 sufficiently small, we have πG1 (k2) >
πG1 (t). Hence, [0, ε) ∩ S(G1) = ∅. Contradiction with 0 ∈ S(G1).
16 Chapter 1. A Silent Battle over a Cake
The following Lemma provides the equilibrium payoffs in a Nash equilibrium.
Lemma 1.8. Let G = (Gi)i∈N be a Nash equilibrium of the n-player cake sharing game ΓS,α,δ
and let η = (ηi)i∈N be the corresponding vector of equilibrium payoffs. Then,
η1 =
α2(S −
∑
j 6=1 αj)
S −∑j 6=2 αj
and, for each j ∈ N\{1}, ηj = αj.
Proof. By Lemma 1.7, we have that, for each j ∈ N\{1}, Gj(0+) > 0 . Hence, for each j ∈ N\{1},
ηj = π
G
j (0) = αj . Again, let k2 := logδ
α2
S−Pj 6=2 αj . By Lemma 1.6, we have that, for each j ∈ N ,
Gj(k2) = 1. Hence,
η1 ≥ πG1 (k2) =
α2(S −
∑
j 6=1 αj)
S −∑j 6=2 αj .
If η1 > π
G
1 (k2), then, by the continuity of π
G
1 (·) at k2, for γ > 0 sufficiently small, we have that,
for each t ∈ [k2−γ, k2], η1 > πG1 (t). Hence, S(G1) ⊆ [0, k2−γ]. Now, player 2 can get more than
α2 by putting all his probability at k2 − γ + ε for ε > 0 small enough.
In the following Lemma we show that in a Nash equilibrium players 3, . . . , n claim their initial
right immediately, i.e., they play pure strategy 0.
Lemma 1.9. Let G = (Gi)i∈N be a Nash equilibrium of the n-player cake sharing game ΓS,α,δ,
with n ≥ 3. Then, for each i ∈ N\{1, 2} we have
Gi(t) =
{
0 t = 0
1 t > 0,
i.e., Gi corresponds with pure strategy 0.
Proof. Let i ∈ N\{1, 2} and suppose that it is not true that
Gi(t) =
{
0 t = 0
1 t > 0.
Let t∗ := inf{t : Gi(t) = 1}. Note that t∗ > 0 and t∗ ∈ S(Gi). Moreover, by the continuity of Gi
at t∗, Gi(t∗) = 1. Now, we have
πG2 (t
∗) = δt
∗
(α2 + (S −
∑
j∈N
αj)
∏
j 6=2
Gj(t
∗)) ≤ α2 (1.4)
since, otherwise, player 2 could deviate to pure strategy t∗ obtaining strictly more than his
equilibrium payoff α2. Moreover, since t
∗ ∈ S(Gi),
πGi (t
∗) = δt
∗
(αi + (S −
∑
j∈N
αj)
∏
j 6=i
Gj(t
∗)) = αi. (1.5)
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From (1.4) and (1.5) we have
δt
∗
(S −
∑
j∈N
αj)
∏
j 6=2
Gj(t
∗) ≤ α2(1− δt∗),
δt
∗
(S −
∑
j∈N
αj)
∏
j 6=i
Gj(t
∗) = αi(1− δt∗).
By Lemma 1.7, we have that, for each j ∈ N , Gj(t∗) > 0. Hence, dividing these two expressions
we have
Gi(t
∗)
G2(t∗)
≤ α2
αi
< 1,
which leads to the conclusion that G2(t
∗) > Gi(t∗) = 1. Contradiction.
As a consequence of the last result, the only possible Nash equilibrium in a cake sharing game
is one in which players 3, . . . , n play pure strategy 0 and players 1 and 2 play the game with total
cake size S −∑ni=3 αi.
Theorem 1.2. Let ΓS,α,δ be an n-player cake sharing game, n ≥ 3. Let k2 := logδ α2S−Pj 6=2 αj .
Define G∗ = (G∗i )i∈N ∈ GN by
G∗1(t) :=


α2 − α2δt
δt(S −∑j∈N αj) 0 ≤ t ≤ k2
1 t > k2,
G∗2(t) :=


0 t = 0
α2(S −
∑
j 6=1 αj)− α1δt(S −
∑
j 6=2 αj)
δt(S −∑j∈N αj)(S −∑j 6=2 αj) 0 < t ≤ k2
1 t > k2,
for each i ∈ {3, . . . , n}, G∗i (t) :=
{
0 t = 0
1 t > 0.
Then, G∗ is the unique Nash equilibrium of ΓS,α,δ.
Proof. Suppose G = (Gi)i∈N ∈ GN is a Nash equilibrium of ΓS,α,δ. By Lemma 1.9, we have that,
for each i ∈ {3, . . . , n}, Gi = G∗i . Hence, players 3, . . . , n claim their initial rights immediately.
Now, (G1, G2) is a Nash equilibrium of the 2-player cake sharing game with cake size S−
∑n
i=3 αi
and initial right vector (α1, α2). By Theorem 1.1, we have G1 = G
∗
1 and G2 = G
∗
2. Hence,
G = G∗.
Now, we show that G∗ is indeed a Nash equilibrium. Since, by Theorem 1.1, (G∗1, G
∗
2) is a Nash
equilibrium of the 2-player cake sharing game with cake size S −∑ni=3 αi and initial right vector
(α1, α2), then players 1 and 2 can not gain by deviating unilaterally. Now, we show that players
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3, . . . , n are not interested in deviating either. It suffices to show that for each i ∈ {3, . . . , n}
and each t ∈ [0,∞), πG∗i (t) ≤ αi. Let i ∈ {3, . . . , n} and ki := logδ αiS−Pj 6=i αj . By Lemma 1.6,
ki < k2. Hence, for each t ∈ [k2,∞), we have
πG
∗
i (t) = δ
t(αi + (S −
∑
j∈N αj)
∏
j 6=iG
∗
j (t))
= δt(αi + (S −
∑
j∈N αj))
= δt(S −∑j 6=i αj)
≤ δk2(S −∑j 6=i αj)
≤ δki(S −∑j 6=i αj)
= αi.
Hence, it suffices to show that for each t ∈ [0, k2], πG∗i (t) ≤ αi. Note that for each t ∈ [0, k2]
(t = 0 included), we have
πG
∗
i (t) = δ
t(αi + (S −
∑
j∈N
αj)
∏
j 6=i
G∗j (t))
= δt(αi + (S −
∑
j∈N
αj)G
∗
1(t)G
∗
2(t))
= δtαi + (α2 − α2δt)
α2(S −
∑
j 6=1 αj)− α1δt(S −
∑
j 6=2 αj)
δt(S −∑j∈N αj)(S −∑j 6=2 αj)
= δt(αi +
α1α2
S −∑j∈N αj ) + δ−t
α22(S −
∑
j 6=1 αj)
(S −∑j∈N αj)(S −∑j 6=2 αj)
−( α1α2
S −∑j∈N αj +
α22(S −
∑
j 6=1 αj)
(S −∑j∈N αj)(S −∑j 6=2 αj) )
= aδt + bδ−t + c,
where
a = αi +
α1α2
1−∑j∈N αj
b =
α22(1−
∑
j 6=1 αj)
(1−∑j∈N αj)(1−∑j 6=2 αj)
c = − α1α2
1−∑j∈N αj −
α22(1−
∑
j 6=1 αj)
(1−∑j∈N αj)(1−∑j 6=2 αj) .
Now, make the change of variables x = δt. Then, it suffices to show that for the function
f : (0,∞)→ IR, defined by
for each x ∈ (0,∞), f(x) := ax+ b
x
+ c,
we have that, for each x ∈ [δk2 , 1], f(x) ≤ αi. Since for each x ∈ [δk2 , 1], f ′′(x) = 2bx3 > 0, then
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the function f is convex on [δk2 , 1]. Hence, f(x) ≤ max{f(δk2), f(1)}. Finally, since f(1) =
a+ b+ c = αi and f(δ
k2) = πG
∗
i (k2) ≤ αi, we are done.
1.5 Concluding Remarks
Throughout this Chapter we assumed that α1 < α2 < · · · < αn. Scrutinizing the proofs of
Lemmas 1.1-1.5 and Theorem 1.1 we may conclude that for 2-player cake sharing games the same
result (existence and uniqueness of a Nash equilibrium) also holds in case α1 = α2. For cake
sharing games with at least three players the existence result is still valid in the more general
case α1 ≤ α2 ≤ · · · ≤ αn (and a Nash equilibrium is still provided by the profile described in
Theorem 1.2). With few additional efforts we can show that this Nash equilibrium is unique if
and only if α2 < α3.
Moreover, it would be interesting to study whether similar results to those in the all-pay
auctions model hold for the different configurations of the initial right vector. If so, we would
have a strong parallelism between the results of the two models that, in principle, are very far
from each other.
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2.1 Introduction
Over the past thirty years, necessary and sufficient conditions have been published for numerous
“folk theorems”, asserting that the individually rational feasible payoffs of finitely or infinitely re-
peated games with complete information can be achieved by Nash or subgame perfect equilibria.1
The original folk theorem was concerned about the Nash Equilibria of infinitely repeated games.
This folk theorem stated that every individually rational feasible payoff of the original game can
be obtained as a Nash Equilibrium of the repeated game; no assumption was needed for this result
(a statement and proof of this result can be found in Fudenberg and Maskin (1986)). Then, the
theorists turned to study subgame perfection in infinite horizon models and they found a counter-
part of the previous result for undiscounted repeated games; again, no assumptions were needed
(Aumann and Shapley, 1976; Rubinstein, 1979). A few years later, discount parameters were
incorporated again into the model; in this case, some conditions were needed to get the perfect
folk theorem (Fudenberg and Maskin, 1986). These conditions were refined in the mid-nineties
(Abreu et al., 1994; Wen, 1994).
Together with the previous results, also the literature on finitely repeated games grew. The
main results for finite horizon models obtained conditions for the Nash folk theorem (Benoît
and Krishna, 1987), and also for the perfect one (Benoît and Krishna, 1985). This perfect folk
theorem relied on the fact that mixed strategies were observable; the same result but without that
assumption was obtained in the mid-nineties (Gossner, 1995). Assuming again observable mixed
strategies, Smith (1995) obtained a necessary and sufficient condition for the arbitrarily close
approximation of strictly rational feasible payoffs by subgame perfect equilibria with finite horizon:
that the game have “recursively distinct Nash payoffs”, a premise that relaxes the assumption in
Benoît and Krishna (1985) that each player have multiple Nash payoffs in the stage game.
Smith claimed that this condition was also necessary for approximation of the individually
rational feasible payoffs of finitely repeated games by Nash equilibria. In this Chapter we show
that this is not so by establishing a similar but distinct sufficient condition that is weaker than
both Smith’s condition and the assumptions made by Benoît and Krishna (1987). Moreover, our
condition is also necessary. Essentially, the difference between the subgame perfect and Nash
cases hinges on the weakness of the Nash solution concept: in the Nash case it is not necessary
for threats of punitive action against players who deviate from the equilibrium not to involve loss
to the punishing players themselves, i.e., threats need not be credible. The kind of equilibrium
we define in this Chapter requires for its corresponding path ρ, to finish, for each player i, with
a series Qi of rounds in which i cannot unilaterally improve his stage payoff by deviation from
ρi, and for this terminal phase to start with a series Q
0
i of rounds in which the other players,
regardless of the cost to themselves, can punish him effectively for any prior deviation by imposing
a loss that wipes out any gains he may have made in deviating.
Many of the results mentioned above concern the approximability of the entire set of individ-
1The survey by Benoît and Krishna (1996) includes many of these results.
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ually rational feasible payoffs. The main theorem in this Chapter is more general in that, for any
game, it characterizes the set of feasible payoffs that are approximable.
Although subgame perfect equilibrium is a desirable refinement of Nash equilibrium, results
for the latter are still needed for games in which the perfect folk theorem does not apply. Game G
in Figure 2.1 shows that, indeed, this is the case for a generic class of games. The assumptions for
the perfect folk theorem do not hold for game G. Moreover, Theorem 2 in Smith (1995) implies
that (3, 3) is the unique payoff achievable via subgame perfect equilibrium in any repeated game
such that G is its stage game. However, every feasible and individually rational payoff, (e.g.,
(4,4)) can be approximated in Nash equilibrium in many of those repeated games (for small
enough discount and big enough number of repetitions).
L R
T 3,3 6,2
B 2,6 0,0
Figure 2.1: A game for which the Nash folk theorem is needed.
We have structured this Chapter as follows. We introduce notation and concepts in Section 2.2.
In Section 2.3 we state and prove the main result. Next, in Section 2.4 we are concerned about
unobservable mixed strategies. Finally, we conclude in Section 2.5.
2.2 Basic Notation, Definitions and an Example
2.2.1 The Stage Game
A strategic game G is a triplet (N,A,ϕ), where:
N := {1, . . . , n} is the set of players,
A :=
∏
i∈N Ai and Ai is the set of player i’s strategies,
ϕ := (ϕ1, . . . , ϕn) and ϕi : A→ R is the payoff function of player i.
Let GN be the set of games with set of players N .
We assume that, for each i ∈ N , the sets Ai are compact and the functions ϕi are continuous.
Let a−i be a strategy profile for players in N\{i} and A−i the set of such profiles. For each
i ∈ N and each a−i ∈ A−i, let µi(a−i) := maxai∈Ai{ϕi(a−i, ai)}. Also, for each i ∈ N , let
vi := mina−i∈A−i{µi(a−i)}. The vector v := {v1, . . . , vn} is the minimax payoff vector. Let F be
the set of feasible payoffs: F := co{ϕ(a) : a ∈ A}. Let F¯ be the set of all feasible and individually
rational payoffs:
F¯ := F ∩ {u ∈ Rn : u ≥ v}.
To avoid confusion with the strategies of the repeated game, in what follows we refer to the
strategies ai ∈ Ai and the strategy profiles a ∈ A of the stage game as actions and action profiles,
respectively.
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2.2.2 The Repeated Game
Let G(δ, T ) be the game consisting in the T-fold repetition of G with payoff discount parameter
δ ∈ (0, 1]. In this game we assume perfect monitoring, i.e., each player can choose his action in
the current stage in the light of all actions taken by all players in all previous stages. Let σ be
a strategy profile of G(δ, T ), and the action profile sequence ρ = {ρ1, . . . , ρT } its corresponding
path. Let ϕti(ρ) be the stage payoff of player i at stage t when all players play in accordance
with ρ. Then, player i’s payoff in G(δ, T ) when σ is played is his average discounted stage payoff:
ψi(σ) ≡ ψi(ρ) := ((1− δ)/(1− δT ))
∑T
t=1 δ
t−1ϕti(ρ).
2
2.2.3 Minimax-Bettering Ladders
Let M be an m-player subset of N . Let AM :=
∏
i∈M Ai and let G(aM ) be the game induced
for the n − m players in N\M when the actions of the players in M are fixed at aM ∈ AM .
By abuse of language, if i ∈ N\M , aM ∈ AM , and σ ∈ AN\M we write ϕi(σ) for i’s payoff
at σ in G(aM ). A minimax-bettering ladder of a game G is a triplet {N ,A,Σ}, where N is
a strictly increasing chain {∅ = N0 ( N1 ( · · · ( Nh} of h + 1 subsets of N (h ≥ 1), A is
a chain of action profiles {aN1 ∈ AN1 , . . . , aNh−1 ∈ ANh−1} and Σ is a chain {σ1, . . . , σh} of
Nash equilibria of G = G(aN0), G(aN1), . . . , G(aNh−1), respectively, such that at σ
l the players of
G(aNl−1) receiving payoffs strictly greater than their minimax payoff are exactly those inNl\Nl−1:
for each i ∈ Nl\Nl−1, ϕi(σl) > vi, and for each i ∈ N\Nl, ϕi(σl) ≤ vi.
Let the sets in N be the rungs of the ladder. In algorithmic terms, if the first l − 1 rungs of
the ladder have been constructed, then, for the l-th rung to exist, there must be aNl−1 ∈ ANl−1
such that the game G(aNl−1) has an equilibrium σ
l. Moreover, σl has to be such that there are
players i ∈ N\Nl−1 for whom ϕi(σl) > vi. Let Nl\Nl−1 be this subset of players of G(aNl−1).
The game played in the next step is defined by some action profile aNl . The set Nh is the top
rung of the ladder. A ladder with top rung Nh is maximal if there is no ladder with top rung Nh′
such that Nh ( Nh′ . A game G is decomposable as a complete minimax-bettering ladder if it has
a minimax-bettering ladder with N as its top rung. We show below that being decomposable as a
complete minimax-bettering ladder is a necessary and sufficient condition for it to be possible to
approximate all payoff vectors in F¯ by Nash equilibria of G(δ, T ) for some δ and T . Clearly, being
decomposable as a complete minimax-bettering ladder is a weaker property than the requirement
in Smith (1995), that at each step l − 1 of a similar kind of ladder there be action profiles
aNl−1 , bNl−1 such that the games G(aNl−1) and G(bNl−1) have Nash equilibria σ
l
a and σ
l
b with
ϕi(σ
l
a) 6= ϕi(σlb) for a nonempty set of players (those in Nl\Nl−1).
2.2.4 An Example
Let G ∈ GN , let L be a maximal ladder of G, and Nmax its top rung. For each i ∈ N , let li
be the unique integer such that i ∈ Nli\Nli−1. In the equilibrium strategy profile constructed
2Or, ψi(σ) ≡ ψi(ρ) := (1/T )
PT
t=1 ϕ
t
i(ρ) if there are no discounts (δ = 1).
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in Theorem 2.1 below, the action profile sequence in the terminal phase Qi referred to in the
Introduction, consists of repetitions of (aNli−1 , σ
li), (aNli−2 , σ
li−1), . . . , (aN2 , σ
2) and σ; and the
σj are Nash equilibria of the corresponding games G(aNj−1). Since player i is a player in all these
games, he can indeed gain nothing by unilateral deviation during this phase. In the potentially
punishing series of rounds Q0i , the action profile sequence consists of repetitions of (aNli−1 , σ
li),
in which i obtains more than his minimax payoff, with the accompanying threat of punishing a
prior unilateral deviation by i by minimaxing him instead.
l m r l m r
T 0, 0, 3 0,-1, 0 0,-1, 0 T 0, 3,-1 0,-1,-1 1,-1,-1
M -1, 0, 0 0,-1, 0 0,-1, 0 M -1, 0,-1 -1,-1,-1 0,-1,-1
B -1, 0, 0 0,-1, 0 0,-1, 0 B -1, 0,-1 -1,-1,-1 0,-1,-1
L R
Figure 2.2: A game that is decomposable as a complete minimax-bettering ladder
As an illustration of the above ideas, consider the three-player game G shown in Figure 2.2.
Its minimax payoff vector is (0, 0, 0), and its unique Nash equilibrium is the action profile σ1 =
(T, l, L), with associated payoff vector (0, 0, 3). Hence, N1 = {3}; player 3 can be punished by 1
and 2 by playing one of his minimax profiles instead of playing (T, l, ·). If player 3 now plays R
(aN1 = R), the resulting game G(aN1) = G(R) has an equilibrium σ
2 = (T, l) with payoff vector
(0, 3). Hence, N2 = {2, 3} and player 2 can be punished by 1 and 3 by playing one of his minimax
profiles instead of playing (T, ·, R). Finally if players 2 and 3 now play r and R (aN2 = (r,R)),
the resulting game G(aN2) = G(r,R) has the trivial equilibrium σ
3 = (T ) with payoff 1 for player
1. Hence, player 1 can be punished by 2 and 3 if they play one of his minimax profiles instead of
playing (·, r, R).
2.2.5 Further Preliminaries
As a consequence of the next Lemma we can unambiguously refer to the top rung of a game G.
Lemma 2.1. Let G ∈ GN . Then, all its maximal ladders have the same top rung.
Proof. Suppose there are maximal ladders L = {N ,A,Σ}, L′ = {N ′,A′,Σ′} with N = {N0 (
N1 ( · · · ( Nh} and N ′ = {N ′0 ( N ′1 ( · · · ( N ′k} such that Nh 6= N ′k. Assume, without
loss of generality, that N ′k\Nh 6= ∅. For each j ∈ N ′k, let lj be the unique integer such that
j ∈ N ′lj\N ′lj−1. Let i ∈ argminj∈N ′k\Nh lj . Then, N ′li−1 ⊆ Nh. Let aNh be the action profile
defined as follows:
for each j ∈ N, (aNh)j =
{
(a′N ′
li−1
)j j ∈ N ′li−1
(σ′li)j j ∈ Nh\N ′li−1,
where σ′li ∈ Σ′ is an equilibrium of the game G(a′N ′
li−1
) induced by the action profile a′N ′
li−1
∈ A′.
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Now, let σh+1 be the restriction of σ′li to N\Nh. Since σ′li is an equilibrium of G(a′N ′
li−1
),
and N\Nh ⊆ N\N ′li−1, σh+1 is an equilibrium of G(aNh). Moreover, the set of players j ∈ N\Nh
for whom ϕj(σ
h+1) > vj is N
′
li
\Nh. Let Nh+1 := N ′li\Nh. Since Nh+1 contains i, it is nonempty.
Let L′′ = {N ′′,A′′,Σ′′} be the ladder defined by
N ′′ = {N0 ( N1 ( · · · ( Nh ( Nh+1},
A′′ = {aN1 , . . . , aNh−1 , aNh},
Σ′′ = {σ1, . . . , σh, σh+1}.
The top rung of L′′ strictly contains that of L. Hence, L is not maximal, which proves the
Lemma.
Let G be a game with set of players N and let N ′ ⊆ N . We say that G ∈ TRN ′(GN ) if the
top rung of any maximal ladder of G is N ′. Hence, a game G is decomposable as a complete
minimax-bettering ladder if and only if G ∈ TRN (GN ).
Let G ∈ TRNmax(GN ) and aˆ ∈ ANmax . Let Λ(aˆ) := {λ = (aˆ, σ) ∈ A : σ Nash equilibrium
of G(aˆ)} and Λ := ⋃aˆ∈ANmax Λ(aˆ). Let ϕ(Λ) := {ϕ(λ) : λ ∈ Λ}. Let F¯Nmax be the set of
Nmax-attainable payoffs of G: F¯Nmax := F¯ ∩ coϕ(Λ). Note that, by the definition of Nmax, for
each u ∈ F¯Nmax and each i ∈ N\Nmax, ui = vi. Moreover, when Nmax = N we have Λ = A and
F¯Nmax = F¯ .
Lemma 2.2. Let G ∈ TRNmax(GN ). Then, the set F¯Nmax is closed.
Proof. First, we show that Λ is closed. Let {(an, σn)} be a sequence of action profiles in Λ with
limit (a, σ). Since ANmax is compact, a ∈ ANmax . Since ϕ is continuous, σ is a Nash equilibrium
of G(a). Hence, (a, σ) ∈ Λ.
The set ϕ(Λ) is the image of a closed set under a continuous function. Since ϕ has a compact
domain, ϕ(Λ) is closed. Hence, F¯ ∩ coϕ(Λ) is closed.
The promised result concerning the approximability of all payoffs in F¯ by Nash equilibrium
payoffs is obtained below as an immediate corollary of a more general theorem concerning the
approximability of all payoffs in F¯Nmax . In this more general case, the collaboration of the players
in Nmax is secured by a strategy analogous to that sketched in the Example of Section 2.2.4, while
the collaboration of the players in N\Nmax is also ensured because none of them is able to obtain
any advantage by unilateral deviation from any action profile in Λ.
2.3 The Theorem
In the theorem that follows, the set of action profiles A may consist either of pure or mixed action
profiles; in the latter case, we assume that all players are cognizant not only of the pure actions
actually put into effect at each stage, but also of the mixed actions of which they are realizations.
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We discuss unobservable mixed actions in Section 2.4. Also, we assume public randomization:
at each stage of the repeated game, players can let their actions depend on the realization of an
exogenous continuous random variable. The assumption of public randomization is without loss
of generality. Given a correlated mixed action, its payoff can be approximated by alternating pure
actions with the appropriate frequencies. More precisely, for each u ∈ F¯ and each ε > 0, there
are pure actions a1, . . . , al such that ||u− (a1+ . . .+al)/l|| < ε. Hence, if the discount parameter
δ is close enough to 1, the same inequality is still true if we consider discounted payoffs. Then,
since we state Theorem 2.1 in terms of approximated payoffs, public randomization assumption
can be dispensed with.3
Theorem 2.1. Let G ∈ TRNmax(GN ). Let u ∈ F . Then, a necessary and sufficient condition
for there to be for each ε > 0, an integer T0 and a positive real number δ0 < 1 such that for each
T ≥ T0 and each δ ∈ [δ0, 1], G(δ, T ) has a Nash equilibrium payoff w such that ‖w − u‖ < ε is
that u be Nmax-attainable ( i.e., u ∈ F¯Nmax).
Proof.
suffic⇐= Let a ∈ Λ be an action profile of G such that ϕ(a) = u, and let L = {N ,A,Σ} be
a maximal minimax-bettering ladder of G. By the definition of Λ, players in N\Nmax have no
incentive for unilateral deviation from a. Let ρ be the following action profile sequence:
ρ := {a, . . . , a︸ ︷︷ ︸
T−T0+q0
, λh, . . . , λh︸ ︷︷ ︸
qh
, λh−1, . . . , λh−1︸ ︷︷ ︸
qh−1
, . . . , λ1, . . . , λ1︸ ︷︷ ︸
q1
},
where for each l ∈ {1, . . . h}, λl = (aNl−1 , σl) with aNl−1 ∈ A and σl ∈ Σ. Let ε > 0. Next, we
obtain (in this order) values for qh, . . . , q1, the discount δ0, q0, and T0 to ensure that for each
T ≥ T0 and each δ ∈ (δ0, 1], there is a Nash equilibrium of G(δ, T ) whose path is ρ and such that
||ϕ(ρ)− u|| < ε.
First, we calculate how many repetitions of G(aNli−1) are necessary for the players in N\{i}
to be able to punish a player i ∈ Nmax for prior deviation. For each action profile aˆ ∈ A, let
µ¯i(aˆ) := µi(aˆ−i)− ϕi(aˆ), i.e., the maximum “illicit” profit that player i can obtain by unilateral
deviation from aˆ. Let µ¯i = max{µ¯i(a), µ¯i((aNh−1 , σh)), . . . , µ¯i(σ1)} and mi = min{ϕi(a) : a ∈
A}. Let li ∈ N be such that i ∈ Nli\Nli−1. Let δ0 ∈ (0, 1) and let qh, . . . , q1 be the natural
numbers defined through the following iterative procedure:
Step 0:
For each i ∈ Nh\Nh−1, let ri ∈ N and δi ∈ (0, 1) be
ri := min{r ∈ N : r(ϕi(σli)− vi) > µ¯i},4
δi := min{δi ∈ (0, 1) : µ¯i −
∑ri
t=1 δ
t
i(ϕi(σ
li)− vi) < 0}.
Let qh ∈ N be
3For further discussion on public randomization refer to Fudenberg and Maskin (1991) and Olszewski (1997).
Also, refer to Gossner (1995) for a paper in which public randomization is not assumed and the approximation
procedure we described above is explicitly made (though discounts are not considered).
4The natural number ri is such that, at each step, punishing player i during ri stages suffices to wipe out any
stage gain he could get by deviating from ρ when the discount is δ = 1.
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qh := max{ri : i ∈ Nh\Nh−1}.
Step k (k < h):
Let Tk :=
∑k−1
l=0 qh−l.
For each i ∈ Nh−k\Nh−k−1, let ri ∈ N and δi ∈ (0, 1) be
ri := min{r ∈ N : r(ϕi(σli)− vi) > µ¯i + Tk(vi −mi)},
δi := min{δi ∈ (0, 1) : µ¯i +
∑Tk
t=1 δ
t
i(vi −mi)−
∑Tk+ri
t=Tk+1
δti(ϕi(σ
li)− vi) < 0}.
Let qh−k ∈ N be
qh−k := max{ri : i ∈ Nh−k\Nh−k−1}.
Step h:
δ0 := maxi∈N δi.
The natural numbers qh, . . . , q1 and the discount δ0 are such that for each l ∈ {1, . . . , h}, ql
repetitions of G(aNl−1) suffice to allow any player in Nl\Nl−1 to be punished. Next, we obtain
the values for q0 and T0. Let q0 be the smallest integer such that:∥∥∥∥q0 ϕ(a) + qh ϕ(λh) + · · ·+ q1 ϕ(λ1)q0 + qh + · · ·+ q1 − ϕ(a)
∥∥∥∥ < ε. (2.1)
Let T0 := q0 + q1 + · · · + qh. Let T ≥ T0 and δ ∈ [δ0, 1]. We prescribe for G(δ, T ) the strategy
profile in which all players play according to ρ unless and until there is a unilateral deviation.
In such a deviation occurs, the deviating player is minimaxed by all the others in the remaining
stages of the game. It is straightforward to check that this profile is a Nash equilibrium of G(δ, T ).
Moreover, by inequality (2.1), its associated payoff vector w differs from u by less than T0T ε if
δ = 1. Hence, the same observation is certainly true if δ < 1, in which case payoff vectors of the
early stages, ϕ(a), receive greater weight than the payoff vectors of the endgame.
necess
=⇒ Let u /∈ F¯Nmax . Suppose that Nmax = N . Then, F¯Nmax = F¯ . Hence, u is not
individually rational. Hence, it can not be the payoff associated to any Nash equilibrium. Then,
we can assume Nmax ( N . Since F¯Nmax is a closed set, there is ε > 0 such that ‖w − u‖ < ε
implies w /∈ F¯Nmax . Hence, if for some T and δ there is a strategy profile σ of G(δ, T ) such that
‖ϕ(σ)− u‖ < ε, then ϕ(σ) /∈ F¯Nmax . Hence, by the definition of F¯Nmax , there is at least one stage
of G(δ, T ) in which, with positive probability, σ prescribes an action profile not belonging to Λ .
Let q be the last such stage and a¯ = (a¯Nmax , a¯N\Nmax) the corresponding action profile. By the
definition of F¯Nmax , a¯N\Nmax cannot be a Nash equilibrium of G(a¯Nmax). Hence, there is a player
j ∈ N\Nmax who can increase his payoff in round q by deviating unilaterally from a¯. Since, by
the definition of q, σ assigns j a stage payoff of vj in all subsequent rounds, this deviation cannot
subsequently be punished. Hence, σ is not an equilibrium of G(δ, T ).
Corollary 2.1. Let G ∈ GN be decomposable as a complete minimax-bettering ladder, ( i.e.,
G ∈ TRN (GN )). Then, for each u ∈ F¯ and each ε > 0, there is T0 ∈ N and δ0 < 1 such
that for each T ≥ T0 and each δ ∈ [δ0, 1], there is a Nash equilibrium payoff w of G(δ, T ) with
‖w − u‖ < ε.
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Proof. N = Nmax ⇒ F¯ = F¯Nmax . Hence, this result is a consequence of Theorem 2.1.
Corollary 2.2. Let G ∈ GN be not decomposable as a complete minimax-bettering ladder ( i.e.,
G /∈ TRN (GN )). Then, for each T ∈ N, each δ ∈ (0, 1], each i ∈ N\Nmax, and each Nash
equilibrium σ of G(δ, T ) we have ϕi(σ) = vi.
Proof. For each u ∈ F¯Nmax and for each i ∈ N\Nmax, ui = vi. Hence, this result follows by an
argument paralleling the proof of necessity in Theorem 2.1.
2.4 Unobservable Mixed Actions
In what follows, we drop the assumption that mixed actions are observable. Hence, if a mixed
action is chosen by one player, the others can only observe its realization. To avoid confusion,
for each game G, let Gu be the corresponding game with unobservable mixed actions. We need
to introduce one additional piece of notation to distinguish between pure and mixed actions. Let
Ai and Si be the sets of player i’s pure and mixed actions respectively (with generic elements ai
and si). Similarly, let A and S be the sets of pure and mixed action profiles. Hence, a game is
now a triplet (N,S, ϕ).
The game G (or Gu) in Figure 2.3 illustrates some of the differences between the two frame-
works. Although it is not entirely straightforward, it is not difficult to check that the minimax
payoff of G is v = (0, 0, 0). Let s3 = (0, 0.5, 0.5) be the mixed action of player 3 in which he plays
L with probability 0, and M and R with probability 0.5. Let σ2 ∈ A{1,2}. Let N = {∅, {3}, N},
S = {s3} and Σ = {(T, l, L), σ2}. Then, L = {N ,S,Σ} is a complete minimax-bettering ladder
of G regardless of σ2 (note that in the game G(s3), for each σ
2 ∈ A{1,2}, both players 1 and 2
receive the constant payoff 0.5). Hence, G satisfies the assumptions of Corollary 2.1, so every
payoff in F¯ can be approximated in Nash equilibrium.
l r l r l r
T 0, 0, 2 0, 0, 0 T 0, 0,-1 2,-1,-1 T 1, 1,-8 -1, 2,-8
B 0, 0, 0 0, 0, 0 B -1, 2,-1 1, 1,-1 B 2,-1,-8 0, 0,-8
L M R
Figure 2.3: A game where unobservable mixed actions make a difference
Consider now the game Gu. Let u ∈ F¯ , and let a be such that ϕ(a) = u (recall that we
assumed public randomization). If we follow the path ρ constructed in the proof of Theorem 2.1,
there are natural numbers q0, q1, and q2 such that ρ leads to play (i) a during the first q0 stages,
(ii) (σ2, s3) during the following q2 stages, and (iii) (T,l,L) during the last q1 stages. Let Q be the
phase described in (ii). Since player 3 is not indifferent between the two actions in the support
of s3, we need a device to detect possible deviations from that support. But, once such a device
has been chosen, it is not clear whether we can ensure that there are not realizations for the first
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q2 − 1 stages of Q that would allow player three to play L in the last stage of Q without being
detected.5
Next, we revisit the results of Section 2.3 to understand the extent to which their counterparts
hold. Unfortunately, we have not found a necessary and sufficient condition for the folk theorem
under unobservable mixed actions, i.e., we have not found an exact counterpart for Theorem 2.1.
More precisely, as the previous example shows, unobservable mixed actions invalidate the proofs
related to sufficiency conditions. On the other hand, proofs related to necessary conditions still
carry over.
For the next result, we need to introduce a restriction on the ladders. The objective is to
rule out situations as the one illustrated with Figure 2.3. Let L = {N ,S,Σ} be a ladder with
S = {sN1 , . . . , sNh−1}. L is a p-ladder if, for each l ∈ {1, . . . , h− 1}, sNl ∈ ANl . That is, at each
rung of the ladder we only look at subgames obtained by fixing pure action profiles.6
Lemma 2.3. Let G ∈ GN . Then, all its maximal p-ladders have the same top rung.
Proof. Analogous to the proof of Lemma 2.1.
Let G (or Gu) be a game with set of players N and let N ′ ⊆ N . We say that G ∈ TRPN ′(GN ) if
the top rung of any maximal p-ladder of G is N ′. Clearly, if G ∈ TRPN ′(GN ), then G ∈ TRN ′′(GN )
with N ′ ⊆ N ′′. The game G in Figure 2.3 provides an example in which the converse fails:
G ∈ TRP{3}(GN ) and G ∈ TR{N}(GN ). Let G ∈ TRPNmax(GN ) and a pure strategy aˆ ∈ ANmax . We
can define F¯PNmax paralleling the definition of F¯Nmax in Section 2.2.
Next, we state the results. Note that the sets TR and F¯Nmax are used for the necessity results
and the sets TRP and F¯PNmax for the sufficiency ones.
Proposition 2.1 (Sufficient condition). Let Gu ∈ TRPNmax(GN ). Then, for each u ∈ F¯PNmax and
each ε > 0, there are T0 ∈ N and δ0 < 1 such that for each T ≥ T0 and each δ ∈ [δ0, 1], there is a
Nash equilibrium payoff w of G(δ, T ), with ‖w − u‖ < ε.
Proof. Analogous to the proof of the sufficiency condition in Theorem 2.1. This is because, as far
as a p-ladder is used to define the path ρ, whenever a player plays a mixed action, all the pure
actions in its support are best replies to the actions of the others.
Corollary 2.3. Let Gu ∈ TRPN (GN ). Then, for each u ∈ F¯ and each ε > 0, there are T0 ∈ N
and δ0 < 1 such that for each T ≥ T0 and each δ ∈ [δ0, 1], there is a Nash equilibrium payoff w
of G(δ, T ), with ‖w − u‖ < ε.
Proof. N = Nmax ⇒ F¯ = F¯Nmax = F¯PNmax . Hence, this result is an immediate consequence of
Proposition 2.1.
5Game Gu partially illustrates why the arguments in Gossner (1995) cannot be easily adapted to our case.
First, mutatis mutandi, he applies an existence of equilibrium theorem to the subgame in Q. If we want to do
so, we need to ensure that players 1 and 2 get more than 0 in Q. Second, Gossner also uses the assumption of
full-dimensionality of F to punish all the players who deviate during Q. We do not have that assumption and
hence, it could be the case that we could not punish more than one player at the end of the game.
6Note that the games G and Gu have the same ladders and the same p-ladders.
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Note that the folk theorem in Benoît and Krishna (1987) is a particular case of this corollary.
Next two results show that the exact counterparts of the necessity results in Section 2.3 carry
over.
Proposition 2.2 (Necessary condition). Let Gu ∈ TRNmax(GN ). If Nmax ( N then, for each
u /∈ F¯Nmax there is ε > 0 such that for each T ∈ N and each δ ∈ (0, 1], G(δ, T ) does not have a
Nash equilibrium payoff w such that ‖w − u‖ < ε.
Proof. Analogous to the proof of the necessity condition in Theorem 2.1.
Corollary 2.4. Let Gu /∈ TRN (GN ). Then, for each T ∈ N, each δ ∈ (0, 1], each i ∈ N\Nmax,
and each Nash equilibrium σ of G(δ, T ) we have ϕi(σ) = vi.
Proof. Analogous to the proof of Corollary 2.2.
2.5 Concluding Remarks
Recall that Corollaries 2.1 and 2.3 hold for a wider class of games than the result obtained by
Benoît and Krishna (1987). Moreover, Theorem 2.1 requires no use of the concept of effective
minimax payoff, because non-equivalent utilities are irrelevant to the approximation of Nmax-
attainable payoffs by Nash equilibria, in which there is no need for threats to be credible.7
Theorem 2.1 raises the question whether a similarly general result on the approximability of
payoffs by equilibria also holds for subgame perfect equilibria. The main problem is to determine
the subgame perfect equilibrium payoffs of players with “recursively distinct Nash payoffs” (Smith,
1995) when the game is not completely decomposable. Similarly, the results in Section 2.4 raise
the question whether a necessary and sufficient condition exists for the Nash folk theorem under
unobservable mixed strategies.
Finally, note that the results of this Chapter can be easily extended to the case in which each
player has a different discount rate.
7See Wen (1994) and Abreu et al. (1994) for details on the effective minimax payoff and non-equivalent utilities
respectively.
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3.1 Introduction
The impact of different kinds of commitments in noncooperative models has been widely studied
in game theoretical literature. Most of the contributions wihtin this issue have been devoted to
study delegation models; situations in which the players are represented by agents who play on
their behalf. The concept of delegation, as well as other approaches to the idea of commitment,
was already discussed in Schelling (1960). There has been an extensive research in the topic of
delegation; see, for instance, Vickers (1985), Fershtman (1985), Sklivas (1987), and, more recently,
Fershtman et al. (1991) and Caillaud et al. (1995). The model we present here is specially close
to that in Fershtman et al. (1991). What they do is the following. For each 2-player strategic
game, they associate a delegation game in which the agents play the original game on behalf of
their principals. There is a first stage in which each principal, simultaneously and independently,
provides his agent with a compensation scheme. In the second stage, the compensation schemes
become common knowledge and the agents play the original game and have the payoffs given by
the compensation schemes. Their main result is a folk theorem which, roughly speaking, states
that if the original game has a Nash equilibrium, then every Pareto optimal allocation can be
achieved as a subgame perfect equilibrium of the delegation game.
In this Chapter we study another model with commitments, not far from that of delegation,
but with several differences. We begin with a motivation and then we informally introduce the
model. There are many strategic situations in real life in which one of the players gets rid of
some of his strategies: a department that makes the commitment of not hiring its own graduate
students; a firm announcing a limited edition of a certain product; a party announcing, during
the election campaign, that they are not going to make certain alliances regardless of the final
result of the election;. . .We model these situations by what we call unilateral commitments (UC).
This is not the first time that unilateral commitments are studied in literature (see, for instance,
Faína-Medín et al. (1998) and García-Jurado et al. (2000)). To each n-player strategic game we
associate its UC-extension as follows. There is a first stage in which each player, simultaneously
and independently, chooses a subset of his set of strategies, i.e., he makes a commitment. In
the second stage, the commitments become common knowledge and the players play the original
game with the restrictions given by the respective commitments.
After the latter (informal) presentation of our model, we can stress some similarities and
differences with the model in Fershtman et al. (1991). We do not have principals and agents,
i.e., we have the same players in the two stages of our game. Nonetheless, our model is very
close to that of delegation; consider the UC-extension of a game in which the strategies of player
1 belong to A1 and he commits to play only strategies in A
c
1. Suppose, for simplicity, that all
the payoffs of the original game are positive. This situation can be seen as a delegation game
in which the principal chooses the following compensation scheme for his agent: (i) if the agent
plays a strategy within Ac1, then he receives some fixed proportion of his principal’s payoff and
(ii) if he plays some strategy not in Ac1 then he receives some fixed negative amount of money.
Hence, because of (i), the agent has the same incentives of the principal in the second stage of
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the game, so we can think of him as the principal himself. It is worth to mention that, as far as
the model in Fershtman et al. (1991) is concerned, the compensation schemes are restricted to
functions that are weakly monotonic on the payoff received by the principal. On the contrary,
the compensation scheme we have defined to “imitate” our commitment can be non-monotonic
and, moreover, it can depend not only on the payoffs but also on the specific strategies leading to
them. Anyhow, the monotonicity assumption in Fershtman et al. (1991) responded to technical
reasons and it seems natural that the principal can sign “non-monotonic contracts” with his agent
if both of them agree upon. One more similarity between the two models is the following: in the
delegation game, the contracts are public and have to be regarded and, in our model, we take the
same assumptions for the commitments.
From the discussion above, we can conclude that our model with unilateral commitments
can be seen as a particular family of delegation games; a family in which only some specific
compensation schemes are possible. Hence, in an economic situation in which there is room for
the contracts needed for the delegation games, there is also room for the kind of commitments
we define in this Chapter. Moreover, recall that in this Chapter we model n-player games and
not only 2-player situations as it is common in the delegation games literature.
We devote this Chapter to study the implications of unilateral commitments within the frame-
work of repeated games with complete information. We show that, when unilateral commitments
are possible, it is easier to find both Nash and subgame perfect equilibria supporting the “cooper-
ative” payoffs of the original game; indeed, most of the folk theorems do not need any assumption
at all when unilateral commitments are considered.
The structure of this Chapter is as follows. In Section 3.2 we introduce the background
concepts, the definition of a new equilibrium concept for extensive games, and the definition
of the model with unilateral commitments. In Section 3.3 we present some folk theorems for
repeated games when unilateral commitments are possible. In addition, we compare our results
with those without unilateral commitments. Finally, we conclude in Section 3.4.
3.2 Notation
A strategic game G is a triplet (N,A,ϕ), where:
N := {1, . . . , n} is the set of players,
A :=
∏
i∈N Ai and Ai is the set of player i’s strategies,
ϕ := (ϕ1, . . . , ϕn) and ϕi : A→ R is the payoff function of player i.
We assume that, for each i ∈ N , the sets Ai are compact and the functions ϕi are continuous.
Let a−i be a strategy profile for the players in N\{i} and A−i the set of such profiles. For
each i ∈ N and each a−i ∈ A−i, let µi(a−i) := maxai∈Ai{ϕi(a−i, ai)}. Also, for each i ∈ N ,
let vi := mina−i∈A−i{µi(a−i)}. The vector v := {v1, . . . , vn} is the minimax payoff vector. Let
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F be the set of feasible payoffs, F := co{ϕ(a) : a ∈ A}. Now, for each i ∈ N , let p−i ∈
argmina−i∈A−i{µi(a−i)}.
To avoid confusion with the strategies of the repeated game, in what follows we refer to the
strategies ai ∈ Ai and the strategy profiles a ∈ A of the stage game as actions and action profiles,
respectively.
Next, given a game G = (N,A,ϕ), we define the repeated game G(δ, T ); the T -fold repetition
of G with discount parameter δ ∈ (0, 1]. A history at stage t ∈ {1, . . . , T} is defined as follows:
(i) for t = 1, an element of A0 = {∗}, where ∗ is any element not belonging to ⋃k∈NAk.
(ii) for t ∈ {2, . . . , T}, an element of At−1.
The set of all histories is H :=
⋃T
t=1A
t−1. In the repeated game we assume perfect monitoring,
i.e., each player can choose his action in the current stage in the light of all actions taken by all
players in all previous stages. Hence, let G(δ, T ) be the triplet (N,S, ϕδ), where:
The set of players N remains the same.
S :=
∏
i∈N Si is the set of strategy profiles, where Si := A
H
i , i.e., the set of mappings
from H to Ai. Let σ = (σ1, . . . , σn) ∈ S and h ∈ H; then, we denote the action profile
(σ1(h), . . . , σn(h)) by σ(h). A strategy profile σ ∈ S recursively determines the sequence of
action profiles π(σ) ∈ AT as follows: π1(σ) := σ(∗) and, for each t ∈ {2, . . . , T}, πt(σ) =
σ(π1(σ), . . . , πt−1(σ)). We refer to π(σ) as the path determined by σ.
The payoff function ϕδ is defined as follows. Let σ ∈ S. Then, player i’s payoff in G(δ, T )
is his average discounted stage payoff:
ϕδi (σ) :=
1− δ
1− δT
T∑
t=1
δt−1ϕi(πt(σ)).1
Finally, recall that, from our definitions, we only use pure actions. If mixed actions are to be
taken into account for a given game, then we just define a new game having them as pure actions.
Hence, we are implicitly assuming that, when working with mixed actions, they are observable,
i.e., the players do not only observe the realization of a mixed action, but also the randomization
process that leads to such a realization.
3.2.1 Virtually Subgame Perfect Equilibria
A repeated game with perfect monitoring can be represented as an extensive game and, more
specifically, as a multi-stage game with observed actions.2 Subgame perfect equilibrium (Selten,
1965), shortly SPE, is probably the most important equilibrium concept within this class of games.
1If there are no discounts (i.e., if δ = 1), we have ϕδi (σ) := (1/T )
PT
t=1 ϕi(π
t(σ)).
2We model extensive games following the framework used in Kreps and Wilson (1982), except for the fact that
we consider that the sets of nodes may be infinite.
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Its main target is to disregard those Nash equilibria which are only possible if some players give
credit to irrational plans of others. More formally, a SPE is a Nash equilibrium which, moreover,
induces a Nash equilibrium in every subgame.
In this Section we introduce a new equilibrium concept for extensive games which is essen-
tial for this Chapter: the virtually subgame perfect equilibrium, shortly VSPE. This equilibrium
concept has the same effect as subgame perfection, but it only concentrates on those subgames
which are relevant for a given strategy profile; relevant in the sense that they are reachable if
exactly one player deviates from the strategy profile in any subgame which has already been
classified as relevant. Despite of being based on the same idea, SPE and VSPE are different
concepts, the latter existing in many games which do not have SPE. Hence, VSPE is especially
useful when dealing with extensive games having large trees. There are many extensive games
without SPE, but still, they can have sensible equilibria. This is the case when the non-existence
of SPE is because some subgames which are irrelevant for a certain strategy profile do not have
Nash equilibria.
Let Γ be an extensive game and let x and σ be a single-node information set and a strategy
profile, respectively. Then, Γx denotes the subgame of Γ that begins at node x and σx the
restriction of σ to Γx. Now, let Γ be an extensive game, σ a strategy profile of Γ, and x a single-
node information set. Then, the subgame Γx is σ-relevant if either (i) Γx = Γ, or (ii) there are a
player i, a strategy σ′i, and a single-node information set y such that Γy is σ-relevant and node x
is reached by (σ−i, σ′i)y.
Definition 3.1. Let Γ be an extensive game. The strategy profile σ is a virtually subgame perfect
equilibrium of Γ if for each σ-relevant subgame Γx, then σx is a Nash equilibrium of Γx.
Let SPE(Γ) and VSPE(Γ) denote the sets of SPE and VSPE of game Γ, respectively. By
definition, for each extensive game Γ, we have SPE(Γ) ⊆ VSPE(Γ). However, the reciprocal is
not true as the following example illustrates.
Example 3.1. Consider the extensive game depicted in Figure 3.1.
Let σ =
(
(D1, a
i
1), (D2, a
i
2)
)
, with i ∈ {1, 2}. Clearly, since the subgame that begins after
playing (U1, U2) is σ-irrelevant, σ is a VSPE. However, this game does not have any SPE (in
pure strategies). Moreover, the equilibrium σ is a sensible one.
Next, we point out one more relation between SPE and VSPE. Let Γ be an extensive game.
Let σ and σˆ be two strategy profiles of Γ. Now, let σ¯ be the strategy profile which consists of
playing in accordance with σ in the σ-relevant subgames and in accordance with σˆ elsewhere.
Then, the following statements hold:
(i) The payoffs associated with σ and σ¯ coincide (they define the same path).
(ii) If σ ∈ VSPE(Γ), then σ¯ ∈ VSPE(Γ).
(iii) If σ ∈ VSPE(Γ) and σˆ ∈ SPE(Γ), then σ¯ ∈ SPE(Γ).
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1
2
1
2
(1,1)
(1,0)
(0,1)
(1,-1)
(-1,1)
(-1,1)
(1,-1)
U1
D1
U2
D2
U2
D2
a11
a21
a12
a22
a12
a22
Figure 3.1: A game without SPE, but with VSPE.
Remark. In this Chapter we study a special family of multistage games with observed actions.
The main reason why we need the concept of VSPE is that we work with pure strategies. Hence,
although we mainly deal with finite extensive games with perfect recall, we cannot apply the
general results for the existence of subgame perfect equilibria.
3.2.2 Unilateral Commitments
The main objective of this Chapter is to study the effect of unilateral commitments on the
appearing of constructive behavior in repeated games. Given a game G, the corresponding game
with unilateral commitments consists of adding an initial stage to G; in this new stage each player
can commit not to play certain strategies of game G. Moreover, these commitments are made
simultaneously and unilaterally. The fact that the commitments have to be unilateral is quite
important; if players could condition their commitments on the commitments of the others, then
we would be in a completely cooperative model, and hence, the players could easily achieve in
equilibrium the cooperative payoffs of the game.
The problem of unilateral commitments, henceforth UC, has already been tackled in García-
Jurado et al. (2000). They obtained a Nash folk theorem for finitely repeated games with UC. In
this Chapter we deepen a little bit more in the impact of UC in the assumptions needed for the
folk theorems. Next, following García-Jurado et al. (2000), we formally define the UC-extension
of a game.
Given a game G = (N,A,ϕ), we define the UC-extension of G, U(G), as follows. There
is a preliminary stage in which players choose, simultaneously and independently, a nonempty
subset of their sets of strategies. Formally, each player i ∈ N chooses Aci ⊆ Ai, where Aci has
to be a compact set. This election is interpreted as a commitment to play strategies only in Aci .
Then, this preliminary stage ends and the commitments of the players, Ac, are made public, i.e.,
they become common knowledge. Finally, a reduced version of game G in which players have
to respect their commitments is played. Note that, as we have already pointed out, this kind of
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commitments are unilateral because we do not allow them to be conditional on the other players’
commitments. The compactness assumption for the sets Aci responds, as usually, to technical
reasons; it ensures that the subgames starting after the stage of commitments belong to the class
of games defined at the beginning of this Section. Note that, in the particular case in which the
sets of strategies of the game under consideration are finite, the compactness requirement imposes
no restriction at all. Throughout the rest of this Section, with a slight abuse of notation, given a
set A, we use 2A to denote the set of compact subsets of A. Now, U(G) := (N,AU , ϕU ), where:
The set of players N remains the same.
AU :=
∏
i∈N A
U
i , where A
U
i is the set of all couples (A
c
i , αi) such that
(i) ∅ ( Aci ⊆ Ai,
(ii) αi :
∏
j∈N 2
Aj −→ Ai and, for each Ac ∈
∏
j∈N 2
Aj , αi(A
c) ∈ Aci .
The payoff associated with a strategy profile (Ac, α) is ϕU (Ac, α) := ϕ(α(Ac)).
3.3 The Folk Theorems
The appearing of constructive behavior in repeated games has been widely treated in the game
theoretical literature.3 Given a game G, the classic Nash folk theorem for finitely repeated games
(Benoît and Krishna, 1987) states that if the game G is such that, for each player i, there are two
Nash equilibria that give i different payoffs, then every feasible and individually rational payoff
of G can be approximated by a Nash equilibrium of G(δ, T ) for big enough T and δ close enough
to 1. Recently, González-Díaz (2003) introduced a new condition, namely that the game G is
decomposable as a complete minimax-bettering ladder; this new condition, besides being weaker
than the former, turned out to be both necessary and sufficient for the finite horizon Nash folk
theorem.
Next, we state and prove a Nash folk theorem for finitely repeated games with unilateral
commitments. This result, Theorem 3.1, is a variation of the main result in García-Jurado et al.
(2000) to place it within our framework. More precisely, here we deal with utilities instead of with
preferences, we allow for discounts, and we consider the set F instead of the set {ϕ(a) : a ∈ A}.
We assume public randomization: at each stage of the repeated game, the players can let their
actions depend on the realization of an exogenous continuous random variable. The assumption
of public randomization is without loss of generality. Given a correlated action, its payoff can be
approximated by alternating actions with the appropriate frequencies. More precisely, for each
u ∈ F and each ε > 0, there are actions a1, . . . , al such that ||u− (a1 + . . .+ al)/l|| < ε. Hence,
if the discount parameter δ is close enough to 1, the same inequality is still true if we consider
discounted payoffs. Then, since we state Theorem 3.1 in terms of approximated payoffs, public
randomization assumption can be dispensed with.4
3Refer to Benoît and Krishna (1996) for a complete survey on the topic.
4For further discussion on public randomization refer to Fudenberg and Maskin (1991) and Olszewski (1997).
40 Chapter 3. Unilateral Commitments in Repeated Games
Theorem 3.1. Let G = (N,A,ϕ) and let v be its minimax payoff vector. Let u ∈ F , u > v.
Then, for each ε > 0, there are δ0 ∈ (0, 1) and T0 ∈ N such that for each δ ∈ [δ0, 1] and each
T ≥ T0, the game U(G(δ, T )) has a Nash equilibrium payoff w such that ‖w − u‖ < ε.
Proof. Let G = (N,A,ϕ). Let u ∈ F and let a¯ ∈ A be a (possibly correlated) action profile such
that ϕ(a¯) = u. Now, for each δ ∈ (0, 1] and each T ∈ N, let G(δ, T ) = (N,S, ϕδ). We define the
following strategy profile (S¯c, α¯) of U(G(δ, T )):
(i) For each i ∈ N , S¯ci := “If a¯ is played in the first stage, then I play a¯i forever”.
(ii) For each i ∈ N and each Sc ∈∏j∈N 2Sj , we define α¯i(Sc) as follows:
If Sc = S¯c:
– i plays a¯i in the first stage.
– If a¯ is played in the first stage, then i plays a¯i forever.
– If in the first stage only player j 6= i has deviated from a¯, then, i plays (p−j)i
forever.
– Otherwise, i plays ad libitum.
If Sc = (Scj , S¯
c
−j), where j 6= i and Scj 6= S¯cj : i plays (p−j)i forever.
Otherwise: i plays ad libitum.
Note that ϕc(S¯c, α¯) = ϕδ(α¯(S¯c)) = ϕ(a¯) = u. For each i ∈ N , let Ti be such that Tiui >
µi(a¯−i)+(T −1)vi and let δi ∈ (0, 1) be such that
∑Ti
t=1 δ
t−1ui > µi(a¯−i)+
∑Ti
t=2 δ
t−1vi. Finally,
let T0 := maxi∈N Ti and δ0 := maxi∈N δi.
Now, it is straightforward to check that for each δ ∈ [δ0, 1] and each T ≥ T0, the strategy
profile (S¯c, α¯) is a Nash equilibrium of U(G(δ, T )) whose payoff w is such that ‖w − u‖ = 0 < ε
(Note that we have obtained an exact result, i.e., w = u because of the public randomization
assumption).5
The main purpose for the rest of this Section is to state and prove a subgame perfect folk
theorem with UC. The trick of the proof of Theorem 3.1, in which the strategies corresponding
with many subgames were defined ad libitum, does not work for subgame perfection. Moreover,
when dealing with unilateral commitments, we face extremely large game trees. They have many
subgames, some of which may correspond to senseless commitments. Thus, we need to use the
VSPE concept instead of the classical SPE. Theorem 3.1 says that, when unilateral commitments
are possible, no condition is needed for the Nash folk theorem to hold. Note that the Nash
equilibrium profile (S¯c, α¯) defined in the proof of Theorem 3.1 is neither a SPE nor a VSPE; this
is because, in general, the punishments to a player who deviates from the commitment are not
credible. Now, Proposition 3.1 shows that not only the proof of Theorem 3.1 fails when we write
VSPE instead of Nash equilibrium, but also the result itself is false.
5The reader willing to deepen into the arguments of this proof is referred to García-Jurado et al. (2000).
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Proposition 3.1. The counterpart of Theorem 3.1 for VSPE does not hold.
Proof. We do the proof by means of an example. Let G = (N,A,ϕ) be the game defined in
Figure 3.2. The game G does not have a Nash equilibrium. Moreover, v = (1, 1) and ϕ(U,L) =
L R
U 10,11 1,10
D 11,0 0,1
Figure 3.2: A counterexample for Proposition 3.1
(10, 11) > v. However, for each T ∈ N and each δ ∈ (0, 1], U(G(δ, T )) does not have a VSPE.
Suppose, on the contrary, that there are δ ∈ (0, 1] and T ∈ N such that (Sc, α) is a VSPE of
U(G(δ, T )). If Sc contains a unique element, then one of the players can change his commitment
to no commitment at all (i.e., Sci = Si if i is such a player) and deviate from the strategy in the
final stage. Hence, there is a last stage in which, according to the path defined by (Sc, α), one of
the players is free to play any action. Let t be that stage and assume, without loss of generality,
that, following the path of (Sc, α), player 1 can play both U and D at stage t. Moreover, let x∗
be the corresponding single-node of G(δ, T ).
Now, let player 2 deviate to the strategy (S¯c2, α¯2) defined as follows: (i) S¯
c
2 := “from stage
t+1 on, I play according to the path defined by (Sc, α)” and (ii) for each Sˆc1 ∈ 2S1 , α¯2(Sˆc1, S¯c2) :=
α2(S
c). Let y be the single-node reached after (Sc1, S¯
c
2) is played. By definition, U(G(δ, T ))y
is a relevant subgame. Let now player 1 deviate, in U(G(δ, T ))y, to the strategy α¯1 defined as
follows: for each Sˆc2 ∈ 2S2 , α¯1(Sc1, Sˆc2) := α1(Sc). The subgame U(G(δ, T ))y is such that, when
playing according to (α1, α2), the single-node x
∗ of G(δ, T ) is reached again at stage t. Hence,
the subgame beginning at the corresponding single-node of U(G(δ, T )), namely x, is relevant for
(Sc, α). According to the commitments, both players can choose their two actions at x and, from
the stage t+1 on, player 2’s actions are determined by the commitment. Now, it is immediate to
check that the relevant subgame U(G(δ, T ))x does not have any Nash equilibrium. Hence, (S
c, α)
cannot be a VSPE.
In the counterexample we used in the proof above, we defined a game G with no Nash equi-
librium. Moreover, for each T ∈ N and each δ ∈ (0, 1], the game G(δ, T ) did not have any Nash
equilibrium. On the other hand, we have the following positive result concerning the existence of
VSPE for games with UC.
Proposition 3.2. Let G = (N,A,ϕ) and let a¯ ∈ A be a Nash equilibrium of G. Then, the game
U(G) has a VSPE (A¯c, α¯) with payoff ϕ(a¯).
Proof. Let (A¯c, α¯) be such that for each i ∈ N , we have
(i) A¯ci = {a¯i},
(ii) for each j 6= i and each Acj ∈ 2Aj , α¯i(A¯c−j , Acj) = a¯i. Finally, for each Aci ∈ 2Ai ,
α¯i(A¯
c
−i, A
c
i ) = aˆi, where aˆi ∈ argmaxai∈A¯ci {ϕi(a¯−i, ai)}.
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It is immediate to check that each such strategy profile (A¯c, α¯) is a VSPE of U(G).
In view of Proposition 3.2, it is clear that every Nash folk theorem for finitely repeated
games can be easily adapted to provide a subgame perfect folk theorem for finitely repeated
games with unilateral commitments. More precisely, the necessary and sufficient condition for
the Nash folk theorem in González-Díaz (2003), “that the game is decomposable as a complete
minimax-bettering ladder”, is a sufficient condition for the VSPE folk theorem with UC. The
former condition implies among other things, the existence of a Nash equilibrium in the stage
game G; this implication is all we use in this Chapter. Example 3.2 shows that such condition is
not necessary.
Example 3.2. Let G = (N,A,ϕ) be the game defined in Figure 3.3.
L M R
U 10,10 0,1 1,0
D 11,0 1,1 0,2
Figure 3.3: A game without Nash equilibria
The game G does not have a Nash equilibrium. Hence, G it is not decomposable as a complete
minimax-bettering ladder. Moreover, v = (1, 2). Now, for each T ∈ N and each δ ∈ (0, 1], the
payoff (10, 10) can be supported by a VSPE of U(G(δ, T )) = (N,SU , ϕU ). To check this assertion,
consider the strategy profile (S¯c, α¯) of U(G(δ, T )) defined as follows: (i) S¯c1 := “I play U in every
stage”, (ii) S¯c2 := “I never play R”, and (iii) for each i ∈ {1, 2} and each Sci ∈ 2Si , α¯(S¯c−i, Sci )
consists of playing, at each stage, the unique Nash equilibrium of the corresponding one stage
game. Then, (S¯c, α¯) is a VSPE and ϕU (S¯c, α¯) = (10, 10).
Proposition 3.2 says that we can use the UC to make actions credible, even actions that in the
original game could be dominated. On the other hand, Example 3.2 shows that we can use the UC
to go further than that. Hence, some more research is needed to find new sufficient conditions for
the VSPE folk theorem; conditions weaker than the existence of a complete minimax-bettering
ladder. Although we have made some research in this specific issue, we have not found any
satisfactory condition. Nevertheless, we have found the following result, which, with the aid of
Proposition 3.2, is straightforward.
Theorem 3.2. Let G = (N,A,ϕ) and let v be its minimax payoff vector. Let u ∈ F , u > v.
Then, for each ε > 0, there are δ0 ∈ (0, 1) and T0 ∈ N such that for each δ ∈ [δ0, 1] and each
T ≥ T0, the game U(U(G(δ, T ))) has a VSPE with payoff w such that ‖w − u‖ < ε.
Proof. Immediate from the combination of Theorem 3.1 and Proposition 3.2.
Theorem 3.2 implies that, when two stages of commitments are possible, any feasible and
individually rational payoff of the original game can be achieved as a VSPE of the repeated
game with unilateral commitments. No assumption is needed for the original game, not even the
existence of a Nash equilibrium.
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Next, we briefly discuss the impact of Theorem 3.2 within the delegation framework discussed
in the Introduction. First, from the point of view of our model with unilateral commitments,
the game U(U(G(δ, T ))) can be difficult to motivate. It is true that we get a very strong result
for the set of equilibrium payoffs of this game, but the fact that we allow for commitments
on commitments might have unnatural features in some models. The point is that, when we
introduced unilateral commitments, we emphasized the fact that they were unilateral, i.e., the
commitments of one player could not be conditional on the other players’ commitments; if we allow
for two stages of commitments, then we are indirectly allowing for commitments on commitments,
and hence, we achieve the same payoffs we could get with a cooperative model. On the other hand,
if we reassess the delegation situation corresponding with our unilateral commitments model, and
we do it in a similar way to that in the Introduction, then we have the following interpretation
for the two stages of commitments. Consider a situation in which two firms are engaged in a
competitive situation. Initially, the players are the presidents, and hence, in the first stage each
president signs a contract with his principal in which the latter is committed not to play certain
strategies and he will be paid proportionally to the payoff he finally gets. Then, in a second
stage, a similar contract is signed between each principal and his agent. Finally, the agents play
the original game but honoring the commitments. This situation has some important differences
with the one stage situation: (i) the commitments that the president includes in the contract
in the first stage can take into account the commitments that the principal will make with the
agent at stage two, i.e., the contract between each president and his principal also commits the
latter on the commitments he can sign with his agent, (ii) in the second stage the principals,
being consistent with the commitments of their contract with the principals and in view of the
commitments made by the rivals, choose a new commitment for the agents, i.e., a commitment on
the commitment, and (iii) finally, the agents have to play being consistent with all the previous
commitments. The hierarchical delegation model we have just described is quite natural and it
is not difficult to think of real life situations with these sub-delegation structures. Hence, if such
situations also correspond to some repeated game, then Theorem 3.2 says that, regardless of the
properties of the underlying stage game, the “cooperative” (collusive) payoffs can be supported
as a VSPE in the game with two stages of commitments.
3.3.1 Infinitely Repeated Games
Although we have not formally introduced the model with infinitely repeated games, the defini-
tions can be immediately extended to encompass also this family of games; basically, replacing T
by ∞ in the definition of history and in the subsequent ones. Now, within this new framework,
Proposition 3.2 still carries over. Now, recall that the classic Nash folk theorem for infinitely re-
peated games (see, for instance, Fudenberg and Maskin (1986)) states that, if the discount is close
enough to 1, every feasible and individually rational payoff can be achieved as a Nash equilibrium
of the infinitely repeated game. Hence, if we combine this classic result with Proposition 3.2 we
get the following Corollary:
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Corollary 3.1. Let G = (N,A,ϕ) and let v be its minimax payoff vector. Let u ∈ F , u > v.
Then, there is δ0 ∈ (0, 1) such that for each δ ∈ [δ0, 1] the game U(G(δ,∞)) has a VSPE with
payoff u.
Proof. It is immediate from the combination of Proposition 3.2 with the classic Nash folk theorem
for infinitely repeated games.
3.3.2 The State of Art
Table 3.1 summarizes the results we have proved in this Chapter along with the classic folk
theorems for repeated games with complete information. In particular, it shows the strength of
Proposition 3.2, that allows to obtain many folk theorems for repeated games with unilateral
commitments as immediate corollaries of the classic ones. Hence, by looking at Table 3.1, one
easily understands the strength of unilateral commitments within this framework. Note that
all the cells in the Table contain necessary and sufficient conditions, all of them but the one
corresponding with the virtual subgame perfect folk theorem for finitely repeated games with
unilateral commitments; some more research is still needed concerning this case.
Without UC 1 stage of UC
2 stages
of UC
Nash Theorem None None None
Infinite Horizon (Fudenberg and Maskin, 1986) (Prop. 3.2) (Prop. 3.2)
(Virtual) Perfect Th. Non-Equivalent Utilities None None
Infinite Horizon (Abreu et al., 1994) (Prop. 3.2) (Prop. 3.2)
Nash Theorem Minimax-Bettering Ladder None None
Finite Horizon (González-Díaz, 2003) (García-Jurado et al., 2000) (Prop. 3.2)
(Virtual) Perfect Th. Recursively-distinct Minimax-Bettering Ladder None
Finite Horizon Nash payoffs (Smith, 1995) (Prop. 3.2, only sufficient) (Th. 3.2)
Table 3.1: Necessary and Sufficient conditions for the folk theorems
3.4 Concluding Remarks
In this Chapter we have deepened in the literature of commitments. More specifically, we have
studied the impact of unilateral commitments in the folk theorems for repeated games.
We want to emphasize again the following fact. Because of the way we have modeled unilateral
commitments, it could seem that they are very far from the more standard models of commitment
via delegation. But, as we pointed out in the Introduction and in the discussion of Theorem 3.2,
unilateral commitments can be used to model situations in which there is a principal who signs a
contract with his agent with two natural features: (i) The agent has committed not play certain
strategies and (ii) among the remaining ones his payoff is proportional to that of the principal,
i.e., the agent can be thought of as a shareholder of the firm.
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Moreover, we have shown that unilateral commitments have very strong implications within
the literature of repeated games with complete information. They lead to new folk theorems in
which the assumptions needed for the classic results have been notably relaxed.
Finally, there are several open questions that should be tackled in the future. One of them
is to refine the conditions for the finite horizon perfect folk theorem with unilateral commit-
ments. There is another important issue where some research is needed: the impact of unilateral
commitments in repeated games with incomplete information.
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4.1 Introduction
To motivate the discussion think of the President of a University who has to allocate a given
budget among a set N of Departments. Each Department, depending on its size, teaching duties,
research commitments, etc. demands a total amount di.Most likely the aggregate amount claimed
by the Departments,
∑
i∈N di, exceeds the budget available, E. This is a standard bankruptcy
problem which requires devising some procedure to allocate what is available as a function of
what is demanded.
More generally, a bankruptcy problem describes a case in which a planner has to allocate a
given amount of a divisible good E among a set N of players, when their claims (di)i∈N exceed the
available amount (i.e.,
∑
i∈N di > E). Most rationing situations can be given this form. Relevant
examples are the execution of a will with insufficient assets, the allocation of a commodity with
excess demand in a fixed price setting, the collection of a given amount of taxes, and, of course,
the liquidation of a bankrupt firm among its creditors. Rationing problems encompass a wide
range of distributive situations and are analytically very simple (indeed, a bankruptcy problem
can be summarized by a triple (N,E, d)).
A solution to a bankruptcy problem, also called a rule, is a function that specifies, for each
admissible problem (N,E, d), a vector R(N,E, d) ∈ Rn satisfying the following two restrictions:
(i) for each i ∈ N , 0 ≤ Ri(N,E, d) ≤ di and (ii)
∑
i∈N Ri(N,E, d) = E. The first restriction says
that no claimant gets more than he claims or less than zero. The second is an efficiency require-
ment: the available amount of the good is fully distributed. Alternative solutions correspond to
the application of different ethical and procedural criteria.
The literature on bankruptcy problems is large and keeps growing. The main contributions
refer to the analysis of different solutions following an axiomatic approach or translating to this
context some of the standard solutions to coalitional games. The reader is referred to the works
of Moulin (2002) and Thomson (2003) for comprehensive surveys of this literature.
There is also a number of contributions that study different strategic aspects of the problem
(see Thomson (2003)). The first one already appears in O’Neill’s seminal paper (see O’Neill
(1982)), where the minimal overlap rule is analyzed as the Nash equilibrium of a noncooperative
game. Chun (1989) introduces a different strategic consideration in the bankruptcy problem by
allowing the players involved to propose solution concepts, rather than allocations. He devises
a procedure that converges to the outcome associated with the constrained equal awards rule.
A dual formulation is presented in Herrero (2003); in this case the procedure converges to the
constrained equal losses rule. Sonn (1992) obtains the constrained equal awards rule as the limit
of a process in which each player makes a proposal for someone else, who either accepts and leaves
or rejects and takes the place of the proposer. Dagan et al. (1997) define a sequential game whose
unique subgame perfect equilibrium outcome corresponds to the allocation of a given resource
monotonic and consistent rule (an extension of the result in Serrano (1995)). The sequential
game, which depends on the consistency assumption, can be summarized as follows. The player
with the highest claim proposes a distribution of the amount available. The other players can
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either accept and leave, or else reject and leave, obtaining what the two-person rule recommends
for the problem made of him and the proposer, with a budget made of the amounts allotted
initially for them by the proposer. See also Dagan et al. (1999) for a further extension.
Along these lines, Corchón and Herrero (2004) discuss the implementation of bankruptcy rules
when the proposals made by the players are bounded by their claims. Herrero et al. (2003) provide
a experimental analysis of the strategic behavior in bankruptcy problems.
Somehow between the axiomatic and the strategic approaches there are those contributions
on the manipulation of the rules via merging or splitting claims (see de Frutos (1999), Ju (2003)
and Moreno-Ternero (2004)).
In this Chapter we provide a noncooperative support to the resolution of bankruptcy problems.
The basic idea is the following. Each player is asked to declare what would be the minimal
admissible reward he is ready to admit, given that there is not enough to satisfy all the demands.
This is a familiar requirement in many discussions of this sort. It is not difficult to imagine the
President of the University putting this question to the Heads of the different Departments: “Tell
me what is the minimum you need to keep going; I’ll try to ensure that you receive that amount
and then we shall see how to allocate the rest”. Of course this is a strategic situation and each
player will declare the amount that maximizes his expected payoff. We propose here an elementary
game form in which those who “demand less” are given priority in the distribution, such that in
a Nash equilibrium all players “demand the same”. Interestingly enough the equilibrium payoff
vector is unique and so is, in many cases, the strategy profile. Moreover, the Nash equilibria of
this game are all strong. By specifying properly what we mean by “demanding less” and “getting
the same” through the rules of each particular game of this type, we obtain all the different
solutions to bankruptcy problems as Nash equilibria.
We implicitly assume, as it is usual in this literature, that both the amount to divide and the
claims are known by all the players. There are, however, two features that make this game form
much simpler than those in other contributions: (i) no sequential procedure is involved (which,
incidentally, makes the result independent on consistency) and (ii) each player’s message only
refers to his decision variable, in contrast with most of the results in which each player proposes a
whole allocation. Moreover, our results apply to virtually all acceptable bankruptcy rules (where
“unacceptable” rules are those that allow some player to get his full claim and, at the same time,
give zero to some else).
The Chapter is organized as follows. Section 4.2 presents the formal model and the main
results. Section 4.3 applies those results to the bankruptcy problem. It is shown that the alloca-
tion proposed by any acceptable bankruptcy rule can be obtained as the Nash equilibrium of a
specific game within the family presented in Section 4.2. We conclude with a few final comments
in Section 4.4.
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4.2 The Model and the Main Results
A bankruptcy problem is a triple (N,E, d), where N = {1, 2, . . . , n} is a collection of players, E > 0
is the amount to divide, and d ∈ Rn++ is the vector of claims. The very nature of the problem under
consideration implies that
∑
i∈N di > E > 0. A bankruptcy rule R is defined as a function mapping
each bankruptcy problem (N,E, d) onto Rn+, such that for each i ∈ N , Ri(N,E, d) ∈ [0, di] and∑
i∈N Ri(N,E, d) = E. The rule R represents a sensible way of distributing the available amount
E, with two natural restrictions. One is that no player gets more than he claims or less than
zero, the other that the total amount E is divided among the players.
Our noncooperative bankruptcy game for the bankruptcy problem (N,E, d) is a strategic game
with N as the set of players, who are endowed with strategy spaces Di, and payoff functions
(πi)i∈N that describe what each player gets as a function of the joint strategy vector.
In our game, player i’s strategy space is a closed interval Di = [0,mi], for some scalar mi > 0.
Let αi be a strategy for player i, α ∈ D =
∏
i∈N Di a strategy profile, and α−i an (n − 1)-
vector consisting of the strategies of all players other than player i. We interpret αi as a message
monotonically related to the amount of the total payoff that he declares admissible, given the
rationing situation. For instance, αi may describe the share of di that player i would be ready to
accept. Or it may correspond to the loss he is ready to admit. We describe this message through
a function fi : Di → [0, di] that specifies the relationship between the player’s message and his
intended reward. For instance fi(αi) = αidi, when αi corresponds to player i’s admissible share.
A strategy profile α is feasible if
∑
i∈N fi(αi) ≤ E.
Concerning the functions fi we assume:
Axiom 4.1. For each i ∈ N, fi is a monotone function that defines a bijection from [0,mi] to
[0, di].
Axiom 4.2. All fi’s are simultaneously increasing or decreasing.
Note that Axiom 4.1 implies that the functions fi are continuous and strictly monotone func-
tions. Hence, we refer to the functions fi as increasing or decreasing meaning strictly increasing
or strictly decreasing, respectively. For simplicity we assume in Axiom 4.2 that the orientation of
the messages of the players is uniform, which means that functions fi are either all increasing or
all decreasing. It follows from Axioms 4.1 and 4.2 that (i) if the functions fi are increasing, then
fi(0) = 0 and fi(mi) = di and (ii) if they are decreasing, then fi(0) = di and fi(mi) = 0. Let f
be (f1, . . . , fn).
If the fi’s are increasing (decreasing) functions, we denote by [i] the player whose message
occupies the i-th position in the increasing (decreasing) ordering of messages. Although it is not
important for the results of this Chapter, a tie-breaking rule must be considered in order to have
a well defined reordering of the players. Here we consider the following: if there is a tie between
two or more players, the ranking is made in increasing ordering of their indices within N. Hence:
If the functions fi are increasing: α[1] ≤ α[2] ≤ . . . ≤ α[n].
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If the functions fi are decreasing: α[1] ≥ α[2] ≥ . . . ≥ α[n].
Consider now the following procedure. Player i chooses his message αi. If the profile α =
(αi, α−i) is feasible, then player i gets fi(αi) and, since each player obtains the payoff associated
with the demand corresponding with his message, the game ends. If α is not feasible, then E is
allocated among the players with lowest ranking. That is, let [h] denote the smallest index for
which
∑
[i]≤[h] f[i](α[i]) > E. Then:
π[i](α) =


f[i](α[i]) [i] < [h]
E −∑[i]≤[h−1] f[i](α[i]) [i] = [h]
0 [i] > [h].
We denote this noncooperative bankruptcy game by 〈N,D, π〉. Note that, under Axioms 4.1
and 4.2, the strict monotonicity of the functions fi is translated, for each α−i and provided that∑
i∈N fi(αi) < E, to the functions πi(α−i, ·). By construction, for each α ∈ D,
∑
i∈N πi(α) ≤ E.
We can define a Nash equilibrium of the game 〈N,D, π〉, associated with a bankrupcty problem
(N,E, d), as a strategy profile α∗ ∈ D such that for each i ∈ N and each αi ∈ Di, πi(α∗) ≥
πi(α
∗
−i, αi).
A strategy profile α∗ ∈ D is a strong equilibrium (Aumann, 1959) if there do not exist T ⊆ N
and αT ∈
∏
i∈T Di such that for each i ∈ T , πi(α∗) < πi(α∗N\T , αT ).
Lemma 4.1. Under Axioms 4.1 and 4.2, if α∗ ∈ D is a Nash equilibrium of the bankruptcy game
〈N,D, π〉, then ∑i∈N πi(α∗) = E, i.e., all the Nash equilibria are efficient.
Proof. Assume that the fi’s are increasing (the case of decreasing functions is fully symmetric).
By the definition of 〈N,D, π〉, ∑i∈N πi(α∗) ≤ E. Moreover, if ∑i∈N πi(α∗) < E, then there is
i ∈ N that can increase his claim and get a larger payoff. Hence, ∑i∈N πi(α∗) = E.
The following result is now obtained.
Proposition 4.1. Let (N,E, d) be a bankruptcy problem and 〈N,D, π〉 an associated noncooper-
ative bankruptcy game. The following statements are true under Axioms 4.1 and 4.2:
(i) There is a constant ρ such that the game has a Nash equilibrium in which α∗i = min{ρ,mi},
i.e., each player selects the strategy in [0,mi] which is closer to ρ.
(ii) The equilibrium payoff for this game is unique.
Proof. Case 1: Functions fi are increasing.
Let F : R+ −→ R+ be such that for each x ∈ R+, F (x) =
∑
i∈N fi(xi), where xi =
min{x,mi}. The continuity of all fi’s implies the continuity of F. Hence, since (i) F (0) = 0, (ii)
F (maxi∈N{mi}) =
∑
i∈N di > E, and iii) F is strictly increasing in the interval [0, maxi∈N{mi}],
there is a unique ρ ∈ (0, maxi∈N{mi}) such that F (ρ) = E.
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Suppose that the profile α∗ is a Nash equilibrium and that, for some fixed i, j ∈ N , we have
α∗j > α
∗
i and mi > α
∗
i . If πj(α
∗) = 0, then player j can ensure for himself a positive payoff with
the strategy ε, for ε small enough. Hence, πj(α
∗) must be positive. Now, player i can obtain a
greater payoff by switching to strategy α′i ∈ (α∗i ,min{α∗j ,mi}); player i has still a lower index
than player j and, since fi is increasing, his payoff increases. Hence, if α
∗ is a Nash equilibrium
and α∗j > α
∗
i for some i, j ∈ N, we have α∗i = mi. Combining this with the fact that ρ is the
unique positive real number for which F (ρ) = E, we get that the strategies α∗i = min{ρ,mi}
define a Nash equilibrium.
Note that there can exist j ∈ N , such that for each i 6= j, (i) α∗i = mi, and (ii) α∗j > α∗i ; in
this case player j can change his strategy to a new αj > α
∗
j , obtaining a new Nash equilibrium
of the game. Nonetheless, the payoff remains unchanged.
Case 2: Functions fi are decreasing.
Take again the function F , now we have (i) F (0) =
∑
i∈N di > E and (ii) F (maxi∈N{mi}) = 0.
Define again ρ as the unique real number in (0, maxi∈N{mi}) such that F (ρ) = E. The situation
is similar to the case with increasing functions: the profile α∗ with α∗i = min{ρ,mi} is again a
Nash equilibrium.
Again, suppose that πi(α
∗) = 0 for some i ∈ N . In this situation, if player i changes his
strategy, no matter how, the new profile is still a Nash equilibrium. Nonetheless, the payoff
remains unchanged.
Moreover, all the Nash equilibria in the Proposition above are in fact strong equilibria, as the
following Proposition shows.
Proposition 4.2. Let (N,E, d) be a bankruptcy problem, 〈N,D, π〉 an associated noncooperative
bankruptcy game, and α∗ a strategy profile. Then, under Axioms 4.1 and 4.2, α∗ is a Nash
equilibrium if and only if α∗ is a strong equilibrium.
Proof. Since a strong equilibrium is a Nash equilibrium only one implication has to be proved.
Assume that the functions fi are increasing. Suppose that α
∗ is a Nash equilibrium which is
not strong. Then, there are T ⊆ N and αT ∈
∏
j∈T Dj such that for each j ∈ T , πj(α∗) <
πj(α
∗
N\T , αT ). By Proposition 4.1, there is ρ such that for each i ∈ N , α∗i = min{ρ,mi}.
Moreover, it is easy to check that, for each i ∈ N , πi(α∗) = fi(α∗i ). Now, for each j ∈ T ,
fj(αj) ≥ πj(α∗N\T , αT ) > πj(α∗) = fj(α∗j ).
Hence, αj > α
∗
j . Hence, α
∗
j < mj . Hence, α
∗
j = ρ and αj > ρ. Now, since for each i ∈ N\T ,
α∗i ≤ ρ, then for each j ∈ T and each i ∈ N\T , we have αj > α∗i . Hence, for each i ∈ N\T ,
πi(α
∗
N\T , αT ) = fi(α
∗
i ) = πi(α
∗). Since
∑
i∈N πi(α
∗
N\T , αT ) ≤ E, then cannot be the case that,
for each j ∈ T , πj(α∗) < πj(α∗N\T , αT ). In the decreasing case, a similar argument can be
formulated.
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4.3 Bankrupcty Games and Bankruptcy Rules
Now, we illustrate how the results in Section 4.2 apply to the standard bankruptcy rules.
The proportional rule, P, which is probably the best known and most widely used solution
concept, distributes awards proportionally to claims. It is defined as follows: for each (N,E, d),
P (N,E, d) = λd, with λ = EP
i∈N di
. It is easy to see that, if we take, for each i ∈ N , Di = [0, 1]
and fi(αi) = αidi, then the (unique) Nash equilibrium of the game produces the proportional
solution to the bankruptcy problem.
The constrained equal-awards rule, A, applies an egalitarian principle on the awards received,
provided no player gets more than he claims. It is defined as follows: for each (N,E, d) and each
i ∈ N , Ai(N,E, d) = min{di, λ}, where λ solves
∑
i∈N min{di, λ} = E. By letting Di = [0, di]
and fi(αi) = αi, we get the constrained equal awards solution as the unique Nash equilibrium of
the associated bankruptcy game.
The constrained equal-loss rule, L, is the dual of the latter. It distributes equally the difference
between the amount available and the aggregate claims, with one proviso: no player ends up with a
negative transfer. Namely, Li(N,E, d) = max{0, di−λ}, where λ solves
∑
i∈N max{0, di−λ} = E.
Taking Di = [0, di] and defining fi(αi) = di − αi, we obtain the constrained equal-losses solution
as the Nash equilibrium payoff of the game.
Aumann and Maschler (1985) introduced the Talmud rule as the consistent extension of the
contested garment rule. It is defined as follows: for each (N,E, d) and each i ∈ N, Ti(N,E, d) =
min{ 12di, λ} if E ≤ 12
∑
i∈N di, and Ti(N,E, d) = max{ 12di, di − µ} if E ≥ 12
∑
i∈N di, where λ
and µ are chosen such that
∑
i∈N Ti(N,E, d) = E. If we let Di = [0, di] and
fi(αi) =
{
1
2αi E ≤ 12
∑
i∈N di
1
2di − αi E ≥ 12
∑
i∈N di,
the Nash equilibrium payoff of the game yields the allocation corresponding to the Talmud rule.
More generally, if we let Di = [0, di] and
fi(αi) =
{
θαi E ≤ θ
∑
i∈N di
θdi − αi E ≥ θ
∑
i∈N di,
we generate the solutions corresponding to the TAL-family (Moreno-Ternero and Villar, 2003)
which encompasses the constrained equal awards, the constrained equal losses, and the Talmud
rule.1
These results illustrate on the applicability of this procedure to provide a noncooperative sup-
1The TAL-family consists of all rules with the following form: there is θ ∈ [0, 1] such that for each bankruptcy
problem (N,E, c) and each i ∈ N ,
Rθi (N,E, d) =

min {θdi, λ} E ≤ θ
P
i∈N di
max {θdi, di − µ} E ≥ θ
P
i∈N di,
where and λ and µ are chosen such that
P
i∈N R
θ
i (N,E, d) = E.
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port to the best known bankruptcy rules. But these results can actually be extended to virtually
any meaningful rule. Consider now the following definition which introduces an extremely mild
requirement on bankruptcy rules:
Definition 4.1. A bankruptcy rule R is called acceptable if there are no bankruptcy problem
(N,E, d) and players i, j ∈ N such that Ri(N,E, d) = 0 and Rj(N,E, d) = dj .
Acceptable rules are those which never concede a player his claim in full whereas some other
player gets nothing. Most of the rules which have been studied in the literature are acceptable.
The following proposition shows that for all acceptable bankruptcy rules there is a bank-
ruptcy game whose equilibrium payoff coincides with the allocation proposed by the selected
rule. Formally:
Proposition 4.3. Let R be an acceptable bankruptcy rule and (N,E, d) a bankruptcy problem.
Then, there is a noncooperative bankruptcy game 〈N,D, π〉, satisfying Axioms 4.1 and 4.2, whose
unique equilibrium payoff coincides with R(N,E, d).
Proof. The proof consists of showing that we can define sets of strategies Di and functions fi in
such a way that the result is a consequence of Proposition 4.1.
Let (N,E, d). To simplify notation we write Ri instead of Ri(N,E, d). Since the rule is ac-
ceptable, either for each i ∈ N , Ri > 0, or for each i ∈ N , Ri < di. Next, we define the sets of
strategies and the functions fi.
Case 1: For each i ∈ N , Ri > 0. Let
mi :=
R1
Ri
di and fi(αi) :=
Ri
R1
αi.
It is clear that the functions fi are monotone (in fact, increasing) and that, for each i ∈ N, fi
is a bijection mapping [0,mi] onto [0, di].
By Proposition 4.1, the noncooperative bankruptcy game has a unique equilibrium payoff.
Clearly, in this case, ρ = R1. Hence, α
∗ = (R1, . . . , R1) is a Nash equilibrium (which is, moreover,
strong by Proposition 4.2); its associated payoff is R(N,E, d).
Case 2: For each i ∈ N , Ri < di.
The reasoning is the same as before, except in that, now, we define:
mi :=
d1 −R1
di −Ri di and fi(αi) := di −
di −Ri
d1 −R1αi.
Now, since (d1−R1, . . . , d1−R1) is a Nash equilibrium of this game and its associated payoff
vector is R(N,E, d), then Proposition 4.1 gives again the desired result.
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4.4 Concluding Remarks
We have presented in this Chapter a simple and intuitive game form which supports virtually all
bankruptcy rules. The allocation proposed by each rule is obtained as the unique payoff vector
corresponding to the Nash equilibrium of a specific game. In this respect, choosing the rules of
the game (and most particularly the strategy space of the players) determines the bankruptcy
rule that will emerge.
Interestingly enough, the game form that allows to implement those bankruptcy rules is a one-
shot game in which every player sends a message concerning his own awards exclusively. Those
messages refer to the cuts in their claims they might be ready to accept, given their claims and the
existing shortage. The game form induces an equilibrium in which all players choose “the same”
message. Selecting the nature of those messages (e.g. awards, shares, losses) amounts to deciding
on the bankruptcy rule whose allocation will result (the equal awards-rule, the proportional rule,
the equal-losses rule).
The game form proposed here implicitly assumes that all the data of the problem are public
knowledge. In particular that the planner may know both the players’ claims and the amount
to divide. This is a natural assumption in most of the bankruptcy situations, where claims have
to be eventually credited. The case of taxation problems may be an exception in this respect.
Dagan et al. (1999) show that those problems are implementable when all players other than the
planner know all the data of the problem. Even though this is an arguable assumption in this
context, they also show an impossibility result when this is not the case (see also Corchón and
Herrero (2004) on this point).
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Introduction to Cooperative Game Theory
This second Part is devoted cooperative game theory. We set the focus on the geometry underlying
some of the best known solution concepts in the TU games literature. We describe the structure
of this Part below.
The first three Chapters deal with the geometry of the core of a TU game. More specifically,
we define a new solution concept for balanced games, the core-center, which is deeply studied
in this Part of the dissertation. These three Chapters are based on the papers González-Díaz
and Sánchez-Rodríguez (2003a,b). In Chapter 5 we formally introduce the core-center as the
barycenter of the core and we carry out an analysis of the properties satisfied by this new allocation
rule. The main focus is on the continuity property, which turns out to be a serious concern. We
have also made an important effort studying the monotonicity properties of the core-center; the
necessity of this effort comes from the existing negative results concerning the possibility of
defining monotonic selections from the core of a TU game (Young, 1985; Housman and Clark,
1998). In Chapter 6 we combine some of the properties studied in Chapter 5 with an additivity
property to obtain an axiomatic characterization of the core-center. Next, in Chapter 7, we
develop some tools to establish a connection between the core-center and the Shapley value
(Shapley, 1953) within the class of convex games. In this Chapter, we describe the formation
of the core as the result of a dynamic process among coalitions. Based on this interpretation,
we define the utopia games, a family of games associated with each TU game which naturally
arise from the mentioned description. The utopia games are the corner stone for the connection
between the core-center and the Shapley value.
Finally, in Chapter 8 we switch to the geometry underlying the τ value (Tijs, 1981). In this
Chapter, which is based on the paper González-Díaz et al. (2005), we characterize the τ value as
the barycenter of the edges of the core-cover of a quasi-balanced game (multiplicities have to be
taken into account).
Summarizing, in this second Part we deepen in the geometry of the TU games. We do it by
establishing some connections between set valued solutions and allocation rules. It is a well known
property of the Shapley value the fact that it is the center of gravity of the vectors of marginal
contributions. On the other hand, the nucleolus is many times referred to as the lexicographic
center of the core. These two “central” properties of the Shapley value and the nucleolus have
been used many times to motivate the use of these two allocation rules. Here, we add two more
“central” relations, namely, (i) we introduce the core-center, defined as the center of gravity of the
core, and hence, an allocation rule occupying a central position within the core and (ii) we show
that the τ value lies, in general, in a central position inside the core-cover of a quasi-balanced
game.
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Introduction
In the framework of cooperative games with transferable utility there are several solution concepts
that give rise to different ways of dividing the worth of the grand coalition, v(N), among the
players. Although solution concepts admit different classifications, we divide them into two
groups: set-valued solutions and allocation rules (single-valued solutions). Roughly speaking,
set-valued solutions provide a set of outcomes that can be infinite, finite, or even empty. The
way to determine a set-valued solution can be seen as a procedure in which the set of all possible
assignments is gradually reduced, until the final solution (not necessarily a singleton) is reached.
This reduction is done by imposing some desirable properties that a solution should possess.
Examples of this approach are the stable sets (von Neumann and Morgenstern, 1944), the core
(Gillies, 1953), the kernel (Davis and Maschler, 1965), the bargaining sets (Aumann and Maschler,
1964) etc. On the other hand, one can establish some properties or axioms that determine a unique
outcome for each game, this is known as an allocation rule. The Shapley value (Shapley, 1953),
the nucleolus (Schmeidler, 1969), and the τ -value (Tijs, 1981) are solutions of this type.
Each solution concept has its interpretation and attends to specific principles (fairness, equity,
stability...) and all of them enrich the field of cooperative game theory. Besides, there have been
many papers discussing on relations between allocation rules and set-valued solutions. Just to
mention a couple of these relations: when the core of a game is nonempty the nucleolus selects
an element inside it and, for the class of convex games, the Shapley value is in the core.
Our main purpose is to introduce a new allocation rule for balanced games summarizing all
the information contained in the core, i.e., obtain a single-valued solution from a set-valued one.
This allocation should be a fair compromise among all the stable allocations selected by the core.
In Maschler et al. (1979) it is shown that the nucleolus can be characterized as a “lexicographic
center” for the core. With that in mind, we study the real center of the core, which we call the
core-center, and discuss its game theoretical properties and interpretations. Now, we provide
a natural motivation for this concept: assume that we have chosen all the efficient and stable
allocations of a given game, i.e., its core. If we want to select only one of all these outcomes as a
proposal to divide v(N), how to do it in a fair way? What we suggest is to select the expectation
of a uniform distribution defined over the core of the game, in other words, its center of gravity.
From the point of view of physics, the core-center is the point of the equilibrium of the core of a
game. We have rewritten this notion in terms of a fairness (impartiality) property.
This Chapter deals with the axiomatic properties of the core-center. The main focus of this
axiomatic study is in the continuity property, since it turns out to be the case that it is not
easy to prove that the core-center is continuous. The problem of continuous selection from multi-
functions has been widely studied in mathematics and Michael (1956) is a central paper in this
literature. More specifically, the issue of selection from convex-compact-valued multi-functions
(as the core) is discussed in Gautier and Morchadi (1992); they study, as an alternative to the
barycentric selection, the Steiner selection, for which continuity is not a problem. Moreover, they
briefly discuss the regularity problems one can face when working with the barycentric selection.
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In this Chapter we show that, because of the special structure of the core of a TU game, the
barycentric selection from the core (the core-center) is continuous as a function of the underlying
game. Section 5.3 is entirely devoted to the discussion of the continuity of the core-center.
We also discuss in detail the monotonicity properties of the core-center. In fact, we show that,
as far as monotonicity is concerned, there is a parallelism between the behavior of the core-center
and that of the nucleolus.
As we have already said, this is not the first time that a central approach is used to obtain an
allocation rule. It is widely known that the Shapley value is the center of gravity of the vectors
of marginal contributions and, for convex games, it coincides with the center of gravity of the
extreme points of the core (taking multiplicities into account). Besides, in González-Díaz et al.
(2005) it is proved that the τ -value corresponds with the center of gravity of the edges of the
core-cover (again multiplicities must be considered).
The structure of this Chapter is as follows. In Section 5.1 we introduce the preliminary game
theoretical concepts. In Section 5.2, we define the core-center, provide some interpretations, and
study its main properties. In Section 5.3 we discuss in depth the issue of the continuity of the
core-center. Finally, we conclude in Section 5.4.
5.1 Game Theory Background
A transferable utility or TU game is a pair (N, v), where N = {1, . . . , n} is a set of players and
v : 2N → R is a function assigning to every coalition S ⊆ N a payoff v(S). By convention,
v(∅) = 0. Since each game assigns a real value to each nonempty subset of N , it corresponds with
a vector in R2
n−1. Let |S| denote the number of elements of coalition S. Saving notation, when
no ambiguity arises, we use i to denote {i}. Let Gn be the set of all n-player games.
Let x ∈ Rn be an allocation. Then, x is efficient if ∑ni=1 xi = v(N) and x is individually
rational if, for each i ∈ N , xi ≥ v(i). Moreover, x is stable if for each S ( N ,
∑
i∈S xi ≥ v(S),
i.e., no coalition can improve by leaving the grand coalition. An allocation rule is a function
which, given a game (N, v), selects an allocation in Rn, i.e.,
ϕ : Ω ⊆ Gn −→ Rn
(N, v) 7−→ ϕ(N, v).
Next, we define some properties for allocation rules. Let (N, v) ∈ Gn and let ϕ be an allocation
rule: ϕ is continuous if the function ϕ : R2
n−1 → Rn is continuous; ϕ is efficient if it always
selects efficient allocations; ϕ is individually rational if it always selects individually rational
allocations; ϕ is scale invariant if for each two games (N, v) and (N,w), and each r ∈ R such
that, for each S ⊆ N , w(S) = rv(S), then ϕ(N,w) = rϕ(N, v); ϕ is translation invariant if
for each two games (N, v) and (N,w), and each α = (α1, . . . , αn) ∈ Rn such that for each
S ⊆ N , w(S) = v(S) +∑i∈S αi, then ϕ(N,w) = ϕ(N, v) + α; ϕ is symmetric if for each pair
i, j ∈ N such that for each S ⊂ N\{i, j}, v(S ∪ {i}) − v(S) = v(S ∪ {j}) − v(S), we have
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ϕi(N, v) = ϕj(N, v); ϕ satisfies dummy player property if for each i ∈ N such that for each
S ⊂ N\{i}, v(S ∪ {i})− v(S) = v({i}), we have ϕi(N, v) = v({i}).
The core of a game (N, v) (Gillies, 1953), C(N, v), is defined by C(N, v) := {x ∈ Rn :∑
i∈N xi = v(N) and, for each S ( N,
∑
i∈S xi ≥ v(S)}. The class of games with a nonempty
core is the class of balanced games. The class of games with nonempty core is the class of balanced
games.The class of games with nonempty core is the class of balanced games.
5.2 The Core-Center:
Definition, Interpretations, and Properties
The core of a game is the set of all the stable and efficient allocations. Now, if we consider that
all these points are equally valuable, then it makes sense to think of the core as if it was endowed
with a uniform distribution. The core-center summarizes the information of such a distribution
of probability. Let U(A) denote the uniform distribution defined over the set A and E(P) the
expectation of the probability distribution P.
Definition 5.1. Let (N, v) be a balanced game with core C(N, v), the core-center of (N, v),
µ(N, v), is defined as follows:
µ(N, v) := E [U(C(N, v))] .
The idea underlying our motivation for the core-center can be summarized as follows: if in
accordance with some properties and/or criteria we have selected a (convex) set of allocations
(the core) and we want to choose one, and only one, of these allocations, why not to choose the
center of the set?
Also, from the point of view of physics, if we think of the core as a homogeneous body, then
the core-center selects its center of gravity. In physics, the center of gravity is a fundamental
concept because it allows to simplify the study of a complex system just by reducing it to a point;
for instance, the movement of a body can be analyzed by describing the movement of its center
of gravity. Roughly speaking, the core-center is the unique point in the core such that all the
core allocations are “balanced” with respect to it.
The fact that the core-center belongs to the core implies that it inherits many of the properties
of the allocations in the latter. Hence, the core-center also satisfies, among others, the following
properties:
Efficiency Individual rationality Stability
Symmetry Scale Invariance Translation Invariance
Dummy player property.
All of them are straightforward, either because they are inherited from core properties or
because they are a consequence of the properties of the center of gravity. In the rest of this
Section, we first discuss a new property that the core-center satisfies, second, we discuss the
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monotonicity properties of the core-center, and, finally, we introduce a first approach to the issue
of the continuity of the core-center.
5.2.1 A Fairness Property
In Dutta and Ray (1989) the problem of selecting an allocation in the core is studied assuming
that all members of the society have subscribed to equality as a desirable end. In this context
they propose an egalitarian allocation which is characterized in terms of Lorenz domination. The
motivation for the core-center is from the angle of impartiality as opposed to that of egalitari-
anism. Assume that the situation the game models is the consequence of some previous efforts
or investments made by the different agents, i.e., the core allocations can be seen as the possible
rewards arising from their contributions (possibly unequal) to a common purpose. In this situ-
ation the equity principle would not be a fair one. We present now a fairness property for the
core-center to show the justice foundations it obeys to.
Let D ⊆ Rn, i ∈ N, and an allocation x ∈ Rn. Let Wi(x) denote the set of all allocations in
D which are worse than x for i, and Bi(x) is the set of all allocations which are better than x for
i (Figure 5.1). Formally, Wi(x) := {y ∈ D : yi < xi} and Bi(x) := {y ∈ D : yi > xi}. Also, let
Ei(x) := {y ∈ D : yi = xi}.
3
21
x
B2(x)
W2(x)
Figure 5.1: The sets B2(x) and W2(x) in the core of a game
Consider now the situation in which there is a probability distribution P defined over D (for
the core-center the uniform distribution is defined over the core). Let x ∈ Rn and i ∈ N , the
relevance (weight) for player i of a point y ∈ D, with respect to x, is the weight of the point
according to P, but re-scaled proportionally to |xi − yi|. The relevance for player i of y with
respect to x depends on the weight of y according to P but also on the difference between xi and
yi, i.e., how good or bad yi is compared to xi.
Let P be a distribution of probability defined over Rn and let x ∈ Rn. The degree of satisfaction
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of player i with respect to x is defined as the quotient
DSPi (x) =
∫
Wi(x)
|xi − yi|dP(y)∫
Bi(x)
|xi − yi|dP(y) =
∫
Wi(x)
(xi − yi)dP(y)∫
Bi(x)
(yi − xi)dP(y) .
According to this definition, a degree of satisfaction of 1 for a player i with respect to an allocation
x means that, in some way, he perceives the sets Bi(x) and Wi(x) as equal (with regard to P and
x). A small observation concerning the indetermination 0/0 is needed, if both numerator and
denominator in DSPi (x) are 0, i.e., player i receives xi in all the points in the support of P, then,
in line with the former comment, DSPi (x) = 1. Besides, when the denominator takes value 0 but
the numerator does not, there is no problem in letting the degree of satisfaction take the value
+∞.
Definition 5.2. Let P be a distribution of probability defined over Rn. An allocation x ∈ Rn is
impartial with respect to P if for each pair i, j ∈ N , DSPi (x) = DSPj (x).
Definition 5.3. Let ϕ be an allocation rule. For each (N, v) ∈ Gn, let P(N, v) be a distribution
of probability defined over Rn. Then, ϕ is impartial with respect to P if for each (N, v) ∈ Gn,
ϕ(N, v) is impartial with respect to P(N, v).
Lemma 5.1. Let (N, v) be a balanced game and let U(N, v) be the uniform distribution defined
over C(N, v). Then, the core-center is the unique efficient allocation which is impartial with
respect to U(N, v).
Proof. This Lemma is almost an immediate consequence of the properties of the center of gravity.
Let y¯ be the expectation of the uniform distribution defined over C(N, v) and let x be an efficient
allocation in Rn. Let f be the density function associated with U . First, we show that for each
i ∈ N , DSUi (x) = 1 if and only if xi = y¯i, i.e., for each i ∈ N ,∫
Wi(x)
(xi − yi)f(y)dy =
∫
Bi(x)
(yi − xi)f(y)dy ⇔ xi = y¯i.
Note that ∫
Rn
(xi − yi)f(y)dy = xi
∫
Rn
f(y)dy −
∫
Rn
yif(y)dy = xi − y¯i.
Moreover, since either the probability of Ei(x) is 0 or for each y ∈ C(N, v), yi = xi, we have∫
Ei(x)
(xi − yi)f(y)dy = 0. Hence,
∫
Rn
(xi − yi)f(y)dy =
∫
Wi(x)
(xi − yi)f(y)dy −
∫
Bi(x)
(yi − xi)f(y)dy.
Now, ∫
Wi(x)
(xi − yi)f(y)dy =
∫
Bi(x)
(yi − xi)f(y)dy ⇔ xi = y¯i.
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Now, suppose that there is a player i ∈ N such that DSUi (x) < 1 (the case DSUi (x) > 1 is
analogous). Then, xi < y¯i. Now, because of the efficiency property, there is j 6= i such that
xj > y¯j . Hence, by the first part of the proof, DS
U
j (x) > DS
U
i (x).
Note that in the previous proof we also showed that the unique outcome (not necessarily
efficient) such that for each i ∈ N , DSUi (x) = 1 is the core-center. Hence, the unique case in
which all players perceive the sets Bi(x) and Wi(x) as equal (with regard to U and x), is in that
in which the core-center is chosen.
5.2.2 An Example
Consider the following 4-player game taken from Maschler et al. (1979),
v(S) =


2 S = N
1 2 ≤ |S| ≤ 3 and S 6= {1, 3}, {2, 4}
0.5 S = {1, 3}
0 otherwise.
This is a quite symmetric game, actually, its main asymmetry hinges on the fact that coalition
{1, 3} can obtain 0.5 whereas the coalition {2, 4} cannot obtain anything alone. In this game we
have that the Shapley value is (13/24, 11/24, 13/24, 11/24) and the nucleolus is (0.5, 0.5, 0.5, 0.5).
The core of this game is the segment joining the points (1, 0, 1, 0) and (0.25, 0.75, 0.25, 0.75); and
the core-center is its midpoint: the allocation (5/8, 3/8, 5/8, 3/8).
The asymmetry of the game is reflected in the Shapley value: players 1 and 3 obtain a higher
payoff, but not in the nucleolus which gives the same payoff to the four players. Besides, these
two allocations lie within the core of the game. As one should expect, the core-center is very
sensitive with the asymmetries which directly affect the structure of the core, and this is the case
in this example.
5.2.3 Monotonicity
Next, we study the behavior of the core-center with respect to monotonicity. To do so, we
define four different monotonicity properties. Let ϕ be an allocation rule. We say ϕ is strongly
monotonic if for each pair (N, v), (N,w) ∈ Gn, and each i ∈ N such that for each S ⊆ N\{i},
w(S ∪ {i}) − w(S) ≥ v(S ∪ {i}) − v(S), we have ϕi(N,w) ≥ ϕi(N, v). Let (N, v), (N,w) ∈ Gn,
let T ⊆ N be such that w(T ) > v(T ) and for each S 6= T , w(S) = v(S): ϕ satisfies coalitional
monotonicity if for each i ∈ T , ϕi(N,w) ≥ ϕi(N, v); ϕ satisfies aggregate monotonicity if T = N
implies that for each i ∈ N , ϕi(N,w) ≥ ϕi(N, v); ϕ satisfies weak coalitional monotonicity if∑
i∈T ϕi(N,w) ≥
∑
i∈T ϕi(N, v).
Young (1985) characterized the Shapley value as the unique strongly monotonic and symmetric
allocation rule. Since the core-center is symmetric, it is not strongly monotonic. Also Young
(1985) and Housman and Clark (1998) showed that if an allocation rule always selects an allocation
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in the core, it cannot not satisfy coalitional monotonicity when the number of players is greater
than three. Hence, the core-center does not satisfy coalitional monotonocity. Things do not get
better if we weaken the monotonicity property in the direction of aggregate monotonicity.
Proposition 5.1. Let n ≥ 4. Then, the core-center does dot satisfy aggregate monotonicity
within the class of balanced games with n-players.
Proof. The proof is made by means of an example when n = 4. If n > 4 the example can be
adapted by adding dummy players. Let (N, v) ∈ Gn be such that N = {1, 2, 3, 4} and v is defined
as follows:
S 1 2 3 4 12 13 14 23 24 34 123 124 134 234 N
v(S) 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 1 1 0 1 1 1 2 2
Now, C(N, v) = {(0, 0, 1, 1)} and hence, µ(N, v) = (0, 0, 1, 1). Let co(A) stand for the convex hull
of the set A. Let (N,w) be such that w(N) = 3 and for each S 6= N , w(S) = v(S). Then,
S 1 2 3 4 12 13 14 23 24 34 123 124 134 234 N
w(S) 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 1 1 0 1 1 1 2 3
and
C(N,w) = co{(1, 0, 1, 1), (0, 0, 2, 1), (0, 0, 1, 2), (0, 1, 1, 1), (1, 1, 1, 0), (1, 1, 0, 1), (1, 2, 0, 0)}.
Next, we prove that the core-center does not satisfy aggregate monotonicity by showing that
µ3(N, v) > µ3(N,w). Let (N, wˆ) be the game defined as follows:
S 1 2 3 4 12 13 14 23 24 34 123 124 134 234 N
wˆ(S) 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 1 1 0 1 1 2 2 3
with core
C(N, wˆ) = co{(1, 0, 1, 1), (0, 0, 2, 1), (0, 0, 1, 2), (0, 1, 1, 1), (1, 1, 1, 0), (1, 1, 0, 1)}.
The game (N, wˆ) only differs from (N,w) in the value for the coalition {1, 3, 4}. Figures 5.2
and 5.3 show the cores of (N,w) and (N, wˆ), respectively. Note that, because of the stronger
restriction for coalition {1, 3, 4}, C(N, wˆ) ( C(N,w). Now, C(N, wˆ) is symmetric with respect
to the point (0.5, 0.5, 1, 1), i.e., x ∈ C(N, wˆ)⇔ −(x− (0.5, 0.5, 1, 1)) + (0.5, 0.5, 1, 1) ∈ C(N, wˆ).
Hence, µ(N, wˆ) = (0.5, 0.5, 1, 1).
Now, C(N,w)\C(N, wˆ) ( co{(1, 1, 1, 0), (0, 1, 1, 1), (1, 1, 0, 1), (1, 2, 0, 0)}. Hence, for each x ∈
C(N,w)\C(N, wˆ), x3 ≤ 1. Moreover, the volume of the points in C(N,w)\C(N, wˆ) with the
third coordinate smaller than 1 is positive. Hence, by the definition of the core-center, since
µ3(N, wˆ) = 1, we have µ3(N,w) < 1 = µ3(N, v). Hence, the core-center does not satisfy aggregate
monotonicity.
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Figure 5.2: The core of the game (N,w)
1
2
4
3
Figure 5.3: The core of the game (N, wˆ)
The nucleolus (Schmeidler, 1969) also violates the three monotonicity properties we have
studied so far. Zhou (1991) introduces the weak coalitional monotonicity and shows that the
nucleolus satisfies it. This weakening of the coalitional monotonicity only requires that, when
one coalition improves moving from (N,w) to (N, v) and there is no difference for all the other
coalitions, then, the coalition as a whole (instead each player separately) has to be better off in
the allocation selected for (N, v).
Proposition 5.2. The core-center satisfies weak coalitional monotonicity.
Proof. Let (N, v) and (N,w) be two balanced games as in the definition of weak coalitional
monotonicity, i.e., they only differ in the fact that w(T ) > v(T ) for a given coalition T . If
T = N the result is immediately derived from the efficiency property. Hence, we can assume
T ( N . If C(N,w) = C(N, v) then µ(N,w) = µ(N, v) and
∑
i∈T µi(N,w) ≥
∑
i∈T µi(N, v).
Hence, we can assume that C(N,w) ( C(N, v). Let x ∈ C(N, v)\C(N,w) and y ∈ C(N,w), then∑
i∈T yi ≥ w(T ) >
∑
i∈T xi. Since the core-center is the expectation of the uniform distribution
over the core, and passing from C(N, v) to C(N,w) we have removed the “bad” allocations for
coalition T (as a whole), this coalition is better off in the core-center of (N,w).
Hence, the core-center and the nucleolus have an analogous behavior with respect to all
monotonicity properties discussed in this Chapter.
5.2.4 Continuity
When introducing a new allocation rule, one of the first things to study is whether it is continuous
or not. Intuitively, one could think that the center of gravity of the core of a game (N, v) varies
continuously as a function of (N, v). Although the result is true, that intuition could lead to wrong
arguments. The core is a set-valued mapping from R2
n−1 to Rn, and there is a huge literature
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studying the problem of continuous selection from set-valued mappings (see, for instance, Michael
(1956)).
If two balanced games are close enough (as vectors of R2
n−1), then the corresponding cores are
also close to each other (as sets). We are computing the center of gravity of these sets when they
are endowed with the uniform distribution. Hence, the question is: are also the corresponding
measures (associated with the uniform distribution) close to each other? This problem is not
trivial at all. The following example shows what the problem is:
Example 5.1. Consider the triangle with vertices (a, 0), (−a, 0) and (0, 1). The center of gravity
of this triangle is (0, 1/3), no matter the value a takes. If we let a tend to 0 then, “in the limit”,
we get the segment joining the points (0, 0) and (0, 1), whose center of gravity is (0, 1/2), which
is not the limit of the centers of gravity.
The problem with the continuity arises when the number of dimensions of the space under
consideration is not fixed, i.e., an (n − 2)-polytope can be expressed (as a set) as the limit of
(n − 1)-polytopes. As we have shown in the previous example, the continuity property is quite
sensitive to this kind of degenerations. Hence, this problem must be handled carefully, taking into
account that the center of gravity of a convex polytope does not necessarily vary with continuity
if degenerations are permitted. Even so, the following statement is true:
Theorem 5.1. The core-center is continuous.
The proof of this statement is quite technical. In Section 5.3 we formally introduce the problem
along with the concepts needed for the proof.
5.2.5 Computation
The complexity of the computation of any allocation rule is a concept which also needs to be
studied. Here, we provide some insights to this problem when working with the core-center. The
computation of the center of gravity of a convex polytope is a problem which has been widely
studied in computational geometry. There are many negative results concerning the complexity
of this problem. In the case of the core-center, even if we are given a polynomial description of
the game (i.e., of the function v), the computation time can grow exponentially with the number
of players. Basically, there are two ways for obtaining the center of gravity of a convex polytope.
The classical one consists of the exact computation; many algorithms have already been developed
for this issue, but all of them are exponential in the number of players. The second approach
consists of using randomizing procedures to estimate the center of gravity. Roughly speaking,
these procedures lead to algorithms which allow to obtain the estimations in polynomial time
whenever we are able to find out whether a point belongs or not to the core in polynomial time;
this is not a mild assumption, but it cannot be dispensed with.
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5.3 Continuity of the Core-Center
5.3.1 The Problem
First, we introduce the exact formulation of the problem to be solved. Henceforth, we denote a
game (N, v) by v. Note that in order to prove Theorem 5.1 it is enough to show that for each
balanced game v, and each sequence of balanced games converging to v (under the usual conver-
gence of vectors in R2
n−1), the associated sequence of the core-centers of the games converges to
the core-center of v. Formally,
Theorem 5.2. Let v¯ be a balanced game and {vt} a sequence of balanced games such that
limt→∞ vt = v¯. Then, limt→∞ µ(vt) = µ(v¯).
Clearly, Theorems 5.1 and 5.2 are equivalent. The next Proposition, which is a weaker ver-
sion of the previous Theorem contains the difficult part of the proof. Theorem 5.2, and hence
Theorem 5.1, are an easy consequence.
Proposition 5.3. Let v¯ be a balanced game and {vt} a sequence of balanced games such that
(i) for each t ∈ N, we have v¯(N) = vt(N),
(ii) limt→∞ vt = v¯.
Then, limt→∞ µ(vt) = µ(v¯).
In contrast with Theorem 5.2, where every possible sequence of games is considered, Propo-
sition 5.3 only concerns specific sequences. Next, we prepare the ground for Proposition 5.3. We
do it by stating and proving a general result. Then, Proposition 5.3 is easily derived. We make
use of some measure theory and functional analysis results, which help us to place our result on
a firm basis.
5.3.2 A New Framework
Next, we introduce a new framework in which we state and prove a general convergence result for
uniform measures. Then, the main part of the proof of Proposition 5.3 is a particular case. The
idea of the whole procedure can be summarized as follows: whenever we think about a balanced
game and its core-center, we can just think of a polytope (its core) and its center of gravity.
Similarly, whenever we have a polytope and its center of gravity, we can just think of the uniform
measure defined over the polytope and the integral of the identity function with respect to it.
Following this idea, if we want to prove that the core-center of a sequence of games converges to
the core-center of the limit game (Theorem 5.2), it is enough to prove that the integrals over the
corresponding uniform measures also converge.
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Notation
A (convex) polyhedron is defined as the intersection of a finite number of closed halfspaces. A
polyhedron P is an m-polyhedron if its dimension is m, i.e., the smallest integer such that P
is contained in an m-dimensional space. A (convex) polytope is a bounded polyhedron. Let
Mmλ stand for the Lebesgue measure on R
m. Let A ⊆ Rm be a Lebesgue measurable set and let
m′ ≥ m; we denoteMm′λ (A) by Volm′(A) , i.e., them′-dimensional volume of A; hence, if A ⊆ Rm
and m′ > m, then, Volm′(A) = 0. Let P be an m-polytope and XP its characteristic function;
let MP be the Borel measure such that MP :=
1
Volm(P )
XPMmλ , i.e., the uniform measure defined
over polytope P .
Let u be a vector in Rm. Let Huα be the following hyperplane normal to u, H
u
α := {x ∈ Rm :∑m
j=1 ujxj = α}. Let BH be the halfspace below hyperplane H. Let P be a polytope, then
we say that hyperplane H is a supporting hyperplane for P if H ∩ P 6= ∅ and BH contains P .
Usually, a face of a polytope P is defined as (i) P itself, (ii) the empty set, or (iii) the intersection
of P with some supporting hyperplane. With a slight abuse of language, we use the term face to
designate only (m− 1)-dimensional faces of an m-polytope. Let F(P ) be the set of all faces of P
and F be an arbitrary face.
Let P be an m-polytope. Then, the finite set of polytopes {P1, . . . , Pk} is a dissection of P if
(i) P =
⋃k
j=1 Pj and (ii) for each pair {j, j′} ⊆ {1, . . . , k}, with j 6= j′, Volm(Pj ∩ Pj′) = 0.
Next, we state, without proof, two elemental results.
Lemma 5.2. Let P and P ′ be two m-polytopes such that P ′ ⊆ P . Then, P ′ belongs to some
dissection of P .
Lemma 5.3. Let P be an m-polyhedron, let u ∈ Rm, and let α, β ∈ R. Let P ∩ Huα 6= ∅ and
P ∩Huβ 6= ∅. Then, P ∩Huα is bounded if and only if P ∩Huβ is bounded.
Let P be an m-polytope, let r > 0 be such that P ( (−r, r)m ( Rm. Let R := [−r, r]m. The
pair (R,B), where B stands for the collection of Borel sets of R, is a measure space. LetM(R) be
the set of all complex-valued regular Borel measures defined on (R,B) and M+(R) the subset of
real-valued and positive Borel measures. Also, let C(R) and CR(R) be the sets of all continuous
functions f : R→ C and f : R→ R respectively.
As a consequence of the Riesz Representation Theorem, C(R)∗ = M(R), i.e., M(R) is the
dual of C(R). This allows us to use the weak∗ topology (henceforth w∗) in M(R). According
to this topology, a sequence of measures {Mt} converges to a measure M if and only if for each
f ∈ C(R), limt→∞
∫
fdMt =
∫
fdM . For each f ∈ C(R), and each measure M ∈ M(R), 〈f,M〉
denotes
∫
fdM .
Remark. We apologize for the readers that are not familiar with these concepts. They lead to
a more consistent notation, cleaner statements, and less tedious proofs. Henceforth, convergence
of a sequence of measures {Mt} to a measure M under w∗ just means that, for each continuous
function f , the sequence of real numbers obtained by integration of f under theMt’s converges to
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the integral under M . Moreover, for notational convenience, we denote those integrals by 〈f,Mt〉
and 〈f,M〉, respectively.
The results
Next, we prove two technical lemmas.
Lemma 5.4. Let f : R2 → R be a continuous function and K ( R a compact set. Then, the
function h : R→ R defined by h(x) := maxy∈K f(x, y) is continuous.
Proof. Suppose, on the contrary, that h is not continuous. Then, there is a sequence of real
numbers {xt} such that (i) limt→∞ xt = x, and (ii) the sequence {h(xt)} does not converge to
h(x). Let y∗ ∈ K be such that f(x, y∗) = maxy∈K f(x, y) = h(x).
For each t ∈ N, let yt ∈ K be such that h(xt) = f(xt, yt). Since each yt ∈ K, the sequence
{yt} has a convergent subsequence. Assume, without loss of generality, that {yt} itself converges
and let y′ be its limit. Then,
f(x, y∗) = h(x)
assumpt
6= lim
t→∞h(xt) = limt→∞ f(xt, yt)
fcont
= f(x, y′).
Hence, f(x, y∗) > f(x, y′). Then, there is δ > 0 such that
|xt − x| < δ
|yt − y′| < δ
}
fcont
=⇒ f(xt, y∗)− f(xt, yt) > 0, contradicting h(xt) = f(xt, yt).
Corollary 5.1. Let f : Rm → R be a continuous function and K ( Rl, 1 < l < m, a compact
set. Then, the function h : Rm−l → R defined by h(x) := maxy∈K f(x, y) is continuous.
Proof. The proof of Lemma 5.4 can be immediately adapted to this general case.
Note that analogous results to Lemma 5.4 and Corollary 5.1 can be stated using min instead
of max.
Lemma 5.5. Let M ∈ M(R) and let {Mt} be a sequence of measures in M(R) such that for
each f ∈ CR(R), limt→∞〈f,Mt〉 = 〈f,M〉. Then, for each f ∈ C(R), limt→∞〈f,Mt〉 = 〈f,M〉.
Proof. For each f ∈ C(R), there exist functions f1 and f2 in CR(R) such that for each x ∈ R,
f(x) = f1(x) + f2(x)i. Then,
〈f,Mt〉 =
∫
f dMt =
∫
f1 dMt + i
∫
f2 dMt
t→∞−→
∫
f1 dM + i
∫
f2 dM = 〈f,M〉.
As a consequence of Lemma 5.5, to prove a convergence under w∗, it suffices to study functions
in CR(R).
Now we are ready to state the main result.
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Theorem 5.3. Let P be an m-polytope and R an m-dimensional cube [−r, r]m containing P in
its interior. Let u ∈ Rm. Let α¯ ∈ R and let {αt} be a sequence in [α¯,∞) with limit α¯. Let
Pt := P ∩BHuαt and P¯ := P ∩BHuα¯. Then, MPt
w∗−→MP¯ .
Proof. Without loss of generality, we assume that u = e1 = (1, 0, . . . , 0) (otherwise a change of
coordinates can be carried out) and that {αt} is a decreasing sequence of positive numbers. If P¯
is an m-polytope, there are no degeneracies and the result is straightforward. Hence, we assume
that P¯ is not an m-polytope. Hence, α¯ = minx∈P x1. Now, we distinguish two cases: P¯ is an
(m− 1)-polytope, and P¯ is an (m− l)-polytope, with l > 1 (multiple degeneracy).
Case 1: P¯ is an (m− 1)-polytope.
Let Q be the polyhedron defined as follows,
Q := {y ∈ Rm : y = x+ γe1, where x ∈ P¯ and γ > 0}.
Now, for each t ∈ N, we define the auxiliary polytopes Qt := Q ∩ BHe1αt . Also, let Q¯ :=
Q ∩BHe1α¯ (see Figure 5.4). Note that, by definition, Q¯ = P¯ .
P¯
Qt−1 Qt
He
1
αt
He
1
αt−1· · ·H
e1
α¯
x Qt(x)
R
P
Figure 5.4: The Qt polytopes
The proof is in three steps. In Step 1 we prove that the sequence of measures induced by
the auxiliary polytopes, {MQt}, converges to MQ¯. In Step 2, we study the relations between the
volumes of Pt\Qt, Qt\Pt, and Qt. Finally, in Step 3 we obtain the desired convergence result,
i.e., that of the sequence {MPt} to MP¯ . Recall that, by Lemma 5.5, we can restrict our attention
to functions in CR(R) whenever we have to prove some convergence under w∗.
Step 1: MQt
w∗−→MQ¯.
We want to prove that for each f ∈ CR(R), limt→∞〈f,MQt〉 = 〈f,MQ¯〉.
Step 1.a: Let f ∈ CR(R) be such that there exists c : [−r, r]m−1 → R with the following
property: for each x ∈ [−r, r]m, f(x) = c(x−1). Let dx−1 stand for dx2 . . . dxm. Also, for each
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x ∈ Q¯ and each t ∈ N, we define the 1-polytopes Qt(x) := {y ∈ Qt : y−1 = x−1}. Note that, if
x 6= x′, then Qt(x) ∩ Qt(x′) = ∅ and Vol1(Qt(x)) = Vol1(Qt(x′)) = αt − α¯. Moreover, for each
x ∈ Q¯, f is constant in Qt(x). Then,
〈f,MQt〉 =
1
Volm (Qt)
∫
Q¯
∫
Qt(x)
c(x−1)dx−1dx1
=
αt − α¯
Volm (Qt)
∫
Q¯
c(x−1)dx−1
=
1
Volm−1 (Q¯)
∫
Q¯
c(x−1)dx−1
= 〈f,MQ¯〉.
Step 1.b: Let f ∈ CR(R). Define the three auxiliary functions
f∗(x1, x−1) := f(α¯, x−1),
ct(x1, x−1) := max
z∈[α¯,αt]
f(z, x−1), and
ct(x1, x−1) := min
z∈[α¯,αt]
f(z, x−1).
By Corollary 5.1, functions ct and ct are continuous. Hence, by Step 1.a, we have 〈ct,MQt〉 =
〈ct,MQ¯〉 and 〈ct,MQt〉 = 〈ct,MQ¯〉. By the continuity of f , for each x ∈ R, limt→∞ ct(x) =
f∗(x) = limt→∞ ct(x). Let g be the constant function such that for each x ∈ R, g(x) :=
maxx∈R |f(x)|. Since
∫
g dMQ¯ = maxx∈R |f(x)|, g is Lebesgue integrable with respect to MQ¯.
Moreover, for each x ∈ R, |ct(x)| ≤ g(x) and |ct(x)| ≤ g(x). Since MQt ∈ M+(R), then
〈ct,MQt〉 ≤ 〈f,MQt〉 ≤ 〈ct,MQt〉. Now, the Lebesgue’s Dominated Convergence Theorem
completes Step 1,
〈ct,MQt〉 ≤ 〈f,MQt〉 ≤ 〈ct,MQt〉
Step 1.a
〈ct,MQ¯〉
t→∞ ↓ Dom Conv
〈f∗,MQ¯〉
f∗(x) = f(x), x ∈ Q¯
〈f,MQ¯〉
Step 1.a
〈ct,MQ¯〉
t→∞ ↓ Dom Conv
〈f∗,MQ¯〉
f∗(x) = f(x), x ∈ Q¯
〈f,MQ¯〉.
Hence, for each f ∈ CR(R), limt→∞〈f,MQt〉 = 〈f,MQ¯〉.
Step 2: lim
t→∞
Volm(Pt\Qt)
Volm(Qt)
= lim
t→∞
Volm(Qt\Pt)
Volm(Qt)
= 0 and lim
t→∞
Volm(Pt)
Volm(Qt)
= 1.
We show that limt→∞
Volm(Pt\Qt)
Volm(Qt)
= 0, being the proof for Qt\Pt analogous. By Lemma 5.2,
there are polytopes P 11 , . . . , P
k
1 , k ≥ 1, such that {P 11 , . . . , P k1 , Q1 ∩ P1} is a dissection of P1.
Hence, P1\Q1 ( ∪kj=1P j1 = co(P1\Q1). Note that co(P1\Q1) coincides with the closure of
P1\Q1. Now, for each t ∈ N and each j ∈ {1, . . . , k}, let P jt := P j1 ∩ BHe
1
αt . Then, for each
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t ∈ N, {P 1t , . . . , P kt , Qt ∩ Pt} is a dissection of Pt and Pt\Qt ( ∪kj=1P jt = co(Pt\Qt). Hence,
Volm(Pt\Qt) ≤
∑k
j=1Volm(P
j
t ) (actually, they are equal).
Now, since Volm(Qt) = Volm−1(P¯ )(αt − α¯), Volm(Qt) = O(αt − α¯), i.e., Volm(Qt) is a linear
function of (αt − α¯).1 Let j ∈ {1, . . . , k}, since Q¯ = P¯ , P j1 ∩ BHe
1
α¯ is contained in some face
of P¯ , i.e., it is in the boundary of P¯ . Hence, P j1 ∩ BHe
1
α¯ is, at most, an (m − 2)-polytope.
Hence, if for each t ∈ N , P jt is an m-polytope, we have that, in the limit, there is, at least, a
2-dimensional degeneracy. Hence, Volm(P
j
t ) = o((αt− α¯)2).2 Now, since the number of polytopes
in the dissection is finite, we have Volm(Pt\Qt) = o((αt − α¯)2).
Finally, lim
t→∞
Volm(Pt\Qt)
Volm(Qt)
= lim
t→∞
o((αt − α¯)2)
O(αt − α¯) = 0.
We turn now to Volm(Pt)Volm(Qt) . Since Pt = Qt\(Qt\Pt) ∪ (Pt\Qt), and Qt\(Qt\Pt) and Pt\Qt are
disjoint sets, then Volm(Pt) = Volm(Qt)−Volm(Qt\Pt) + Volm(Pt\Qt). Hence,
lim
t→∞
Volm(Pt)
Volm(Qt)
= lim
t→∞
(
1− Volm(Qt\Pt)
Volm(Qt)
+
Volm(Pt\Qt)
Volm(Qt)
)
= 1.
Step 3: MPt
w∗−→MP¯ .∫
f dMPt =
∫
fXPt
Volm(Pt)
dMmλ
=
1
Volm(Pt)
∫
f(XQt −XQt\Pt + XPt\Qt) dMmλ
=
∫
fXQt
Volm(Pt)
dMmλ −
∫
fXQt\Pt
Volm(Pt)
dMmλ +
∫
fXPt\Qt
Volm(Pt)
dMmλ .
We want to show that both the second and the third addend tend to 0. We can assume
that Volm(Qt\Pt) 6= 0, otherwise,
∫
fXQt\Pt dMmλ = 0 and we are done with the corresponding
addend. Similarly, we assume that Volm(Pt\Qt) 6= 0. Now,∫
f dMPt = A1 −A2 +A3,
where,
A1 =
Volm(Qt)
Volm(Pt)
∫
fXQt
Volm(Qt)
dMmλ =
Volm(Qt)
Volm(Pt)
∫
f dMQt ,
A2 =
Volm(Qt\Pt)
Volm(Pt)
∫
fXQt\Pt
Volm(Qt\Pt)dM
m
λ =
Volm(Qt\Pt)
Volm(Pt)
∫
fdMQt\Pt , and
A3 =
Volm(Pt\Qt)
Volm(Pt)
∫
fXPt\Qt
Volm(Pt\Qt)dM
m
λ =
Volm(Pt\Qt)
Volm(Pt)
∫
f dMPt\Qt .
1We say that f(t) = O(g(t)) if there are c1, c2 > 0 and t′ ∈ N such that, for each t > t′, c1|g(t)| ≤ |f(t)| ≤
c2|g(t)|. The notation f(t) = o(g(t)) means that there is c > 0 and t′ ∈ N such that, for each t > t′, |f(t)| ≤ c|g(t)|.
2Just because, roughly speaking, the volume of a polytope is a linear function of its “length” in each dimension.
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Since
∫
fdMQt\Pt ≤ maxx∈R f(x) and
∫
fdMPt\Qt ≤ maxx∈R f(x), then, by Step 2, both A2
and A3 tend to 0. We move now to A1. By Step 2, limt→∞
Volm(Qt)
Volm(Pt)
= 1. Since, by Step 1,
limt→∞
∫
f dMQt =
∫
f dMP¯ , we have limt→∞
∫
f dMPt =
∫
f dMP¯ .
Case 2: P¯ is an (m− l)-polytope, l > 1.
We have multiple degeneracy. To study this case, new auxiliary polytopes Qt and Q¯ have to
be defined, but the idea of the proof is the same. Assume that the degeneracies are in the first l
components. Then, there exist a1, . . . , al ∈ R such that for each x ∈ P¯ , x1 = a1, . . . , xl = al. Let
{F1, . . . , Fk} ⊆ F(P ) be the set of the faces of P containing P¯ ; since P¯ is an (m − l)-polytope,
k ≥ 2. For each j ∈ {1, . . . , k}, let Hj be the hyperplane containing Fj and assume, without loss
of generality, that P ( BHj . For each i ∈ {1, . . . ,m}, let ei ∈ Rm be the i-th canonical vector.
Let Q be the polyhedron defined as follows,
Q :=
{
y ∈ Rm : for each j ∈ {1, . . . , k}, y ∈ BH
j and
y = x+
∑l
i=1 γie
i, where x ∈ P¯ and, for each i ∈ {1, . . . , l}, γi > 0
}
.
Now, for each t ∈ N, we define the auxiliary polytopes Qt := Q ∩ BHe1αt . Also, let Q¯ :=
Q ∩ BHe1α¯ (see Figure 5.5). Note that, by definition, Q¯ = P¯ . Since Qt ∩ He
1
α¯ = Q¯ is bounded,
applying Lemma 5.3, we have that Qt is bounded. Hence, each Qt is indeed a polytope.
Now, all the steps in Case 1 can be adapted for the Qt’s. Only some minor (and natural)
changes have to be made. Next, we go through these steps, stressing where modifications are
needed.
Step 1: MQt
w∗−→MQ¯.
Step 1.a: Let xL := (x1, . . . , xl) and xL¯ := (xl+1, . . . , xm). Let f ∈ CR(R) be such that there
exists c : [−r, r]m−l → R with the following property: f(xL, xL¯) = c(xL). Also, for each x ∈ Q¯
and each t ∈ N, we define the l-polytope Qt(x) := {y ∈ Qt : y−L = x−L} (Figure 5.6). Again, if
x 6= x′, then Qt(x) ∩Qt(x′) = ∅ and Voll(Qt(x)) = Voll(Qt(x′)) = Volm(Qt)Volm−l(Q¯) . Moreover, for each
x ∈ Q¯, f is constant in Qt(x). The rest is analogous to Case 1.
Step 1.b: Let f ∈ CR(R). Let xˆ ∈ Q¯. For each t ∈ N, we define the compact set
Kt := {z ∈ Rl : z = yL, where (yL, yL¯) = y ∈ Qt(xˆ)}, i.e., Kt is the projection of Qt(x) into Rl.
Note that the definition of Kt is independent of the selected xˆ ∈ Q¯. Define the three auxiliary
functions
f∗(xL, xL¯) := f(a1, . . . , al, xL¯),
ct(xL, xL¯) := max
z∈Kt
f(z, xL¯), and
ct(xL, xL¯) := min
z∈Kt
f(z, xL¯).
With these definitions Corollary 5.1 still applies. The rest is analogous to Case 1.
Step 2: lim
t→∞
Volm(Pt\Qt)
Volm(Qt)
= lim
t→∞
Volm(Qt\Pt)
Volm(Qt)
= 0 and lim
t→∞
Volm(Pt)
Volm(Qt)
= 1.
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P
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1
α¯
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Q1
Figure 5.5: Defining the polytopes Qt (P is a 2-polytope and P¯ a 0-polytope)
front face
He
1
α¯
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1
αt
Qt(x)
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Q¯ = P¯
Qt
R
Figure 5.6: The set Qt(x) (P is a 3-polytope and P¯ a 1-polytope)
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Now, P j1 ∩ BHe
1
α¯ is, at most, an (m − (l + 1))-polytope; Volm(Pt\Qt) = o((αt − α¯)l+1); and
Volm(Qt) = O(αt − α¯)l. The rest is analogous to Case 1.
Step 3: MPt
w∗−→MP¯ . Analogous to Case 1.
Remark. Now, if we go back to Example 5.1, the one we used to illustrate the problem with
continuity, we can wonder why the scheme of the proof above does not apply. The reason is that
the vector u we used to define the sequence of polytopes was fixed for the whole proof and, in
Example 5.1, we would need an infinite number of different vectors to construct the corresponding
sequence of polytopes.
So far, measures MP have belonged to M(R). These measures can be extended to (Borel)
measures in Rm by letting the measure of each A ⊆ Rm be MP (A ∩ R). With a slight abuse of
notation, we also denote these extensions by MP .
Corollary 5.2. Let P ( Rm be an (m − l)-polytope, 0 ≤ l ≤ m. Let u ∈ Rm. Let α¯ ∈ R and
let {αt} be a sequence in [α¯,∞) with limit α¯. Let Pt := P ∩ BHuαt and P¯ := P ∩ BHuα¯. Let
f : Rm → R be a continuous function. Then, limt→∞
∫
f dMPt =
∫
f dMP¯ .
Proof. We distinguish two cases:
Case 1: l = 0. Let r > 0 be such that P is contained in the interior of R = [−r, r]m. Let
fR : R→ R be the restriction of f to R. Then,∫
f dMPt =
∫
fR dMPt
Th. 5.3−→
∫
fR dMP¯ =
∫
f dMP¯ .
Case 2: l > 0. There exist a1, . . . , al ∈ R such that x ∈ P if and only if x1 = a1, . . . , xl = al.
Let R = a1 × . . . × al × [−r, r]m−l be such that P belongs to its interior. Now, everything in
Theorem 5.3 can be adapted for the MPt ’s, MP¯ and this new R. Hence, the same argument of
Case 1 leads to the result.
5.3.3 Back to Game Theory
Now, we turn back to the game theoretical framework and prove the results stated in Section 5.3.1.
Proof of Proposition 5.3. We distinguish two cases in this proof. In Case 1, only the value of
a fixed coalition S varies throughout the sequence {vt}. Next, in Case 2, all the coalitions but
coalition N can change.
Case 1: There is S ( N such that for each T 6= S and each t ∈ N, v¯(T ) = vt(T ).
First, we define a new game whose core contains the cores of all vt’s and of v¯. Let v be
defined, for each S ⊆ N , by v(S) := min{v¯(S), {vt(S) : t ∈ N}}. Game v is well-defined because
the set v¯(S) ∪ {vt(S) : t ∈ N} is compact for each S (otherwise the sequence {vt} would not
be convergent). Let P := C(v), Pt := C(v
t) and P¯ := C(v¯). Clearly, by definition of v, P
contains polytopes Pt and P¯ . Let H
S
vt(S) be the hyperplane of equation
∑
i∈S xi = v
t(S). Let
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eS ∈ Rn be such that eSi = 1 if i ∈ S and eSi = 0 if i /∈ S. Then, eS is the normal vector
of HSvt(S). The sequence {vt(S)} has limit v¯(S). Now, using the notation of Section 5.3.2, let
Pt = P ∩ BHeSvt(S), and P¯ = P ∩ BHe
S
v¯(S). Let h : R
n → Rn be defined by h(x) := x. Then,
µ(vt) =
∫
h dMPt and µ(v¯) =
∫
h dMP¯ . For each i ∈ {1, . . . , n}, the function hi : Rn → R defined
by hi(x) = (h(x))i = xi is continuous. Hence, by applying Corollary 5.2 to each hi, we have
limt→∞ µ(vt) = µ(v¯).
Case 2: For each t ∈ N, v¯(N) = vt(N). Only the value for the grand coalition is fixed now.
Assume that there are coalitions S, S¯ ( N such that, for each T 6= S, S¯ and each t ∈ N,
v¯(T ) = vt(T ). Let BHe
S
vt(S) and BH
eS¯
vt(S¯)
be the corresponding halfspaces. The key now, is that
we can change the order in which we make the intersections with the halfspaces, i.e., the same
polytope arises if we intersect first with a (BHe
S
)-like halfspace and then with a (BHe
S¯
)-like
one, or we intersect the other way around. Then, we can see the sequence of polytopes as a
sequence with two indices. Polytope Pi,j is obtained by intersecting P with the i
th (BHe
S
)-like
halfspace and the jth (BHe
S¯
)-like halfspace. Polytope P¯ is the “limit” of the polytopes Pi,j when
both i and j go to infinity. Hence, using Case 1 first for index i and second for index j, we
prove the convergence of the centers of gravity. Intuitively, we carry out all the intersections with
one halfspace, and then we do so with the other one (limits are inter-changeable). If there are
more than two different types of halfspaces (more coalitions with non-fixed values throughout the
sequence), the same argument works because there is always a finite number of such types.
Proof of Theorem 5.2. Now we consider the general case, when the worths of all coalitions can
vary along the sequence {vt} .
Let εt := v¯(N) − vt(N) (note that εt can be either positive or negative). For each t ∈ N,
let vˆt be the auxiliary game such that for each S ⊆ N , vˆt(S) = vt(S) + |S|n εt. Now, for each
t ∈ N, we have (i) vˆt(N) = v¯(N), and (ii) C(vˆt) is obtained by translation of C(vt) by the
vector 1n (εt, . . . , εt). Since {εt} tends to 0, limt→∞ vt = v¯ implies that limt→∞ vˆt = v¯. Hence,
by Proposition 5.3, limt→∞ µ(vˆt) = µ(v¯). Since the core-center is translation invariant, µ(vt) =
µ(vˆt)− 1n (εt, . . . , εt). Now, using again that {εt} → 0 we have
lim
t→∞µ(v
t) = lim
t→∞
(
µ(vˆt)− 1
n
(εt, . . . , εt)
)
= lim
t→∞µ(vˆ
t)− lim
t→∞
1
n
(εt, . . . , εt) = µ(v¯),
and the Theorem is proved.
5.4 Concluding Remarks
In this Chapter we introduced a new allocation rule for the class of balanced games: the core-
center. Then, we provided a detailed discussion of the axiomatic properties of the core-center.
Special emphasis was made in two of them. First, we showed that the core-center does not satisfy
some of the standard monotonicity properties; even though, we showed that it satisfies weak
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coalitional monotonicity and we established a certain parallelism with the nucleolus. Second, we
deeply discussed the continuity property of the core-center. This property is finally derived from a
more general result. Indeed, using Corollary 5.2, it can be shown that any allocation rule defined
as the integral, with regard to the Lebesgue measure, of a continuous function (not necessarily
the identity) is also continuous.
5.A Appendix (Classical Results in Measure Theory and
Functional Analysis)
This appendix contains the statements of the main classic results used along the chapter. For a
deeper discussion refer to Rudin (1966) and/or Conway (1990) and/or Billingsley (1968).
Let X be any set and let Ω be a σ-algebra of subsets of X. Hence, (X,Ω) is a measurable
space. If X is a locally compact set and Ω denotes the smallest σ-algebra of subsets of X that
contains the open sets, then sets in Ω are called Borel sets. Let (X,B) denote this particular
measurable space and let M(X) be the set of complex-valued regular Borel measures on X.
5.A.1 The Riesz Representation Theorem
Let X be a locally compact set. Let C0(X) be the set of all continuous functions f : X → C such
that for each ε > 0, the set {x ∈ X : |f(x)| ≥ ε} is compact. Let C0(X)∗ be the dual of C0(X).
Next theorem shows that the dual of C0(X) is M(X).
Theorem 5.4 (Riesz Representation Theorem3). Let X be a locally compact space and M ∈
M(X). Let FM : C0(X)→ C be such that FM(f) :=
∫
f dM. Then, FM ∈ C0(X)∗ and the map
η 7→ Fη is an isometric isomorphism of M(X) onto C0(X)∗.
In this chapter X = R, a compact space. Hence, C0(R) = C(R), and the Riesz Representation
Theorem can be used to conclude that C(R)∗ =M(R).
5.A.2 The Weak∗ Topology
Seminorms and generated topologies
Let X be a normed space. A natural metric can be defined considering the distance d(x, y) :=
||x − y||. Let τ be the topology induced by this metric. This topology is usually referred to as
the topology induced by the norm.
If X is a vector space over K, a seminorm is a function q : X → [0,∞) having the following
properties,
(i) for each pair x, y ∈ X, q(x+ y) ≤ q(x) + q(y),
3There are many similar theorems in literature which have been named “Riesz Representation Theorem”, the
one we present here has been extracted from Conway (1990).
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(ii) for each α in K, and each x in X, q(αx) = |α|q(x).
A norm is a seminorm such that q(x) = 0 implies x = 0. Seminorms can be used to generate
topologies, indeed, the weak∗ topology is defined in this way.
Let X be a vector space and {qα, α ∈ I} be a family of seminorms. The smallest translation
invariant topology that makes all the qα continuous, is the topology generated by {qα, α ∈ I}. It
can be proved that the collection {⋂∞k=1 q−1αk ([0, εk)) : ε1, . . . , εn ∈ (0,∞) , α1, . . . , αn ∈ I , n ∈
N}, is a local base in the origin for this topology (now, by the translation invariance property a
base can be obtained). Under this topology, V ⊆ X is open if and only if for each x ∈ V , there
exist α1, . . . , αn ∈ I, and ε1, . . . , εn ∈ (0,∞), such that x +
⋂∞
k=1 q
−1
αk
([0, εk)) ⊆ V . Moreover,
limn→∞{xn} = 0 if and only if for each ε > 0, and each α ∈ I, there exists Nαε such that
for each n > Nαε , xn ∈ q−1α ([0, ε)). Then, limn→∞{xn} = 0 if and only if for each α ∈ I,
limn→∞ qα(xn) = 0. Since this topology is translation invariant, then limn→∞{xn} = x if and
only if limn→∞{xn − x} = 0.
Weak∗ topology
Next, the weak∗ topology, henceforth w∗, in introduced. Let X be a normed space, X∗ its dual
and τ and τ∗ the topologies induced by the corresponding norms. For each x ∈ X, let qx be the
function in X∗ such that for each ϕ ∈ X∗, qx(ϕ) = |ϕ(x)| = |〈ϕ, x〉|. Function qx is a seminorm
in X∗. The family of seminorms {qx : x ∈ X}, generates a topology in X∗, w∗. Recall that w∗
is, therefore, the smallest topology under which all the seminorms are continuous. It is also true
that w∗ ≤ τ∗; the equality holds if and only if dim(X∗) <∞.
Borel measures and the weak∗ topology
In this chapter X = C(R) and X∗ =M(R). Consider the topology w∗ in M(R). The sequence of
measures {Mn} converges to the measureM if and only if {Mn−M} converges to the measure
0, i.e., for each f ∈ C(R), limn→∞ qf (Mn −M) = 0. Then, the sequence converges if and only
if for each f ∈ C(R), limn→∞
∫
fdMn =
∫
fdM. The latter formulation is the appropriate for
this chapter.
5.A.3 Lebesgue’s Dominated Convergence Theorem
Let X be a measurable space, Y a topological space and f a mapping of X into Y . Then, f
is a measurable function if for each open set V in Y , f−1(V ) is a measurable set in X. Let
M ∈ M(X), and let L1(M) be the collection of all complex measurable functions f on X for
which
∫ |f |dM < ∞. Functions in L1(M) are called Lebesgue integrable functions with respect
to M.
Theorem 5.5 (Lebesgue’s Dominated Convergence Theorem). Let {fn} be a sequence of complex
measurable functions on X such that for each x ∈ X, f(x) := limn→∞ fn(x) exists. If there is a
5.A. Appendix (Classical Results) 83
function g ∈ L1(M) such that for each n ∈ N, and all x ∈ X, |fn(x)| ≤ g(x), then f ∈ L1(M),
limn→∞
∫
X
|fn − f | dM = 0, and limn→∞
∫
X
fn dM =
∫
X
f dM.
In this chapter we apply this theorem to the sequences of functions {ct} and {ct} defined
in Step 1.a of the proof of Theorem 5.3. It is easy to verify that they are, indeed, under the
assumptions needed for the theorem. They are continuous and, since we work with Borel measures,
they are also measurable. It is also easy to define a function dominating them because we work
in a compact set. Finally, the punctual convergence in R is also fulfilled.
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6.1 Introduction
In González-Díaz and Sánchez-Rodríguez (2003), the core-center, a new allocation rule for the
class of balanced games is introduced. That paper contains a first approach both to the study of
the axiomatic properties of the core-center and to the search for an axiomatic characterization.
This Chapter focuses in the latter. We formally develope and refine the characterization provided
there.
The key property for the characterization is a weighted additivity, based on a principle of
fairness with regard to the core, that we call fair additivity. This property, along with other
standard properties in game theory leads to the axiomatic characterization of the core-center. It
has a certain parallelism with the characterization of the Shapley value based on the additivity
property. First, we prove the result for games with a simplicial core, which play the role of the
unanimity games in Shapley’s characterization. Second, we prove the result for arbitrary games
by means of simplicial dissections of their cores.
In the fair additivity property the weights depend on the volumes of the cores. There are
antecedents in game theory that look for this kind of fairness. One of the solutions for two person
bargaining problems which depends on the whole feasible set is the Equal Area Solution. Anbarci
and Bigelow (1994) interpreted equal area as equal concessions. Later Calvo and Peters (2000)
looked at the underlying dynamic process.
The structure of this Chapter is as follows. In Section 6.2 we introduce the preliminary game
theoretical concepts along with the definition of the core-center. In Section 6.3 we introduce and
discuss the fair additivity property. In Section 6.4 we state and prove the characterization of the
core-center. Finally, in the Appendix we provide rigorous proofs of some technical statements
which have been skipped in the text; moreover, it also includes formal definitions and properties
of some geometric concepts used along the Chapter.
6.2 Game Theory Background
A transferable utility or TU game is a pair (N, v), where N := {1, . . . , n} is a set of players
and v : 2N → R is a function assigning to each coalition S ⊆ N a payoff v(S). By convention,
v(∅) = 0. Since each game assigns a real value to each nonempty subset of N , it corresponds with
a vector in R2
n−1. Let |S| be the number of elements of coalition S. Saving notation, when no
ambiguity arises, we use i to denote {i}. Given a game (N, v), the imputation set is defined by
I(N, v) := {x ∈ Rn : ∑i∈N xi = v(N) and, for each i ∈ N , xi ≥ v(i)}.
Let x ∈ Rn be an allocation. Then, x is efficient if ∑ni=1 xi = v(N). A game (N, v) is
superadditive if for each S, T ⊆ N such that T ∩ S = ∅, we have v(S ∪ T ) ≥ v(S) + v(T ). We
restrict our attention to efficient allocations. Within this framework, it is widely accepted that
superadditivity is quite a reasonable requirement for the game. This is because we expect the
grand coalition to form, and then, share the amount v(N) among the players; if the game was not
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superadditive this expectation might be unfounded. Hence, in the present Chapter we restrict to
the class of superadditive TU games, denoted by G (Gn denotes the superadditive games with n
players).
An allocation rule is a function which, given a game (N, v), selects an allocation in Rn, i.e.,
ϕ : Ω ⊆ Gn −→ Rn
(N, v) 7−→ ϕ(N, v).
Next, we define some properties for allocation rules. Let (N, v) ∈ Gn and let ϕ be an allocation
rule: ϕ is continuous if the function ϕ : R2
n−1 → Rn is continuous; ϕ is efficient if it always
select efficient allocations; ϕ is translation invariant if for each two games (N, v) and (N,w),
and each α = (α1, . . . , αn) ∈ Rn such that for each S ⊆ N , w(S) = v(S) +
∑
i∈S αi, then
ϕ(N,w) = ϕ(N, v) + α.
Next, we define some properties regarding symmetry. Let (N, v) ∈ Gn and let i, j ∈ N . Then,
i and j are symmetric if for each S ⊆ N\{i, j}, v(S ∪ i) − v(S) = v(S ∪ j) − v(S); i and j are
quasi-symmetric if for each S ⊆ N\{i, j}, v(S∪ i)− (v(S)+v(i)) = v(S∪ j)− (v(S)+v(j)). Now,
(N, v) is symmetric if for each pair i, j ∈ N , i and j are symmetric; (N, v) is quasi-symmetric if for
each pair i, j ∈ N , i and j are quasi-symmetric or, equivalently, a game is quasi-symmetric if the
corresponding 0-normalized game is symmetric. Note that, for a symmetric game, v(S) depends
only on the cardinality of S (this gives an idea of the strength of this property). Quasi-symmetric
games are important in this Chapter because their cores are symmetric sets from the geometric
point of view.
Finally, we define two symmetry properties for an allocation rule. Let ϕ be an allocation
rule. We say ϕ satisfies weak symmetry if for each symmetric game (N, v) and each pair i, j ∈ N ,
ϕi(N, v) = ϕj(N, v); ϕ satisfies extended weak symmetry if for each quasi-symmetric game (N, v)
and each pair i, j ∈ N , ϕi(N, v)− v(i) = ϕj(N, v)− v(j). The extended weak symmetry property
says that if for each pair i, j ∈ N , their contribution to any coalition differs only in v(i) − v(j),
then, the difference in the payoffs is also v(i) − v(j). This property, besides being a symmetry
property (it implies weak symmetry) has some flavor to translation invariance; roughly speaking,
it says that the allocation rule satisfies weak symmetry and, moreover, translation invariance
within the class of quasi-symmetric games. Next Lemma illustrates this point.
Lemma 6.1. Translation invariance + weak symmetry ⇒ extended weak symmetry.
Proof. Let ϕ be an allocation rule satisfying both translation invariance and weak symmetry. Let
(N, v) be a quasi-symmetric game and α = (−v(1), . . . ,−v(n)). Now, let (N,w) ∈ Gn be such
that, for each S ⊆ N , w(S) = v(S) +∑i∈S αi. Then (N,w) is symmetric. Hence, by weak
symmetry, for each pair i, j ∈ N , ϕi(N,w) = ϕj(N,w). Now, by translation invariance, we have
ϕi(N, v) + αi = ϕj(N, v) + αj . Since αi = −v(i) and αj = −v(j), the result is proved.
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6.2.1 The Core and its Relatives
We introduce now the notions of core (Gillies, 1953) and strong ε-core (Maschler et al., 1979);
both of them are based on efficiency and stability. An allocation x ∈ Rn is stable if there is no
coalition S ⊆ N such that ∑i∈S xi < v(S), analogously, for each ε ∈ R, x is ε-stable if there is
no coalition S ⊆ N such that ∑i∈S xi < v(S)− ε.
The core of a game (N, v), C(N, v), is the set of all efficient and stable allocations
C(N, v) := {x ∈ Rn :
∑
i∈N
xi = v(N) and, for each S ( N,
∑
i∈S
xi ≥ v(S)}.
The class of games with nonempty core is the class of balanced games. Let BG ( G be the
class of superadditive balanced games (BGn ( Gn denotes the set of superadditive balanced
games with n players).
Let ε ∈ R. The strong ε-core of a game (N, v), Cε(N, v) is the set of all efficient and ε-stable
allocations:
Cε(N, v) := {x ∈ Rn :
∑
i∈N
xi = v(N) and, for each S ( N,
∑
i∈S
xi ≥ v(S)− ε }.
By definition, if ε = 0, C0(N, v) ≡ C(N, v). The least core of (N, v), LC(N, v), is the intersection
of all nonempty strong ε-cores. Equivalently, let ε0(N, v) be the smallest ε such that Cε(N, v) 6= ∅,
then LC(N, v) = Cε0(N,v)(N, v).1
Let (N, v) ∈ Gn. The family of “shifted” games (N, vε) is defined by:2
vε(S) :=
{
v(S)− ε ∅ ( S ( N
v(S) S = ∅ or S = N.
Finally, we introduce a last concept related to balanced games: a balanced game (N, v) is
exact (Schmeidler, 1972) if for each S ⊆ N , there is x ∈ C(N, v) such that ∑i∈S xi = v(S).
Moreover, let (N, v) ∈ BGn with core C(N, v), then, there is a unique exact game (N, vˆ) such
that C(N, vˆ) = C(N, v); this game is the exact envelope of (N, v). Note that if we have two exact
games with the same core, then they are the same game. From the point of view of stability, we
can say that (N, vˆ) throws away the redundant information of (N, v).
6.2.2 Some Geometric Considerations
For the sake of clarity, and if it does not entail confusion, henceforth we denote a game (N, v) by
v. We need to introduce some notation and make some considerations regarding the underlying
geometry of a TU game. We denote the efficient hyperplane by HNv ; hence, H
N
v := {x ∈ Rn :
1In Maschler et al. (1979) it is shown that ε0(N, v) exists and is unique.
2This concept has also been taken from Maschler et al. (1979)
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∑
i∈N xi = v(N)}. All the sets we consider in this Chapter are contained in HNv and hence, we
develop all our framework in an (n− 1)-dimensional euclidean space.
A (convex) polytope P is the convex hull of a finite set of points V = {x1, . . . , xk} in Rn,
equivalently, it is a bounded subset of Rn which can be expressed as the intersection of a finite
number of halfspaces. The core of a game, when nonempty, is a convex polytope (it is the
intersection of halfspaces in HNv ). An m-polytope is a polytope that lies in an m-dimensional
space but there is no (m − 1)-dimensional space containing it. Let P be an m-polytope and let
m′ ≥ m, then, Volm′(P ) denotes the m′-dimensional volume of P . Let P be an m-polytope.
Then, a set of polytopes {P1, . . . , Pk} define a dissection of P if (i) P =
⋃k
l=1 Pl and (ii) for each
pair l, l′ ∈ {1, . . . , k}, with l 6= l′, Volm(Pl ∩ Pl′) = 0.
Lemma 6.2. Except for the least core, all nonempty strong ε-cores are (n − 1)-polytopes. The
least core is always an m-polytope with m < n− 1.
Proof. The statement in this lemma has been taken from Maschler et al. (1979). Hence, we do
not prove it. Anyway, not being a completely straightforward result, it is quite intuitive.
Whenever the core of a game in Gn is an (n − 1)-polytope, we say it is a full dimensional
core. Otherwise, it is degenerate. By definition, all the restrictions in the core of a game are as
follows: let S ( N , RSv := {x ∈ Rn :
∑
i∈S xi ≥ v(S)}. Let RSv be a restriction, then we say
that RSv is a |S|-restriction. The 1-restrictions play a special role in this Chapter; we call them
elemental restrictions. We say a restriction is redundant in the core if removing it does not change
the core. Conversely, the restrictions which are not redundant ones are active restrictions. Let
HSv be the hyperplane associated with the restriction R
S
v , i.e., x ∈ HSv if and only if x ∈ HNv
and
∑
i∈S xi = v(S). Note that, because of the efficiency condition, the hyperplanes H
S
v have
dimension n− 2.
Lemma 6.3. Let v ∈ Gn and let ∅ ( S ( N . Then, the hyperplanes HSv and HN\Sv are parallel
in HNv .
Proof. Let v ∈ Gn and ∅ ( S ( N . Then, HSv := {x ∈ Rn :
∑
i∈S xi = v(S)}. We claim that
there is k ∈ R such that HSv can be expressed as
∑
i∈N\S xi = k. Once this claim is proved, the
statement of the Lemma is immediately derived. Since we work in HNv ,
∑
i∈S xi +
∑
i∈N\S xi =
v(N). If we impose the restriction
∑
i∈S xi = v(S), we have v(S) +
∑
i∈N\S xi = v(N). Hence,∑
i∈N\S xi = v(N)− v(S) = k.
6.2.3 The Core-Center
The core of a game is the set of all the stable and efficient allocations. Now, if we consider
that all these allocations are equally reasonable, then it makes sense to think of the core as if it
was endowed with a uniform distribution. The core-center summarizes the information of such
a distribution of probability. Let U(A) be the uniform distribution defined over the set A and
E(P) the expectation of the probability distribution P.
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Definition 6.1. Let (N, v) be a balanced game with core C(N, v). The core-center of (N, v),
µ(N, v), is defined as follows:
µ(N, v) := E [U(C(N, v))] .
6.3 Fair Additivity
We devote this Section to the motivation and definition of the fair additivity property. This
property is crucial in the characterization of the core-center we obtain in Section 6.4. First,
before introducing the fair additivity property, we define a general family of allocation rules, that
we call T -solutions. Then, we say that an allocation rule satisfies the fair additivity property if
it belongs to a special subfamily of T -solutions.
6.3.1 T -Solutions and RT -Solutions
We need to introduce some concepts before formally defining what a T -solution is. Let v ∈ Gn,
∅ ( T ( N , and k ≥ v(T ). We use constant k to define two games: v, a good game for coalition
T , and v a good game for coalition N\T . Suppose that, because of some change in the situation
underlying our TU game, coalition T alone can obtain k instead of v(T ). We define v as the game
obtained when introducing this change in v:
v(S) =
{
max{v(S), v(S\T ) + k} T ⊆ S
v(S) otherwise.
We define v¯(S) as max{v(S), v(S\T ) + k} to ensure that v is a superadditive game. Super-
additivity also implies that v(T ) ≤ v(N) − v(N\T ). Hence, if we want game v to remain in the
class of superadditive games, k must belong to the interval [v(T ), v(N)− v(N\T )].
So, for value k, we have naturally defined a game v in which coalition T has improved with
respect to v. Now, for this constant k, we define a game v in which coalition T is worst-off. We
do it by letting coalition N\T improve, i.e., defining v(N\T ) := v(N) − k. The motivation for
this definition comes from the idea of stability. Since v(T ) = k, coalition T should receive at
least k in game v. On the other hand, v(N\T ) = v(N) − k implies that coalition N\T should
receive, at least, v(N)− k and hence, coalition T should obtain at most k. This change leads to
the superadditive game:
v(S) =
{
max{v(S), v(S\(N\T )) + v(N)− k} N\T ⊆ S
v(S) otherwise.
At this point, we have defined two games: v, in which coalition T has improved with respect
to v, and v, in which coalition N\T is the one that is better-off. A cut on the game v for coalition
T at height k ∈ [v(T ), v(N) − v(N\T )] is denoted by χT,k(v) and defined as the pair of games
{v, v}. The reason for the name cut becomes clear when dealing with balanced games below.
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An extra condition needs to be imposed on cuts, namely, if v(T ) = v(N) − v(N\T ), then no
cut is permitted for coalition T . This last requirement is quite natural, if omitted, we could
have a situation in which v = v = v, and the cut makes no sense. Note that, by definition, if
χT,k(v) = {v, v} and χN\T,v(N)−k(v) = {v′, v′}, then v = v′ and v = v′. Lemma 6.4 shows that
the games v and v are superadditive.
Lemma 6.4. Let v ∈ Gn. Let ∅ 6= T ( N be such that v(T ) < v(N) − v(N\T ). Let χT,k(v) =
{v, v}. Then, both v and v are superadditive games.
Proof. Let χT,k(v) = {v, v}. We do the proof for the superadditivity of v, being the one for
v analogous (just think of the cut χN\T,v(N)−k(v) = {v′, v′} where v′ = v). Let S, S′ ⊆ N ,
S ∩ S′ = ∅. We want to show that v(S) + v(S′) ≤ v(S ∪ S′). Now we have four possibilities:
(i) T * S ∪ S′. Now, v(S) = v(S), v(S′) = v(S′), and v(S ∪ S′) = v(S ∪ S′). Hence, the result
follows from the superadditivity of v.
(ii) T ⊆ S∪S′, T * S, and T * S′. Now, v(S) = v(S), v(S′) = v(S′), and v(S∪S′) ≥ v(S∪S′).
Hence, the result follows from the superadditivity of v.
(iii) T * S and T ⊆ S′. By definition of v, v(S) = v(S) and v(S′) = max{v(S′), v(S′\T ) +
k}. If v(S′) = v(S′), then, since v(S ∪ S′) ≥ v(S ∪ S′), we are done. Hence, we can
assume that v(S′) = v(S′\T ) + k. Now, since S ∩ S′ = ∅, we have T ∩ S = ∅ and hence,
(S ∪ S′)\T = S ∪ (S′\T ). Hence, by the definition of v and the superadditivity of v,
v(S ∪ S′) ≥ v((S ∪ S′)\T ) + k ≥ v(S) + v(S′\T ) + k = v(S) + v(S′).
(iv) T ⊆ S and T * S′. Analogous to (iii).
Next, we introduce the definition of T -solution, where T stands for trade-off.
Definition 6.2. An allocation rule ϕ is a T -solution if for each game v and each cut χT,k(v) =
{v, v}, there is α ∈ [0, 1] such that
ϕ(v) = αϕ(v) + (1− α)ϕ(v).
The idea of a T -solution is that ϕ(v), the solution of the original game, must be a trade-off
between ϕ(v) and ϕ(v). The result of a give and take between coalitions T and N\T . The
coefficient α measures how important v and v are for the original game v when ϕ is being
considered. Once the allocation rule is fixed, the coefficient α is a function depending on the
game v, the coalition T , and the constant k. Therefore, the concept of T -solution is very general
and dealing with the whole family of T -solutions is not an easy task. Next, we impose a regularity
condition on how the trade-off has to be made.
Let v ∈ Gn and let {v1, v2} be a cut on v. Now, a new cut {v2, v2} can be defined on v2.
Hence, we have cut the original game v into the games {v1, v2, v2}. The generalization of this idea
leads to the definition of dissection. The collection of games G = {v1, v2, . . . , vr} is a dissection
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of v if it can be obtained by cutting successively game v. Now, if ϕ is a T -solution, then there
are constants α1, . . . , αr such that
∑r
i=1 αi = 1, for each i ∈ {1, . . . , r}, αi ≥ 0, and finally
ϕ(v) =
r∑
i=1
αiϕ(vi).
Again, each αi measures the importance of vi for the original game v within the dissection G.
Next, we impose a regularity condition on the T -solutions.
Definition 6.3. An allocation rule ϕ is an RT -solution if it satisfies the following properties:
(i) ϕ is a T -solution.
(ii) (Translation Invariance) Let v ∈ Gn. Let v1 and v2 be such that each of them belongs to
some dissection of v. Let β ∈ Rn be such that for each S ⊆ N , v1(S) = v2(S) +
∑
i∈S βi.
Then, the coefficients associated with v1 and v2 in the corresponding dissections coincide.3
The translation invariance requirement is quite natural and needs no motivation. It implies, in
particular, that if a game v′ belongs to two different dissections of a game v, then the correspond-
ing coefficients associated with v′ must coincide. Hence, let v ∈ Gn and let G = {v1, . . . , vr}, then
we can interpret each coefficient αi as dependent only on the original game v and on the game
vi; we do not need to know the cut that led to game vi. The coefficients are now a function of v
and vi. Once ϕ and v are fixed, if v
′ belongs to some dissection of v then we denote the relevance
of v′ for game v by αv(v′).
6.3.2 RT -Solutions and Balanced Games: Fair Additivity
Next, we show that being an RT -solution has strong implications when working with balanced
games. Besides, we introduce the fair additivity; a property that leads to RT -solutions with an
extra regularity condition within the class of balanced games. Next, Figure 6.1 and Lemma 6.5
illustrate why given a game v, χT,k(v) = {v, v} is called a cut.
Lemma 6.5. Let v be balanced game. Then, a cut χT,k(v) = {v, v} has the following properties:
(i) C(v) ∪ C(v) = C(v).
(ii) If C(v) is an (n − 1)-polytope and C(v) ∩ C(v) 6= ∅ then this intersection lies in an m-
dimensional space with m < n− 1, i.e., its (n− 1)-dimensional volume is 0.
Proof. Let χT,k(v) = {v, v}.
(i) “ ⊆ ” For each S ⊆ N , we have v(S) ≥ v(S) and v(S) ≥ v(S). Hence, C(v) ⊆ C(v) and
C(v) ⊆ C(v). Hence, C(v) ∪ C(v) ⊆ C(v).
3Note that for each v′ ∈ G, v′(N) = v(N). Hence, if for each S ⊆ N , v1(S) = v2(S) +
P
i∈S βi, then
P
i∈N βi = 0.
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3
s
C(v)
k
C(v)
C(v)
Figure 6.1: The cut χ3,k(v) for the three-player balanced game v
“ ⊇ ” Let x ∈ C(v). Suppose that x /∈ C(v) ∪ C(v). Then, since x /∈ C(v), there is S ( N
such that T ⊆ S and ∑i∈S xi < v(S). Moreover, since x ∈ C(v), we have v(S) ≤ ∑i∈S xi and
hence, v(S) = v(S\T ) + k. Similarly, since x /∈ C(v), there is S′ ( N such that T ⊆ S′ and∑
i∈S′ xi < v(S
′) = v(S′\(N\T )) + v(N)− k. Hence,
∑
i∈S
xi +
∑
i∈S′
xi < v(S\T ) + k + v(S′\(N\T )) + v(N)− k = v(N) + v(S\T ) + v(S′\(N\T ))
and, on the other hand,
∑
i∈S
xi +
∑
i∈S′
xi =
∑
i∈N
xi +
∑
i∈S\T
xi +
∑
i∈S′\(N\T )
xi
x∈C(v)
≥ v(N) + v(S\T ) + v(S′\(N\T )).
Contradiction.
(ii) A cut χT,k(v) on game v leads to a cut in C(v). This cut consists of taking the hyperplane∑
i∈T xi = k, that cuts it in two pieces (one of them can be empty if the hyperplane does not
intersect the core). Once this consideration has been made the result follows immediately.
Note that a cut on a game defines a unique cut on its core. Therefore, we use the expression
cut to refer to both cuts on games and cuts on cores. Moreover, it is important to note that a
dissection G of a game v induces, by Lemma 6.5, a dissection on its core. Let v be a balanced
game and G a dissection of v. We say that G is a balanced dissection of v if for each v′ ∈ G, v′ is
balanced. Next, we introduce a strengthening of the RT -property: the fair additivity.
Definition 6.4. Let ϕ be an allocation rule. Let v be a balanced game. Let v′ and v′′ be two
balanced games such that each of them belongs to some dissection of v. Then, ϕ satisfies fair
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additivity with respect to the core if:
(i) ϕ is a RT -solution.
(ii) C(v′) = C(v′′) implies that αv(v′) = αv(v′′).
The idea of this property is that, from the point of view of stability, games v′ and v′′ are equal.
For instance, if we think of v′ as the exact envelope of v′′, then v′ is obtained from v′′ by removing
redundant information. Hence, their relevance for game v should be the same. An immediate
consequence of this property is that the coefficients αv(v
′) can be denoted by αv(C(v′)), i.e., the
weight only depends on the core.
Example 6.1. Let v be the game described in Table 6.1. Consider the cut χ3,2(v) = {v1, v2}
and then, the cut χ3,2(v1) = {v3, v4}. The values associated to each of these games are also
summarized in Table 6.1. After these two cuts, we have the following dissection of v: G =
{v2, v3, v4}.
S v v1 (= v) v2 (= v) v3 (= v1) v4 (= v1)
{1} 0 0 0 0 0
{2} 0 0 0 0 0
{3} 0 2 0 2 2
{1,2} 6 6 8 6 8
{1,3} 6 6 6 6 6
{2,3} 6 6 6 6 6
N 10 10 10 10 10
Table 6.1: The game v and the cuts χ3,2(v) and χ3,2(v1)
Now, it is straightforward to check that C(v), C(v1), and C(v3) are 2-polytopes. However,
C(v2) and C(v4) are 0-polytopes; their core coincides with the point (4, 4, 2). Now, if ϕ is a RT -
solution, we have that ϕ(v) = αv(v1)ϕ(v1)+αv(v2)ϕ(v2) and ϕ(v) = αv(v2)ϕ(v2)+αv(v3)ϕ(v3)+
αv(v4)ϕ(v4) with αv(v1)+αv(v2) = 1 and αv(v2)+αv(v3)+αv(v4) = 1. Moreover, since v1 = v3
we also have αv(v1) = αv(v3). Finally, if ϕ also satisfies fair additivity, although v2 6= v4, we
have that C(v2) = C(v4) and hence αv(v2) = αv(v4). Now, combining the two equations we easily
conclude that αv(v2) = αv(v4) = 0, i.e., the weight of the games with a degenerate core is 0.
Lemma 6.6 shows that what happens in Example 6.1 is a general feature of the fair additivity
property. More precisely, if we have a balanced dissection of a game with a full dimensional core,
then fair additivity pins down to 0 the coefficients of the games whose core is degenerate.
Lemma 6.6. Let ϕ be an allocation rule satisfying fair additivity. Let v be a balanced game
and let χT,k(v) = {v1, v2} be a balanced dissection of v. If C(v) is an m-polytope and there is
i ∈ {1, 2} such that C(vi) is an l-polytope with l < m, then αv(vi) = 0.
Proof. Take a balanced game v, and a cut χT,k(v) = {v1, v2} such that C(v) is an m-polytope
and C(v2) is an l-polytope with l < m. Then, v1 can be cut using again coalition T and height
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k, i.e., cut χT,k(v1) = {v3, v4}. Then,
ϕ(v) = αv(v1)ϕ(v1) + αv(v2)ϕ(v2)
and
ϕ(v) = αv(v2)ϕ(v2) + αv(v3)ϕ(v3) + αv(v4)ϕ(v4),
where αv(v1) + αv(v2) = 1, αv(v2) + αv(v3) + αv(v4) = 1, and v3 = v1. Moreover, we claim
that C(v4) = C(v2). The restrictions in C(v4) are stronger than those defining C(v2) and hence,
C(v4) ⊆ C(v2). Now, suppose that there is x ∈ C(v2)\C(v4). Note that, since C(v2) is degenerate
we have that C(v1)∩C(v2) = C(v2). Hence, C(v2) ( C(v1). Since x /∈ C(v4), there is S′ ( N such
that
∑
i∈S′ xi < v4(S
′). Now, for each S ⊆ N such that T * S, we have v2(S) = v4(S). Hence,
since x ∈ C(v2), we have T ⊆ S′. Since we also have that x ∈ C(v1), then
∑
i∈S′ xi ≥ v1(S′).
But, by definition of v1 and v4, v4(S
′) = v1(S′). Contradiction.
Now, by fair additivity, αv(v4) = αv(v2) and αv(v3) = αv(v1). Then, αv(v1)+αv(v2) = 1 and
αv(v2) + αv(v3) + αv(v4) = αv(v1) + 2αv(v2) = 1. Hence, αv(v2) = 0.
In the previous proof we used that, after the second cut, C(v4) = C(v2). Note that, as
Example 6.1 shows, it might be the case v4 6= v2 and hence, fair additivity is needed. Next
result describes RT -solutions satisfying fair additivity property within the class of balanced
games. The idea of Proposition 6.1 is similar to the idea of one classical result in measure
theory, namely, “If m is the Lebesgue measure, and η is a positive translation invariant Borel
measure on Rk such that η(K) <∞ for every compact set K, then there is a constant c such that
η(E) = cm(E) for all Borel sets E ⊂ Rk” (Rudin, 1966). Although Lemma 6.6 is a weaker result
than Proposition 6.1, we obtain the two results independently, i.e., we do not use Lemma 6.6 in
the proof of Proposition 6.1.
Proposition 6.1. Let ϕ be an allocation rule satisfying fair additivity. Let v and v′ be two
balanced games such that v′ belongs to some dissection of v. If C(v) is an m-polytope, then
αv(v
′) = Volm(C(v
′))
Volm(C(v))
.
Proof. Let v be a balanced game with anm-dimensional core. Let v′ be a balanced game belonging
to some dissection of v and let w(v′) := αv(v′)Volm(C(v)). We claim that w(v′) = Volm(C(v′)).
Next, we show that there is ε > 0 such that if Volm(C(v
′)) < ε, then w(v′) = Volm(C(v′)).
Suppose, on the contrary, that for each ε > 0, there is vε such that w(vε) 6= Volm(C(vε)).
Now, let {εl}l∈N be a sequence of positive numbers with limit 0 and, for each l ∈ N, let vεl be
such that w(vεl) 6= Volm(C(vεl)). Now, either |{l ∈ N : w(vεl) > Volm(C(vεl))}| = ∞, or
|{l ∈ N : w(vεl) < Volm(C(vεl))}| =∞ (or both of them are true at the same time). Hence, we
can consider the two following cases:
Case 1: For each ε > 0, there is vε such that Volm(C(vε)) < ε and w(vε) > Volm(C(vε)).
Let ε > 0. Let vε be such that w(vε) > Volm(C(vε)). Let δ = w(vε) − Volm(C(vε)). Let
{εk}k∈N be a sequence of positive numbers with limit 0 and, for each k ∈ N, let vεk be such that
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w(vεk) > Volm(C(vεk)). Now, we can define a balanced dissection G of v, G = vε ∪G1 ∪G2, where
G1 is such that,
(i) For each vˆ ∈ G1, there is k ∈ N such that vˆ is a translation of vεk and hence, C(vˆ) is a
translation of C(vεk).
(ii)
∑
vˆ∈G1 Volm(C(vˆ)) > Volm(C(v))−Volm(C(vε))− δ.
Now, by the translation invariance of the RT -solution and the fair additivity, for each vˆ ∈ G1
there is k ∈ N such that, w(vˆ) = w(vεk) > Volm(C(vεk)) = Volm(C(vˆ)). Hence,∑
vˆ∈G
w(vˆ) ≥ w(vε) +
∑
vˆ∈G1
w(vˆ) > Volm(C(vε)) + δ+Volm(C(v))−Volm(C(vε))− δ = Volm(C(v)).
Hence,
∑
vˆ∈G αv(vˆ) > 1. Contradiction.
Case 2: For each ε > 0 there is vε such that Volm(C(vε)) < ε and w(vε) < Volm(C(vε)).
We proof now that Case 2 implies Case 1. Let {εk}k∈N be a sequence of positive numbers
with limit 0 and, for each k ∈ N, let vεk be such that w(vεk) < Volm(C(vεk)). Let δ > 0. Now,
we can define a balanced dissection Gδ of v, Gδ = G1 ∪ G2, where G1 is such that,
(i) For each vˆ ∈ G1, there is k ∈ N such that C(vˆ) is a translation of C(vεk).
(ii)
∑
vˆ∈G1 Volm(C(vˆ)) > Volm(C(v))− δ.
Now, by the translation invariance of the RT -solution and the fair additivity, for each vˆ ∈ G1,
w(vˆ) = w(vεk). Now, since
∑
vˆ∈G αv(vˆ) = 1 implies that
∑
vˆ∈G w(vˆ) = Volm(C(v)), there is
vδ ∈ G2 such that w(vδ) > Volm(C(vδ)). Hence, we can construct a sequence {δl}l∈k converging
to 0 and such that for each l ∈ N, there is vδl such that w(vδ) > Volm(C(vδ)), Hence, Case 2
implies Case 1 and we are done.
Hence, we have shown that there is ε > 0 such that if Volm(C(v
′)) < ε, then w(v′) =
Volm(C(v
′)). Now, for each balanced game v′ belonging to a dissection of v, we can dissect v′ in
such a way that the cores of the games of the dissection cover C(v′) and their volumes do not
exceed ε. Hence, w(v′) = Volm(C(v′)).
Corollary 6.1. Let ϕ be an allocation rule satisfying fair additivity. Let v be a balanced game
and G = {v1, . . . , vr} a balanced dissection of v. If C(v) is an m-polytope, then
ϕ(v) =
r∑
i=1
αv(vi)ϕ(vi), where αv(vi) =
Volm(C(vi))
Volm(C(v))
.
Proof. Immediate from Proposition 6.1
As a consequence of Proposition 6.1 and Corollary 6.1, if ϕ is a solution satisfying fair addi-
tivity, then we have completely characterized the coefficients associated with ϕ and a dissection
of a balanced game. Indeed, we have shown that such weights are proportional to the volumes of
the cores of the games in the dissection.
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6.4 The Characterization
We state now the main result in this Chapter, a characterization of the core-center.
Theorem 6.1. Let ϕ be an allocation rule satisfying
T1) Efficiency
T2) Continuity
T3) Extended Weak Symmetry
T4) Fair Additivity with respect to the core.
Then, for each v ∈ BG, ϕ(v) = µ(v).
Let TG denote the subclass of games in which the four properties of Theorem 6.1 characterize
the core-center. The proof of Theorem 6.1 will be focused in showing that BG ⊆ TG.
Next, we provide an outline of the proof with the main steps in which we have divided it:
Step 1 We show that extended weak symmetry and efficiency characterize the core-center when
the core is simple enough (Section 6.4.1).
Step 2 We show that the four properties T1-T4 characterize the core-center for the class of games
with full dimensional core (Section 6.4.2).
Step 3 Finally, we show that the core of a balanced game can be approximated by full dimensional
cores. Hence, the previous results along with the continuity property lead to the proof of
Theorem 6.1 (Section 6.4.3).
In the first two steps we study full dimensional cores. We only deal with the degenerate case,
when the core coincides with the least core, in the last step.
6.4.1 An Elemental Core
In this Subsection we show that, when the core is simple enough, the core-center can be char-
acterized using extended weak symmetry and efficiency. Let v ∈ BGn, and let A denote the
set of active restrictions in C(v). We say C(v) is elemental if A = {xi ≥ v(i) : i ∈ N} =
{elemental restrictions}. If C(v) is an elemental core, then C(v) = I(v).
Lemma 6.7. Let v ∈ BGn be such that C(v) is elemental. Then, C(v) it is a regular simplex
and its center of gravity is the allocation x such that, for each i ∈ N ,
xi =
v(N)−∑j∈N v(j)
n
+ v(i).
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Proof. If C(v) is elemental, C(v) = I(v). For each v ∈ Gn, I(v) is a regular simplex4 with vertices
u1, . . . , un where, for each i ∈ N ,
ui = (v(1), v(2), . . . ,
i︷ ︸︸ ︷
v(N)−
∑
j 6=i
v(j), . . . , v(n)).
Hence, to obtain the result, we only need to calculate the center of gravity of the simplex, i.e.,
the average of the vertices.
Lemma 6.8. Let v ∈ BGn. If C(v) = I(v), then, v is quasi-symmetric.
Proof. I(v) is a regular (n−1)-simplex. Hence, if C(v) = I(v), then, for each S ( N , with |S| > 1,
the restrictions RSv are redundant. Let S ( N , |S| > 1. By superadditivity, v(S) ≥
∑
i∈S v(i).
Moreover, since RSv is redundant, v(S) ≤
∑
i∈S v(i). Hence, v(S) =
∑
i∈S v(i). Now, regardless
of v(N), the game is quasi-symmetric.
Proposition 6.2. Let v ∈ BGn be such that C(v) is elemental. Let ϕ be an allocation rule
satisfying efficiency and extended weak symmetry. Then, ϕ(v) = µ(v).
Proof. Since v has an elemental core, C(v) = I(v). By Lemma 6.8, v is quasi-symmetric. Now,
by extended weak symmetry, we have that, for each pair i, j ∈ N , ϕi(v) − v(i) = ϕj(v) − v(j).
Hence, there is k ∈ R such that, for each i ∈ N , ϕi(v) = k + v(i). The latter comment, along
with the efficiency property, implies that, for each i ∈ N ,
ϕi(v) =
v(N)−∑j∈N v(j)
n
+ v(i).
Now, by Lemma 6.7, ϕ(v) is the center of gravity of C(v), i.e., the core-center. Hence, ϕ(v) =
µ(v).
6.4.2 The Core is Full Dimensional
In this Section we combine Proposition 6.2 with the continuity and the fair additivity properties
to show that a game with a non degenerate core belongs to TG.
At this point we know that games with an elemental core belong to TG. The class of games
with an elemental core plays an important role in the forthcoming results. This role is similar to
that of the unanimity games in the characterization of the Shapley value using additivity. The
outline of this part of the proof is as follows. Let v be a balanced game and let C(v) be full
dimensional. First, successively cutting v, we obtain a dissection of C(v); being this dissection
primarily composed by small parallelepipeds. Second, we cut the games corresponding to these
parallelepipeds, obtaining an elemental core inside each of them. Then, we successively repeat
this procedure with the remaining non-elemental cores. Finally, we show that, using cuts, the
4Go over the Appendix to find a rigorous definition of a simplex and related concepts.
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core of v can be covered with elemental cores (this is indeed a kind of triangulation). Finally,
the fair additivity property leads to the conclusion of this part of the proof. Figure 6.2 illustrates
this outline.
=⇒
Original situation, I(v), C(v) Dissecting I(v) into parallelepipeds
=⇒
All dark shaded cores Cutting the parallelepipeds
are parallelepipeds to obtain elemental cores
Figure 6.2: Scheme of the proof for full dimensional cores
Proposition 6.3. Let v ∈ BGn be such that C(v) is full dimensional. Let ϕ be an allocation
rule satisfying the four properties T1-T4. Then, ϕ(v) = µ(v).
Proof. Let ϕ be an allocation rule satisfying the properties T1-T4. Let v ∈ BGn be a game with
a full dimensional core. The body of the proof consists of dissecting C(v) into elemental cores;
we do it in such a way that we can combine Proposition 6.2 with the continuity and the fair
additivity properties to get ϕ(v). Hence, we describe a procedure which “nearly” triangulates any
full dimensional core. Henceforth, till the end of the proof, Vol(P ) denotes the (n−1)-dimensional
volume of polytope P .
First, we divide I(v) into small (n − 1)-parallelepipeds.5 Let i ∈ N , i’s payoff in his best
allocation within I(v) is v(N)−∑j 6=i v(j), and in his worst one is v(i); hence, regardless of i, the
5A rigorous definition of a k-parallelepiped can be found in the Appendix.
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difference between these two payoffs is v(N) −∑j∈N v(j). Let L := v(N) −∑j∈N v(j). From
now on, and for the sake of clarity, v(i) is denoted by mi. Let q ∈ N (for simplicity we assume
q > 2), and let δ = L/q. For each face in I(v), different to that corresponding with the hyperplane
xn = mn, we make q + 1 cuts on it, all of them parallel to the hyperplane in which that face
lies. Hence, we partition I(v) using the following hyperplanes: for each i ∈ N , i 6= n, and for
each k ∈ {0, . . . , q}, Hik := {x ∈ Rn : xi = mi + kδ}. We use these hyperplanes to define a
dissection of C(v). Let χi,k be a cut, and let G be a collection of games. We denote by χi,k(G) the
result of cutting successively all the cores of the games in G with the hyperplane xi = k. Hence,
χi,k({w,w′, w′′, . . . }) = {w,w,w′, w′, w′′, w′′, . . . }. It can be the case that some of these cuts is
not permitted, i.e., k /∈ [w(i), w(N) − w(N\i)]; besides, it is also possible that one of the games
in χi,k(w) is not balanced. In the last two cases we take {w} instead of χi,k(w), i.e., we do not
consider those cuts.
Let v ∈ BGn be such that C(v) is full dimensonal. Let Gδ be the collection of games defined
as follows:
Stage 0: We begin with the set of games G0 ≡ G0,q = {v}.
...
Stage i, i ∈ N, i 6= n: We define the cuts for player i.
Step i.0: We cut I(v) with xi = mi; Gi,0 = χi,mi(Gi−1,q).
Step i.1: Gi,1 = χi,mi+δ(Gi,0).
...
Step i.k: Gi,k = χi,mi+kδ(Gi,k−1).
...
Step i.q: Gi,q = χi,mi+qδ(Gi,q−1).
Let Gδ denote the set Gn−1,q. In order to save notation, if no ambiguity arises, we denote
C(v′) by C ′. Now,
⋃
v′∈Gδ C
′ = C and, for each pair v1, v2 ∈ Gδ, Vol(C(v1)∩C(v2)) = 0, i.e., the
cores of the games in Gδ define a dissection of C. It is quite intuitive that, for each 0 < ε < 1,
we can find δ > 0 such that the sum of the volumes of the cores of games in Gδ which are
not parallelepipeds is, at most, εVol(C) (note that ε is fixed now for all the proof). All these
parallelepipeds are equal and they have positive (n − 1)-dimensional volume. Let GNP ( Gδ
be the set of games such that their core is not a parallelepiped. The second part of the proof
consists of cutting each one of the parallelepipeds to obtain an elemental core, a simplex, inside
the parallelepiped. It is quite intuitive, and not difficult to check, that for 0 < α < 1 small
enough, we can find a procedure which divides each parallelepiped P in such a way that the core
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of one of the resulting games is elemental and its volume is, at least, αVol(P ).6 Let GNE be the
set of games obtained in this second step such that their core is not elemental.
We can ensure now that at least a volume α(1 − ε)Vol(C) has been covered by elemental
cores. Period 1 is finished. The procedure continues as follows. We begin period 2: for each
game v′ ∈ GNP ∪ GNE , we repeat the procedure we have made for v (we have to find a new
constant δ′ which will probably be smaller than δ), covering at least a volume α(1 − ε)Vol(C ′)
of its core with elemental cores. Note that the constant α keeps constant. This is because in this
second period we obtain the same kind of parallelepipeds we had in the first one (but smaller).
Hence, the procedure obtained to “put” a simplex inside each parallelepiped is the same, and the
proportion of covered volume also remains unchanged.
Note that δ varies as the period changes but both α and ε keep constant. We claim that if
we repeat successively this procedure, the volume of C which is not covered by elemental cores
tends to 0. We begin with a volume RV 0 = Vol(C) which needs to be covered by elemental cores.
After the first period, this volume has been reduced to RV 1 = (1− α)(1− ε)Vol(C) + εVol(C).
Then, after t periods we have RV t = (a + b)tVol(C), where a = (1 − α)(1 − ε) and b = ε. The
proof of this statement is easily done by induction:
Case 1: RV 1 = (1− α)(1− ε)Vol(C) + εVol(C) = (a+ b)Vol(C).
Case t: Assume the result is true for this case (induction assumption).
Case t+1: Finally, we have RV t+1 = (1 − α)(1 − ε)RV t + εRV t = aRV t + bRV t induc=
a(a+ b)tVol(C) + b(a+ b)tVol(C) = (a+ b)t+1Vol(C).
Hence, since a+ b = (1− α)(1− ε) + ε < 1, we have limt→∞RV t = limt→∞(a+ b)tVol(C) = 0.
This means that, in the limit, this procedure defines an infinite dissection of C(v). Let Gt be
the collection of games after period t and EGt those with an elemental core. Now, by the fair
additivity of ϕ:
ϕ(v) =
∑
v′∈Gt
Vol(C ′)
Vol(C)
ϕ(v′) =
1
Vol(C)
( ∑
v′∈EGt
Vol(C ′)ϕ(v′) +
∑
v′∈Gt\EGt
Vol(C ′)ϕ(v′)
)
. (6.1)
By Proposition 6.2, we have already characterized ϕ for the games in the first addend of the last
term in Equation (6.1). Moreover, since ϕ is continuous, it is uniformly continuous in the set
B = {w ∈ Gn : for each S ⊆ N, v(S) ≤ w(S) ≤ v(N)}. Hence, ϕ is bounded in B. Since all the
games we have defined so far belong to B, we have limt→∞
∑
v′∈Gt\EGt Vol(C
′)ϕ(v′) = 0. Now,
6We prove in the Appendix that the cuts divide the core of the original game in many parallelepipeds and that
the proportion of the core covered by these sets is as close to one as needed. We also provide there an example of
a procedure to “put” an elemental core inside each parallelepiped.
104 Chapter 6. A Characterization of the Core-Center
for each t ∈ N, ϕ(v) =∑v′∈Gt Vol(C′)Vol(C) ϕ(v′). Then,
ϕ(v) = lim
t→∞
∑
v′∈Gt
Vol(C ′)
Vol(C)
ϕ(v′)
=
1
Vol(C)
(
lim
t→∞
∑
v′∈EGt
Vol(C ′)ϕ(v′) + lim
t→∞
∑
v′∈Gt\EGt
Vol(C ′)ϕ(v′)
)
= lim
t→∞
1
Vol(C)
∑
v′∈EGt
Vol(C ′)ϕ(v′)
Prop 6.2
= lim
t→∞
1
Vol(C)
∑
v′∈EGt
Vol(C ′)µ(v′)
= µ(v).
6.4.3 The Core is Not Full Dimensional
Now, the core is an m-polytope with 1 ≤ m ≤ n− 2.
Proposition 6.4. Let v ∈ BGn be such that C(v) is not full dimensional. Let ϕ be an allocation
rule satisfying the properties T1-T4. Then, ϕ(v) = µ(v).
Proof. By Lemma 6.2, C(v) is the least core of v. Let {v1/t}t∈N be a sequence of shifted games.
Now, limt→∞ v1/t = v. The core of v1/t coincides with the 1t -core of v. By Lemma 6.2, all these
1
t -cores are full dimensional, and now, by Proposition 6.3 we know that these games have already
been characterized. Hence,
ϕ(v)
cont
= lim
t→∞ϕ(v1/t)
Prop 6.3
= lim
t→∞µ(v1/t)
cont
= µ(v).
Proof of Theorem 6.1. The assertion of the theorem follows from Propositions 6.2, 6.3, and 6.4.
Next, we prove that the properties in Theorem 6.1 are tight. In order to do this we need a
last Lemma.
Lemma 6.9. Let v be a quasi-symmetric game. Then, C(v) either is a point or is full dimen-
sional.
Proof. This is a geometric result. As we have already seen, the core of a quasi-symmetric game
can be transformed in that of a symmetric game just using a translation. To prove this Lemma it
suffices to show that the result is true for symmetric games. Hence, let v be a symmetric game,
and assume that it has a degenerate core. Hence, there are 1 ≤ s ≤ n−1 and an s-player coalition
S, such that v(S)+ v(N\S) = v(N). By efficiency and stability, we have that there is k ∈ R such
that, for each x ∈ C(v), ∑i∈S xi = v(S) = k (this is the reason for the degeneration). Now, by
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symmetry, for each x ∈ C(v) and each s-player coalition S′, we have ∑i∈S′ xi = k. If s = 1, we
have that, for each i ∈ N and each x ∈ C(v), xi = k and we are done. Hence, we can assume
that s > 1. Now, we claim that, for each x ∈ C(v) and each i ∈ N , xi = k/s. Suppose, on the
contrary, that there are x ∈ C(v) and i ∈ N such that xi > k/s. Hence, for each s-player coalition
S containing i, there is j ∈ S sucht that xj < k/s. But this contradicts that, for each s-player
coalition
∑
i∈S xi = k (just taking an s-player coalition with all these j’s such that xj < k/s and
the lower of the remaining to have s players). Hence, we have that, for each i ∈ N , xi = k/s.
Now, by efficiency, k = sv(N)/n. Hence C(v) = {x}, where, for each i ∈ N , xi = v(N)/n.
Proposition 6.5. None of the properties used in Theorem 6.1 to characterize the core-center is
redundant.
Proof. Next, we show that if we remove one of these properties there are allocation rules different
from the core-center satisfying the remaining ones.
Remove Fair Additivity: Both Shapley value and nucleolus satisfy efficiency, extended weak
symmetry, and continuity.
Remove Efficiency: Take k 6= 0. The allocation rule ϕ(v) = µ(v) + (k, . . . , k) where µ(v)
denotes the core-center of the game v satisfies fair additivity, extended weak symmetry, and
continuity.
Remove extended weak symmetry: The allocation rule ϕ(v) = (v(N), 0, . . . , 0) satisfies fair
additivity, efficiency and continuity.
Remove continuity: This is the most complex situation, we need to distinguish different cases
in the definition of our allocation rule ϕ:
The core is a single point: ϕ selects the point (the core-center).
The core is degenerate but not a single point: In this case the allocation ϕ selects
the point (v(N), 0, . . . , 0).
The core is not degenerate: ϕ selects the core-center.
This allocation rule satisfies fair additivity, efficiency and extended weak symmetry. It
satisfies fair additivity because of the following: if a cut divides a core in two new cores, and
one of them is not full dimensional while the original was, then, the weight of this degenerate
core is 0. Efficiency is straightforward. It also satisfies extended weak symmetry: in the
non-degenerate case it coincides with the core-center so extended weak symmetry is met;
in the degenerate case, as a consequence of Lemma 6.9 there are no quasi-symmetric games
with degenerate core with more than one point and hence, extended weak symmetry can
never be violated.
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6.5 Concluding Remarks
In this Chapter we have presented a characterization of the core-center. The main result we
stated uses three standard properties along with a new one, the fair additivity property. Recall
that, according to the definitions of T -solution and fair additivity, given a game we can “cut”
it using any nonempty coalition different from the grand coalition. Nonetheless, the proofs we
presented here involve cuts that only use 1-player coalitions and hence, we could state and proof
a new characterization result, similar to Theorem 6.1, but with a weakened version of the fair
additivity.
Although we have provided a first characterization of the core-center, more research is needed
in order to find more convincing characterizations. One possibility is to deepen into the concepts
of T -solution and RT -solution, and try to characterize the core-center without the additional re-
striction imposed by the fair additivity property. Similarly, the problem of finding an independent
characterization that does not need the concept of T -solution is still to be solved.
6.A Appendix
6.A.1 The Geometry of the Core-Center in Depth
-Definition of Simplex.
Let {a0, a1, . . . , an} ( Rn be a geometrically independent set.7 The simplex ∆n spanned by
a0, a1, . . . , an is the set of all x ∈ Rn such that x = ∑ni=0 tiai, where ∑ni=0 ti = 1 and, for each
i ∈ {1, . . . , n}, ti ≥ 0. Each ai is a vertex of the n-simplex. The superscript n of ∆n corresponds
with the dimension of the simplex. An n-simplex is regular if the distance between any two
vertices is constant.
The barycenter of a simplex ∆n spanned by the points a0, a1, . . . , an is Θ(∆n) :=
∑n
i=0
ai
n+1 .
Let m ≤ n, let ∆m be an m-simplex contained in Rn, and let a0, . . . , am be its vertices. The
m-dimensional volume of ∆m, Volm(∆
m), can be computed in the following way: Let B = (βij)
denote the (m+ 1)× (m+ 1) matrix given by βij = ‖ai − aj‖2. Then,
2m(m!)2Volm(∆
m)2 = |det(Bˆ)|,
where Bˆ is the (m+2)×(m+2) matrix obtained from B by bordering it with a top row (0, 1, . . . , 1)
and left column (0, 1, . . . , 1)T . This is known as the Cayley-Menger determinant formula.8
7A set {a0, a1, . . . , an} ( Rn is geometrically independent if for each vector (t0, t1, . . . , tn) ∈ Rn+1, the
equations
Pn
i=0 ti = 0 and
Pn
i=0 tia
i = (0, . . . , 0), hold only if t0 = t1 = · · · = tn = 0. Note that {a0, a1, . . . , an}
is geometrically independent if and only if the vectors a1 − a0, . . . , an − a0 are linearly independent.
8For references on this and other formulas for computing simplicial volumes look at Gritzman and Klee (1994).
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-Definition of Parallelepiped.
Let {u1, u2, . . . , um} be m linearly independent vectors in Rn, with m ≤ n. The m-parallelepiped
Pm spanned by u
1, u2, . . . , um is the set of all x ∈ Rn such that x = ∑mi=1 tiui, where, for each
i ∈ {1, . . . ,m}, 0 ≤ ti ≤ 1. Let A be the matrix whose rows are the vectors u1, u2, . . . , um. The
m-dimensional volume of Pm is |detATA|1/2.
Proof of the statements relative to Proposition 6.3 (footnote 6).
We divide this proof in three parts. First, we show that the procedure defined in the proof
of Proposition 6.3 provides a dissection of I(v); this dissection is mainly formed by (n − 1)-
parallelepipeds. Second, we show that for each ε > 0, there is δ > 0 such that the sum of the
the volumes of the parallelepipeds in the induced dissection of C is ε-close to Vol(C). Finally, we
show a procedure to “put” an elemental core inside a parallelepiped. In order to make this proof
more readable we assume, without loss of generality, that for each i ∈ N , mi = 0.
The procedure described in the proof of Proposition 6.3 is a “quasi-dissection
in parallelepipeds” of I(v):
Let x ∈ I(v). There is r = (r1, . . . , rn−1) ∈ Rn−1 such that, (i) for each i ∈ N , ri ∈ {0, . . . , q}
and (ii) for each i ∈ N , i 6= n we have riδ ≤ xi ≤ (ri + 1)δ; note that the second inequality is
equivalent to
∑
j 6=i xj ≥ v(N) − (ri + 1)δ. Next, we find the parallelepiped corresponding with
this vector r (note that the same point x can lie more than one parallelepiped at the same time).
Let P be the parallelepiped spanned by the vectors {u1, . . . , un−1}, where ui = eiδ − enδ (ei
denotes the ith vector of the canonical base in Rn). Now, since the vectors {u1, . . . , un−1} are
independent, they generate a parallelepiped. Now, for each x ∈ I(v), and an associated vector
r ∈ Rn−1, x lies in the parallelepiped P r := P +(r1δ, r2δ, . . . , rn−1δ, v(N)−
∑
i6=n riδ). Note that
we have also shown that all the parallelepipeds are equal (changing the translation we just move
P onto a different position). But now, as it can be seen in Figure 6.2, a small amount of these
parallelepipeds is not completely included in I(v); those for whom the restriction xn ≥ 0 is not
redundant. We show in the next step that this is not a problem.
The induced “quasi-dissection in parallelepipeds” in C can be arbitrarily tight:
Next, we show that, for each 0 < ε < 1, we can find δ > 0 such that the sum of the volumes
of the cores of the games in Gδ which are not parallelepiped is, at most, εVol(C).
The situation we have is similar to that in Figure 6.2, most of the cores of games in Gδ are
strictly contained in C. Let v′ ∈ Gδ be such that C ′ is nonempty. There is a parallelepiped P ′ such
that C ′ = P ′ ∩C. We want to show that, in most of the cases, we have C ′ = P ′ ∩C = P ′ and C ′
is a parallelepiped (dark shaded zone in the third picture of Figure 6.2). Let dδ be the maximum
euclidean distance between any two points in P (since all the parallelepipeds are translations of
each other, dδ is common to all of them). By definition of P , limδ→0 dδ = 0.9
9The maximum dδ is achieved when x = (0, . . . , 0) and y =
Pn−1
i=1 ui = (δ, . . . , δ,−(n − 1)δ). The distance
between these two points is (n(n− 1))1/2δ. Hence, it goes to 0 as δ does.
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Each face of C is determined by a restriction RSv , where ∅ ( S ( N . Hence, the maximum
number of faces of the core of a game with n players is fn = 2
n − 2. Let F(C) denote the set of
all faces of C.
Let y ∈ C be such that the distance from y to each face in F (C) is more than dδ. Then, y
is inside a core C ′ such that C ′ = P ′ ∩ C = P ′ for some parallelepiped P ′, i.e., C ′ is itself a
parallelepiped. Hence, we can find an upper bound for the volume of the points y ∈ C which
are not in a parallelepiped. Let F ∈ F (C). Let B(F, δ) := {x ∈ Rn : d(x, F ) < dδ}. Now,
limδ→0B(F, δ) = F and, since F lies in an (n − 2)-dimensional space, Voln−1(F ) = 0. Now,
since for each F ∈ F (C), B(F, δ) is bounded, we have that Vol(B(F, δ)) goes to 0 as δ does.
Hence, for each 0 < ε < 1, we can find δ > 0 such that for each F ∈ F (C), Vol(B(F, δ)) < εfn .
Once one such δ has been chosen, if y ∈ C but it is not in a parallelepiped, then it must lie in
B(F, δ) for some face F of C. Hence, the total volume of these points is bounded from above by∑
F∈F(C)Vol(B(F, δ) <
∑
F∈F(C)
ε
fn
= fn
ε
fn
= ε.
Cutting a parallelepiped to obtain an elemental core: Let vr be the game such
that its core is the parallelepiped P r defined by P + (r1δ, r2δ, . . . , rn−1δ, v(N) −
∑
i6=n riδ). Let
χn,k(vr) be the cut where k = v(N) − (1 +
∑
i6=n ri)δ. The game vr has an elemental core ∆
whose vertices are the following n extreme points:
for each i ∈ N, pi = (r1δ, r2δ, . . . , rn−1δ, v(N)−
∑
i6=n
riδ) + eiδ − enδ.
The constant α used in the proof can be calculated as the quotient of the (n− 1)-dimensional
volumes of the simplex ∆ and the parallelepiped P containing it. Making some computations
with the formulas we introduced when we defined simplices and parallelepipeds we have
Vol(∆) =
√
n
(n− 1)!δ
n−1 and Vol(P ) =
√
nδn−1.
Hence, α = Vol(S)Vol(P ) =
1
(n−1)! . Once n is fixed, α keeps constant. 
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7.1 Introduction
In González-Díaz and Sánchez-Rodríguez (2003), a new allocation rule in the core of a TU game,
the core-center, is defined for the class of balanced games. The core-center establishes a connec-
tion between a set-valued solution (the core) and a single-valued solution (the core-center) that
summarizes all the information contained in the former. If we think of the core as a homogeneous
body, then the core-center is its center of mass. In other words, it is the expectation of the
uniform distribution defined over the core. Hence, the core-center summarizes the information of
the core, inherits its properties, and, since it is a central point, it has also appealing motivations
from the point of view of fairness. We refer to González-Díaz and Sánchez-Rodríguez (2003) for
a detailed analysis and an axiomatic characterization of the core-center.
In the present Chapter we focus on the analysis of the core-center for convex games. A convex
game has special properties: it is balanced; its core has a specially regular structure; the core
coincides with the convex hull of the vectors of marginal contributions; the core is the unique
stable set; the Weber set, the bargaining set, and the core coincide; the kernel coincides with
the nucleolus... Moreover, the special geometric structure of the core of a convex game leads to
the main finding of this Chapter: a direct relation between two different “centers” of the core,
the Shapley value (Shapley, 1953) and the core-center. Recall that the Shapley value for convex
games is the center of mass of the vectors of marginal contributions (the extreme points of the
core).
One possible criticism for the core-center is that, since there can be different games with the
same core, it does not necessarily use all the information of the characteristic function. But, for
the class of convex games, two different games cannot have the same core. Hence, for convex
games, since the core-center uses the information provided by all the allocations in the core, it
also uses all the information of the characteristic function.
In this Chapter we analyze in detail the core of a game by means of a dynamic process among
coalitions. Initially, we start with the imputation set; assuming that the players agree on the total
amount to be shared and on their individual values. Then, each coalition S announces the value
v(S), that represents the utility that the coalition S can obtain independently of N\S. Once the
players accept that value, the set of stable allocations is reduced. The core is the final result of
this process, once all the values of the characteristic function are considered. Once the process is
finished, the imputation set can be dissected in several pieces, all of them being cores of games.
The core of the original game is a piece of the dissection and the other pieces are cores of some
particular games, that we call, utopia games. Each utopia game measures the loss experimented
by a coalition once some other coalition announces its value. What we prove in this Chapter is
that, for special classes of convex games, the core-center can be expressed as the Shapley value
of a specific game, defined through the utopia games. We call this specific game the fair game.
Another important objective we have in this Chapter is to deepen in the study of the geometry
of the core of a TU game and we hope that this contribution can help to a better understanding
of the relation between the core and the Shapley value.
7.2. Preliminaries 113
The outline of this Chapter is the following. In Section 7.2 we present the notation and
background concepts. In the first part of Section 7.3, we introduce some geometrical concepts,
and then we introduce the core-center. In Section 7.4 we define the utopia games and state the
main results; we have moved some of the proofs of the results in this Section to the Appendix.
Finally, we conclude in Section 7.5.
7.2 Preliminaries
A cooperative n-player game with transferable utility, shortly, a TU game, is a pair (N, v), where
N is a finite set of players and v : 2N → R is a function assigning to each coalition S ∈ 2N a
real number v(S); by convention v(∅) = 0. For each coalition S, v(S) indicates what the players
in S can get by cooperation among themselves. A player i ∈ N is a dummy player if for each
S ⊆ N\{i}, v(S ∪ {i})− v(S) = v({i}). Let Gn be the set of all n-player games. Given S ⊆ N ,
let |S| be the number of players in S, and let (S, vS) ∈ G|S| be the subgame such that, for each
T ⊆ S, vS(T ) := v(T ).
A game (N, v) is convex if for each i ∈ N and each S and T such that S ⊆ T ⊆ N\ {i},
v(S ∪ {i}) − v(S) ≤ v(T ∪ {i}) − v(T ). The amount v(S ∪ {i}) − v(S) is called i’s marginal
contribution to coalition S. Convexity says that, for each i ∈ N, i’s marginal contribution to the
different coalitions does not decrease as the coalitions grow.
Let (N, v) ∈ Gn. The efficiency condition, ∑i∈N xi = v(N), is used to define the preimputa-
tion set : I∗(N, v) := {x ∈ Rn :∑i∈N xi = v(N)}.
A solution, defined on some subdomain of Gn, is a correspondence ψ that associates, to each
game (N, v) in the subdomain, a subset ϕ(N, v) of its preimputation set I∗(N, v).
The imputation set, I(N, v), contains the individually rational preimputations, i.e., I(N, v) :=
{x ∈ Rn :∑i∈N xi = v(N) and, for each i ∈ N, xi ≥ v({i})}. The imputation set is nonempty if
and only if v(N) ≥∑i∈N v({i}). If v(N) =∑i∈N v({i}), then I(N, v) = (v({1}), . . . , v({n})). If,
on the contrary, v(N) >
∑
i∈N v({i}), then I(N, v) is an (n−1)-dimensional simplex with extreme
points e1, . . . , en, where eii(N, v) = v(N)−
∑
j 6=i v({j}) and, for each j 6= i, eij(N, v) = v({j}).
Let (N, v) ∈ Gn. The core (Gillies, 1953), is defined by C(N, v) := {x ∈ I(N, v) : for each S ⊆
N,
∑
i∈S xi ≥ v(S)}. The allocations in the core satisfy the minimum requirements that any
coalition might demand in the game. If for each S ⊆ N , v(S) = ∑i∈S v({i}), then (N, v)
is additive and C(N, v) = {(v({1}), . . . , v({n})}; if a game is additive, then every player is
dummy. Moreover, if a game (N, v) is such that (i) for each S ( N , v(S) =
∑
j∈S v({j}) and (ii)
v(N) >
∑
i∈N v({i}), then C(N, v) = I(N, v). A game is balanced if it has a nonempty core. Let
BGn be the set of all n-player balanced games . A game has a full dimensional core if the latter
has dimension n − 1.1 Each convex game is balanced, but not every balanced game is convex.
Let CGn be the set of all n-player convex games.
1A polytope P has dimension m if P is contained in an m-dimensional euclidean space but, for each m′ < m,
no m′-dimensional space contains it.
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Let S ⊆ N , and let Π(S) be the set of all possible orderings of the elements in S, i.e.,
bijective functions from {1, . . . , |S|} to {1, . . . , |S|}. For each i ∈ N and each σ ∈ Π(N), let
Pσ({i}) := {j ∈ N : σ(j) < σ(i)} be the set of predecessors of i with respect to σ.
Let (N, v) ∈ Gn and σ ∈ Π(N), the marginal vector associated with (N, v) and σ, mσ(N, v),
is the vector such that, for each i ∈ N , mσi (N, v) := v(Pσ({i}) ∪ {i})− v(Pσ({i})).
An allocation rule, defined on some subdomain of Gn, is a function ϕ that associates, to each
game (N, v) in the subdomain, a preimputation ϕ(N, v). An allocation rule ϕ satisfies additivity
on the characteristic function if for each pair of games, (N, v) and (N,w), then ϕ(N, v + w) =
ϕ(N, v) + ϕ(N,w), where, for each S ⊆ N , (v + w)(S) = v(S) + w(S).
Let (N, v) ∈ Gn. The Shapley value, Sh, is the average of the marginal vectors, i.e.,
Sh(N, v) :=
1
n!
∑
σ∈Π(N)
mσ(N, v).
The Shapley value satisfies, among many other properties, additivity on the characteristic func-
tion.
If (N, v) is a convex game, then the marginal vectors are the extreme points of its core, i.e.,
C(N, v) = co{mσ(N, v) : σ ∈ Π(N)}.2 Then, for the class of convex games, the Shapley value is
the barycenter of the extreme points of the core where the weight of each extreme point is the
number of permutations that originate it. Usually, when working with convex games, the Shapley
value is called, with an abuse of language, the barycenter of the core.
7.3 The Core-Center
Before defining the core-center, we introduce some notation regarding the geometrical concepts
we deal with in this Chapter. A convex polytope P is the convex hull of a finite set of points in
Rn. Henceforth, we omit the word convex because we only deal with such polytopes. A polytope
P is an m-polytope if its dimension is m, i.e., the smallest integer such that P is contained in an
m-dimensional space. The core of a game in BGn is a polytope and its dimension is, at most,
n − 1. Let P be an m-polytope and let m′ ≥ m, then, Volm′(P ) denotes the m′-dimensional
volume of P .
Let {a0, a1, . . . , an} ( Rn be a geometrically independent set.3 The simplex ∆n spanned by
a0, a1, . . . , an is the set of all x ∈ Rn such that x = ∑ni=0 tiai, where ∑ni=0 ti = 1 and, for each
i ∈ {1, . . . , n}, ti ≥ 0. Each ai is a vertex of the n-simplex. The superscript n in ∆n corresponds
with the dimension of the simplex. An n-simplex is regular if the distance between any two
vertices is constant.
2Given a set A ⊆ Rn, we denote its convex hull by co(A).
3A set {a0, a1, . . . , an} ( Rn is geometrically independent if for each vector (t0, t1, . . . , tn) ∈ Rn+1, the
equations
Pn
i=0 ti = 0 and
Pn
i=0 tia
i = (0, . . . , 0), hold only if t0 = t1 = · · · = tn = 0. Note that {a0, a1, . . . , an}
is geometrically independent if and only if the vectors a1 − a0, . . . , an − a0 are linearly independent.
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The barycenter of a simplex ∆n spanned by the points a0, a1, . . . , an is Θ(∆n) :=
∑n
i=0
ai
n+1 .
Let m ≤ n, let ∆m be an m-simplex contained in Rn, and let a0, . . . , am be its vertices. The
m-dimensional volume of ∆m, Volm(∆
m), can be computed in the following way: Let B = (βij)
denote the (m+ 1)× (m+ 1) matrix given by βij = ‖ai − aj‖2. Then,
2m(m!)2Volm(∆
m)2 = |det(Bˆ)|,
where Bˆ is the (m+2)×(m+2) matrix obtained from B by bordering it with a top row (0, 1, . . . , 1)
and left column (0, 1, . . . , 1)T . This is known as the Cayley-Menger determinant formula.4
Let P be an m-polytope in Rn. Then, the set of polytopes {P1, . . . , Pk} defines a dissection
of P if (i) P =
⋃k
l=1 Pl and (ii) for each pair l, l
′ ∈ {1, . . . , k}, with l 6= l′, Volm(Pl ∩ Pl′) = 0.
Let U(A) be the uniform distribution defined over the set A and E(P) the expectation of the
probability distribution P. Let (N, v) ∈ BGn. The core-center of (N, v), µ(N, v), is defined as
follows:
µ(N, v) := E [U(C(N, v))] .
Next, we define an additivity property satisfied by the core-center that plays an essential role
in this Chapter. Let (N, v) ∈ BGn such that C(N, v) is an m-polytope, with m ≤ n − 1. Let
{v1, . . . , vk} be such that {C(N, v1), . . . , C(N, vk)} is a dissection of C(N, v). Then, an allocation
rule ϕ satisfies w-additivity (where “w” stands for weighted) if
Volm(C(N, v))ϕ(N, v) =
k∑
l=1
Volm(C(N, vl)ϕ(N, vl).
The w-additivity of the core-center is an immediate consequence of the classical properties of the
barycenter of a set.
Next, we prove a series of simple results that establish a first connection between the core-
center and the Shapley value.
Lemma 7.1. Let (N, v) ∈ Gn, with n ≥ 2, be such that v(N) >∑j∈N v({j}). Then:
(i) For each i ∈ N , Θi(I(N, v)) = v({i}) + v(N)−
P
k∈N v({k})
n .
(ii) If for each S ( N , v(S) =
∑
i∈S v({i}), then,
µ(N, v) = Sh(N, v) = Θ(I(N, v)).
(iii) Voln−1(I(N, v)) =
√
n
(n−1)!
(
v(N)−∑j∈N v({j}))n−1.
Proof. (i) Follows from the formula for the barycenter of a simplex.
(ii) Follows from the following observations: v is convex and C(N, v) = I(N, v).
(iii) It is a consequence of the formula for the volume of a simplex.
4For references on this and other formulas for computing simplicial volumes look at Gritzman and Klee (1994).
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Corollary 7.1. Let (N, v) ∈ G2 be such that v(N) > v({1}) + v({2}). Then,
Sh(N, v) = Θ(I(N, v)) = µ(N, v).
Moreover, they coincide with the barycenter (midpoint) of the segment joining the two points(
v({1}), v(N)− v({1})) and (v(N)− v({2}), v({2})).
Proof. Immediate from Lemma 7.1.
Let Dv be the set of dummy players of (N, v) and dv its cardinality. Recall that, if dv = n,
then the game is additive.
Lemma 7.2. Let (N, v) ∈ Gn. Then, the following statements are true:
(i) dv 6= n− 1.
(ii) Let (N, v) ∈ BGn and dv < n. Then, xN ∈ C(N, v) if and only if (i) for each i ∈ Dv, xi =
v({i}) and (ii) xN\Dv ∈ C(N\Dv, vN\Dv ).
(iii) Let (N, v) ∈ CGn and dv < n. Then, (N\Dv, vN\Dv ) ∈ CGn−dv , i.e., it is a convex game
with full dimensional core.
Proof. a) Suppose that dv ≥ n−1. Then, there is i ∈ N such thatN\{i} ⊆ Dv. Suppose now that
i /∈ Dv. Let S be a minimal coalition among those such that i /∈ S and v(S∪{i})−v(S) 6= v({i}).
Clearly, S 6= ∅. Let j ∈ S, then,
v((S ∪ {i})\{j}) = v((S ∪ {i})\{j})− v(S\{j}) + v(S\{j})
S\{j}(S
= v({i}) +
∑
l∈S\{j}
v({l}).
Now, v({j}) = v(S ∪ {i}) − v((S ∪ {i})\{j}) = v(S ∪ {i}) − v({i}) −∑l∈S\{j} v({l}). Hence,
since
∑
l∈S v({l}) = v(S), we have v(S ∪ {i})− v(S) = v({i}), contradicting the definition of S.
Hence, i ∈ Dv and dv = n.
b) Follows from the equality v(N) = v(N\Dv) +
∑
j∈Dv v({j}).
c) Each subgame of a convex game is a convex game. Hence, (N\Dv, vN\Dv ) is a convex
game with no dummy players. Let (N,w) be a convex game. Since (i) for each i ∈ N , there is a
marginal vector such thatmσi = v({i}) and (ii) C(N,w) is the convex hull of the marginal vectors,
C(N,w) has at least one point in each face of I(N,w). Now, if (N,w) has no dummy players,
then, for each i ∈ N , there is a marginal vector such that mσ′i > v({i}). The full dimensionality
of the core of each convex game with no dummy players follows from the combination of the two
previous observations.
Corollary 7.2. Let (N, v) be a convex game with n−2 dummy players. Then, Sh(N, v) = µ(N, v).
Proof. It follows from Lemma 7.2 and Corollary 7.1.
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Remark. Lemma 7.2 shows that coalitions involving dummy players are not needed in order
to compute the core-center. Then,
µi(N, v) =
{
v({i}) i ∈ Dv
µi(N\Dv, vN\Dv ) i /∈ Dv.
Note that the Shapley value also satisfies that for each i ∈ Dv, Shi(N, v) = v({i}).
Because of the previous Remark, we do not consider games with dummy players anymore. The
main results in the next Section hold for convex games without dummy players or, equivalently,
convex games with full dimensional core.
7.4 The Dynamic Process between Coalitions. The Utopia
Games
The class of exact games (Schmeidler, 1972) is a subclass of BGn. The main property of the games
in this subclass is that, given two exact games, if they have the same core, then they are the same
game, i.e., no two distinct exact games have the same core. Hence, when working with exact
games, the core uses all the information of the underlying game. Since the class of convex games
is contained in the class of exact games, the last observation is also relevant to our framework:
no two distinct convex games have the same core. This property reinforces the motivations for
the core-center within the class of convex games. Since the core uses all the information of the
game, why not to select the allocation rule that summarizes all the information of the core?
The results in this Section are for games with full dimensional core. Hence, when no confusion
arises, Vol(P ) denotes the (n− 1)-dimensional volume of polytope P .
Let N be a set of players and suppose that the game (N, v) is gradually defined. First, the
players agree on the amount v(N) that is to be divided. Then, they agree on the individual
values. Hence, only v(N) and, for each i ∈ N , the value v({i}) are determined. To formalize this
step we define the game (N, v∅), where the players do not gain anything by forming coalitions
different from N ,
v∅(S) =
{ ∑
l∈S v({l}) S 6= N
v(N) S = N.
At this point, a fair allocation rule should provide some payoff in the imputation set, and without
any more information, why not choose the center of the imputation set?
Suppose now that coalitions enter in the game and, for instance, players 1 and 2 announce
that, together, they can get v({1, 2}). At this point, the set of “stable” points is C1,2 = {x ∈
I(N, v) : x1+x2 ≥ v({1, 2})}. Clearly, C1,2 is a subset of the imputation set and, the larger is the
difference v({1, 2})−(v({1})+v({2})), the smaller is C1,2. Next, we want measure how big is this
set of “stable” points, which is contained in I(N, v). One natural way is through the difference
of the volumes, i.e., Vol(I(N, v))−Vol(C1,2) (note that allocations in I(N, v)\C1,2 are the good
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ones for coalition N\{1, 2}). Now, we can repeat the argument with some other coalition different
from {1, 2}; we can compare the different coalitions and “measure” their differences.
Next, we introduce a new class of games: the utopia games. Roughly speaking, these games
are such that the core of the utopia game for coalition S is precisely the set of allocations that
are not “stable” after coalition N\S announces v(N\S). Formally, let (N, v) be a convex game,
and let T ∈ 2N\∅. Let H ∈ 2T \∅. Then, we define the game (N, vHT ) ∈ Gn as follows:5
vHT (S) =


v((T ∩ S) ∪ (N\T ))− v(N\T ) + v(S\(T ∩ S)) H ⊆ S
v((T ∩ S) ∪ (N\T ))− v(N\T ) + ∑
l∈S\(T∩S)
v({l}) otherwise.
Despite of the apparent complexity of this definition, the specific utopia games we look at in this
Chapter allow for more transparent expressions.
It is easy to check that
vHT (∅) = 0,
vHT (N) = v(N),
if T ∩ S = ∅, vHT (S) =
∑
l∈S v({l}).
Next, we interpret the game (N, vHT ). For each coalition S 6= T , the value vHT (S) is the sum
of two quantities. First, the marginal contribution of the players in S that are in T to N\T .
Second, the contribution of players in S that are not in T . Hence, what a coalition S ⊆ T obtains
in the game vHT is its marginal contribution to N\T , i.e., vHT (S) = v(S ∪ (N\T ))− v(N\T ); note
that, if S = T , vHT (T ) = v(N)− v(N\T ).
Take now S ⊆ N such that ∅ ( T ∩ S ( S. The contribution of the players in S that are not
in T depends on the coalition H. Fixed H, if H ⊆ S, the contribution of players in S\(T ∩ S)
is the utility that they can guarantee themselves by joining together, i.e., v(S\(T ∩ S)). On the
other hand, if H * S, that contribution is computed by
∑
l∈S\(T∩S) v({l}). Roughly speaking,
players in H can be thought as the ones who have the key to allow for cooperation.
The main idea underlying the games vHT is that the players in T are the ones who have the
power in the game, but always respecting the minimum rights of players in N\T . In addition,
the game also establishes, via coalition H, a hierarchical structure among players in T . As next
proposition reads, these games are convex.
Proposition 7.1. Let (N, v) ∈ CGn, T ∈ 2N\∅, and H ∈ 2T \∅. Then, (N, vHT ) ∈ CGn.
Proof. See the Appendix.
Next, we study utopia games defined by coalitions with, at most, two players. For these
special utopia games, the intuitions highlighted in the discussion above should become clearer.
5We do not use the subgames (S, vS) anymore. Hence, no confusion can arise because of the notation for
utopia games.
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Let i ∈ N and T = {i}; in this case H = T . Henceforth, we denote, for each i ∈ N , the game
(N, v
{i}
{i}) by (N, vi). The game (N, vi) is the utopia game for player i, shortly, i-utopia game:
For each S ⊆ N, vi(S) =
{
v(N)− v(N\ {i}) + v(S\{i}) i ∈ S∑
l∈S v({l}) i /∈ S.
In this game player i has the key for cooperation. The other players by themselves can only
get the sum of their individual values.
We describe now the games vHT where T is a 2-player coalition, T = {i, j} ⊆ N with i 6= j.
To this extent, we define two games:
(N, v
{i}
{i,j}) and (N, v
{j}
{i,j}),
6
that we denote by (N, v(i,j)) and (N, v(j,i)), respectively. The former, that we call (i, j)-utopia
game is good for both players 1 and 2, but excellent for player 1:
v(i,j)(S) =
{
v((T ∩ S) ∪ (N\T ))− v(N\T ) + v(S\(T ∩ S)) i ∈ S
v((T ∩ S) ∪ (N\T ))− v(N\T ) +∑l∈S\(T∩S) v({l}) i /∈ S
=


v(N)− v(N\{i, j}) + v(S\{i, j}) i ∈ S, j ∈ S
v(N\{j})− v(N\{i, j}) + v(S\{i}) i ∈ S, j /∈ S
v(N\{i})− v(N\{i, j}) +∑l∈S\{j} v({l}) i /∈ S, j ∈ S∑
l∈S v{l}) i /∈ S, j /∈ S.
Analogously, by interchanging the role of i and j, we can define the (j, i)-utopia game.
The next concept leads to a classification of the games in CGn. This classification looks at the
size of the smaller coalition, say S, such that v(S) >
∑
i∈S v({i}), i.e., joining together to form S
is profitable for the players in S. Formally, let (N, v) ∈ CGn, n > 2. Let t ∈ {1, . . . , n−1}. Then,
(N, v) ∈ CGnt if (i) for each S ⊆ N with |S| ≤ t, v(S) =
∑
i∈S v({i}) and (ii) there is a coalition
S, |S| = t + 1, such that v(S) > ∑i∈S v({i}). On the other hand, if v(N) = ∑i∈N v({i}), then
(N, v) ∈ CGnn. Let (N, v) ∈ CGn, then there is t ∈ {1, . . . , n} such that (N, v) ∈ CGnt . Note
that I(N, v) = C(N, v) if and only if (N, v) ∈ CGnt , with t ≥ n − 1, and then, by Lemma 7.1
both Shapley value and core-center coincide with the barycenter of the imputation set. Let
(N, v) ∈ CGnt , with t < n, then, (i) the core restrictions originated by the m-player coalitions,
1 < m ≤ t, are redundant and (ii) there is at least one coalition with more than t players imposing
a non-redundant restriction on C(N, v).
Lemma 7.3. Let (N, v) ∈ CGnn−2, n > 2. Then:
6We could also define the game (N, v
{i,j}
{i,j}
), where H = T . But, since we do not use it in our results, we skip
its definition.
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1
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Figure 7.1: Core of a game in CG42
1
2
4
3
1-utopia core
2-utopia core
Figure 7.2: Cores of two utopia games
(i) For each i ∈ N, C(N, vi) = I(N, vi) and
Vol(C(N, vi))
Vol(I(N, v))
=
(
v(N\{i})−∑l∈N\{i} v({l})
v(N)−∑l∈N v({l})
)n−1
.
(ii) Let i, j ∈ N, i 6= j. Then, C(N, (vi)j) = mσ(N, v), where σ ∈ Π(N) is such that σ(i) = n
and σ(j) = n− 1.
(iii) I(N, v) =
(⋃
i∈N C(N, vi)
) ∪ C(N, v).
(iv) Vol(I(N, v)) =
∑
i∈N Vol(C(N, vi)) + Vol(C(N, v)).
Proof. See the Appendix.
Let (N, v) ∈ CGnn−2. Let p := Vol(C(N, v)), p0 = Vol(C(N, v∅)), and, for each i ∈ N ,
pi = Vol(C(N, vi). Let the fair game associated with (N, v), (N, v∗), be defined as follows:
v∗(S) =
1
p
(
p0v∅(S)−
∑
i∈N
pivi(S)
)
.
Theorem 7.1. Let (N, v) ∈ CGnn−2, n > 2. Then, µ(N, v) = Sh(N, v∗).
Proof. The core-center satisfies w-additivity and, by Lemma 7.3, the imputation set can be
dissected into n + 1 polytopes, the core of (N, v) and the cores of the utopia games. Hence,
µ(N, v∅) =
p
p0
µ(N, v) +
∑
i∈N
pi
p0
µ(N, vi). By Lemma 7.1, µ(N, v∅) = Sh(N, v∅), and, for each
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i ∈ N , µ(N, vi) = Sh(N, vi). Hence,
µ(N, v) =
p0
p
(
µ(N, v∅)−
∑
i∈N
pi
p0
µ(N, vi)
)
=
p0
p
Sh(N, v∅)−
∑
i∈N
pi
p
Sh(N, vi)
=
1
p
(
p0 Sh(N, v∅)−
∑
i∈N
pi Sh(N, vi)
)
= Sh(N, v∗),
where the last equality holds by the additivity of the Shapley value.
Remark. This proof has the following feature: we start with the core-center of a game and,
in two steps, using both the w-additivity of the core-center and the additivity of the Shapley
value, we end up with the Shapley value of the fair game.
Corollary 7.3. Let (N, v) ∈ CG3. Then, µ(N, v) = Sh(N, v∗).
Proof. Immediate from Theorem 7.1.
Remark. If (N, v) ∈ CG3, the game (N, v∗) summarizes all the information of the core.
The core of the fair game coincides with its imputation set and contains C(N, v). Following the
definition of (N, v∗) we have, for each i ∈ N , v∗({i}) = v({i}) − pip
(
v(N) − v(N\{i}) + v({i})).
Hence,
µ(N, v) = v∗({i}) + 1
n
(
v(N)−
∑
k∈N
v∗({k})).
Example 7.1. Let (N, v) ∈ G3 be such that, for each i ∈ N , v({i}) = 0; v({1, 2}) = 2, v({1, 3}) =
v({2, 3}) = 5, and v(N) = 10. Then,
S v∅ v1 v2 v3 v{1,2} v{1,3} v{2,3} v∗
{1} 0 5 0 0 5 2 0 −2.7174
{2} 0 0 5 0 5 0 2 −2.7174
{3} 0 0 0 8 0 5 5 −0.6957
{1, 2} 0 5 5 0 10 2 2 −5.4348
{1, 3} 0 5 0 8 5 10 5 −3.4130
{2, 3} 0 0 5 8 5 5 10 −3.4130
N 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10
and,
Sh(N, v) = (2.8333, 2.8333, 4.3333)
µ(N, v) = (2.6594, 2.6594, 4.6812).
Let r := p/p0 and, for each i ∈ N , ri := pi/p0. In this example we have r1 = r2 = 1/4, r3 = 1/25
and r = 1− (r1 + r2 + r3) = 23/50. Hence, players 1 and 2 are less powerful than player 3. Note
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that C(N, v(1,2)) = C(N, v(2,1)) = (5, 5, 0). Moreover, x ∈ C(N, v{1,2}) if and only if
v({1, 3})− v(3) ≤ x1 ≤ v(N)− v({2, 3}),
v({2, 3})− v(3) ≤ x2 ≤ v(N)− v({1, 3}), and
x3 = v({3}).
1
2
3
C(N, v)
I(N, v)
Figure 7.3: Core of a game in CG3
1
2
3
I(N, v)
C(N, v)
C(N, v∗) = I(N, v∗)
Figure 7.4: The core of the fair game
Since
∑
ri = 1 and, for each i ∈ N , 0 ≤ ri ≤ 1, the ratios ri have the following interpretation.
They determine a probability distribution over the cores of the utopia games and hence, over
the imputation set; r is the probability that an allocation in I(N, v) belongs to C(N, v) and, for
each i ∈ N , ri is the probability that an allocation in I(N, v) belongs to C(N, vi). Hence, the
greater the core of the i-utopia game is, the worse is i’s situation in the game. Roughly speaking,
Figures 7.3 and 7.4 show that for (N, v), the “big” utopia cores are those of the utopia games of
players 1 and 2. Hence, in the core of the fair game, the “bad” section that has been added for
player 3 (with respect to the core of the original game) is smaller than those for players 1 and 2.
We turn now to study games in CGnn−3. We denote the game (v(i,j))j by v(i,j)j .
Lemma 7.4. Let (N, v) ∈ CGnn−3, n > 3, and let i ∈ N . Then,
(i) (N, vi) ∈ CGnn−t, t < 3.
(ii) For each i, j ∈ N , i 6= j, C(N, (vi)j) = I(N, (vi)j).
(iii) µ(N, vi) = Sh(N, (vi)
∗).
Proof. (i) It suffices to show that, for each S ⊆ N such that |S| ≤ n − 2, we have vi(S) =
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1-utopia core
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1-utopia core
2-utopia core
(1, 2)-utopia core

1
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4
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1-utopia core
2-utopia core
1
2
4
3
1-utopia core
2-utopia core
(1, 2)-utopia core
(1, 2)2-utopia core
 o
Figure 7.5: Example of a game in CG43 with some of its utopia games
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∑
k∈S vi({k}). Now, for each S ⊆ N ,
vi(S) =


v(N)− v(N\ {i}) + v(S\{i}) i ∈ S, |S| ≥ n− 2
v(N)− v(N\ {i}) +∑l∈S\{i} v({l}) i ∈ S, |S| < n− 2∑
l∈S v({l}) i /∈ S.
Hence, if |S| < n − 2, the result is immediate; if |S| = n − 2, since |S\{i}| = n − 3 we have
v(S\{i}) =∑l∈S\{i} v({l}). Hence, for each S ⊆ N such that |S| ≤ n−2, vi(S) =∑k∈S vi({k}).
(ii) and (iii) follow from Lemma 7.3 and Theorem 7.1.
Lemma 7.5. Let (N, v) ∈ CGnn−3, n > 3. Let i, j ∈ N , i 6= j and let (N, v(i,j)) be the (i, j)-utopia
game. Then, if C(N, v(i,j)) is full dimensional we have
(i) Sh(N, v(i,j)) = µ(N, v(i,j)).
(ii) Vol(C(N, v(i,j))) =
=
√
n
(n− 2)!
(
v(N\{i, j})−
∑
l∈N\{i,j}
v({l})
)n−2(
v(N)− v(N\{i}) + v(N\{i, j})− v(N\{j})
)
Proof. See the Appendix.
Lemma 7.6. Let (N, v) ∈ CGnn−3, n > 3. Let i, j ∈ N , i 6= j and let (N, v(i,j)) be the (i, j)-utopia
game. Then,
(i) For each S ⊆ N , v(i,j)j (S) = (vj)i(S) and C(N, v(i,j)j ) = C(N, (vj)i).
(ii) µ(N, v(i,j)j ) = Sh(N, v(i,j)j ).
(iii) We have the following dissection of the set of imputations:
I(N, v) = C(N, v∅) =
( ⋃
i∈N
C(N, vi)
)
∪
(⋃
i<j
(
C(N, v(i,j)) ∪ C(N, v(i,j)j )
)) ∪ C(N, v).
Proof. See the Appendix.
Let (N, v) ∈ CGnn−3. As before, let p := Vol(C(N, v)), p0 = Vol(C(N, v∅)), and, for each
i ∈ N , pi = Vol(C(N, vi). Moreover, for each pair i, j ∈ N , let p(i,j) = Vol(C(N, v(i,j))) and
p(i,j)j = Vol(C(N, v(i,j)j )). Let the fair game associated with (N, v), (N, v
∗), be defined as
follows:
v∗(S) =
1
p
(
p0v∅(S)−
∑
i∈N
pivi(S)−
∑
i6=j
1
2
(
p(i,j)v(i,j)(S) + p(i,j)jv(i,j)j (S)
))
.
Since for each (N, v) ∈ CGnn−2, the coefficients p(i,j) and p(i,j)j are 0, this definition of fair game
is consistent with the old one.
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Let r(i,j) = p(i,j)/p0 and r(i,j)j = p(i,j)j/p0. Then,
r(i,j) =
√
n
(n−2)!
(
v(N\{i,j})−Pl∈N\{i,j} v({l})
)n−2(
v(N)−v(N\{i})+v(N\{i,j})−v(N\{j})
)
√
n
(n−1)!
(
v(N)−Pl∈N v({l})
)n−1
= (n− 1)
(
v(N\{i,j})−Pl∈N\{i,j} v({l})
v(N)−Pl∈N v({l})
)n−1
v(N)−v(N\{i})+v(N\{i,j})−v(N\{j})
v(N)−Pl∈N v({l}) ,
and,
r(i,j)j =
(
v(N\{i, j})−∑l∈N\{i,j} v({l})
v(N)−∑l∈N v({l})
)n−1
.
Again, the numbers r(i,j) and r(i,j)j can be interpreted as the probabilities that an allocation in
C(N, v(i,j)) or C(N, v(i,j)j ), respectively, is chosen. According to our interpretation of the utopia
games, if an allocation in C(N, v(i,j)) is chosen, the coalition {i, j} would receive an “utopic”
payoff, i.e., allocations in C(N, v(i,j)) are the best for coalition {i, j} within I(N, v). Note that
r(i,j) = r(j,i) and r(i,j)j = r(j,i)i . This observation is crucial to understand the following result.
Lemma 7.7. Let (N, v) ∈ CGnn−3, n > 3. Let i, j ∈ N , i 6= j and let (N, v(i,j)) be the (i, j)-utopia
game. Then,
r(i,j)µ(N, v(i,j)) + r(i,j)jµ(N, (v(i,j)){j}) = r(j,i)µ(N, v(j,i)) + r(j,i)iµ(N, (v(j,i)){i}).
Proof. This result is a consequence of the following equality:
C(N, v(i,j)) ∪ C(N, v(i,j)j ) = C(N, v(j,i)) ∪ C(N, v(j,i)i).
Lemma 7.7 shows that, given any two players, there is an important symmetry between the
two corresponding 2-player utopia games. Next, we state our main Theorem. It provides a direct
relation between the core-center and the Shapley value of the fair game.
Theorem 7.2. Let (N, v) ∈ CGnn−3, n > 3. Then, µ(N, v) = Sh(N, v∗).
Proof. Since
C(N, v∅) =
( ⋃
i∈N
C(N, vi)
)
∪
(⋃
i<j
(
C(N, v(i,j)) ∪ C(N, v(i,j)j )
)) ∪ C(N, v),
we have
µ(N, v∅) =
∑
i∈N
pi
p0
µ(N, vi) +
∑
i<j
(
p(i,j)
p0
µ(N, v(i,j)) +
p(i,j)j
p0
µ(N, v(i,j)j )
)
+ pp0µ(N, v)
=
∑
i∈N
pi
p0
µ(N, vi) +
∑
i6=j
(
p(i,j)
2p0
µ(N, v(i,j)) +
p(i,j)j
2p0
µ(N, v(i,j)j )
)
+ pp0µ(N, v),
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where the last equality holds by Lemma 7.7. Now, by Lemmas 7.1 and 7.5,7 and by the additivity
of the Shapley value, we have,
µ(N, v) = p0p µ(N, v∅)−
∑
i∈N
pi
p µ(N, vi)−
∑
i6=j
(
p(i,j)
2p µ(N, v(i,j)) +
p(i,j)j
2p µ(N, v(i,j)j )
)
= p0p Sh(N, v∅)−
∑
i∈N
pi
p Sh(N, vi)−
∑
i6=j
(
p(i,j)
2p Sh(N, v(i,j)) +
p(i,j)j
2p Sh(N, v(i,j)j )
)
= Sh(N, v∗).
Corollary 7.4. Let (N, v) ∈ CG4. Then, µ(N, v) = Sh(N, v∗).
Proof. Immediate from Theorem 7.2.
Remark. The fair game uses all the information of the original game. Suppose that we
only have the value of the grand coalition and the values for the 1-player coalitions; with this
information on the table, only the allocations within the set of imputations (the core of (N, v∅))
seem to be reasonable. Hence, the center of the imputation set would be a fair outcome, i.e.,
every player gets what he would expect if an imputation were to be randomly picked. But, if
we had all the characteristic function on the table, would it still be fair? Now, stability could
turn to be a concern. Hence, players must take into account that each coalition S such that
v(S) >
∑
i∈S v({i}) is imposing a relevant constraint in the imputation set. The fair game
uses all that information and, indirectly, measures its relevance. There is also a probabilistic
interpretation for the 2-player coalitions: when two players, say i and j, form a coalition, there
are two ways of ordering them within the coalition; we assign equal probability to each of them,
i.e., the orderings {i, j} and {j, i} are equally likely.
7.5 Concluding Remarks
The main question that arises from this Chapter is to know whether Theorem 7.2 can be extended
to the entire class of convex games.
This Chapter shows that the utopia games use a lot of information of the underlying game.
Since we have only defined them for convex games, a natural question is whether they can be
defined for any balanced game. Then, the following step would be to wonder if the core-center
of any balanced game can be expressed by means of these games. Even when we have provided
many insights on the properties of these games, much more research on this topic is needed.
This Chapter also deepens in the motivations for the core-center: an allocation rule obtained
in a natural way from a set-valued solution. Hence, as the final conclusion, just insist in the
fact that the core-center provides a new focus on the search for connections between set-valued
solutions and allocation rules. Of course, many things still remain to be explored.
7Lemma 7.5 is important for the games v(i,j) with a full dimensional core; otherwise, their volume would be
0, and hence, the corresponding addends would also be 0.
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7.A Appendix
7.A.1 Proof of Proposition 7.1
Proof. We want to show that for each R ⊆ S ⊆ N\{i},
vHT (R ∪ {i})− vHT (R) ≤ vHT (S ∪ {i})− vHT (S). (7.1)
Case 1: i /∈ T . We distinguish three possibilities:
a) H ⊆ R ⊆ S. Since
(i) vHT (S ∪ {i})− vHT (S) = v((S ∪ {i})\T )− v(S\T ),
(ii) vHT (R ∪ {i})− vHT (R) = v((R ∪ {i})\T )− v(R\T ), and
(iii) (N, v) is convex,
inequality (7.1) holds.
b) H 6⊆ R and H ⊆ S. Since
(i) vHT (S ∪ {i})− vHT (S) = v((S ∪ {i})\T )− v(S\T ),
(ii) vHT (R ∪ {i})− vHT (R) = v({i}), and
(iii) (N, v) is convex,
inequality (7.1) holds.
c) H 6⊆ S. Since i /∈ T , vHT (R ∪ {i}) − vHT (R) = vHT (S ∪ {i}) − vHT (S) = v({i}) and (7.1) holds
again.
Case 2: i ∈ T . Again, we distinguish three possibilities:
a) H ⊆ R ∪ {i} ⊆ S ∪ {i}. We distinguish two subcases: i /∈ H and i ∈ H.
a.1) i /∈ H. Since
(i) vHT (S ∪ {i})− vHT (S) = v((T ∩ S) ∪ (N\T ) ∪ {i})− v((T ∩ S) ∪ (N\T )),
(ii) vHT (R ∪ {i})− vHT (R) = v((T ∩R) ∪ (N\T ) ∪ {i})− v((T ∩R) ∪ (N\T )), and
(iii) (N, v) is convex,
inequality (7.1) holds.
a.2) i ∈ H. Now,
(i) vHT (S ∪ {i})− vHT (S) = v((T ∩ S) ∪ (N\T ) ∪ {i})− v((T ∩ S) ∪ (N\T ))
+ v(S\(T ∩ S))− ∑
l∈S\(T∩S)
v({l}) and
(ii) vHT (R ∪ {i})− vHT (R) = v((T ∩R) ∪ (N\T ) ∪ {i})− v((T ∩R) ∪ (N\T ))
+ v(R\(T ∩R)− ∑
l∈R\(T∩R)
v({l}).
128 Chapter 7. The Core-Center and the Shapley Value: A Direct Connection
Moreover, by the convexity of (N, v) we have
(iii) v((T ∩S)∪(N\T )∪{i})−v((T ∩S)∪(N\T )) ≥ v((T ∩R)∪(N\T )∪{i})−v((T ∩R)∪(N\T )).
Finally, since
v(S\(T ∩ S))− v(R\(T ∩R)) = v(S\(T ∩ S))− v(R\(T ∩ S ∩R))
and
∑
l∈S\(T∩S)
v({l})− ∑
l∈R\(T∩R)
v({l}) = ∑
l∈S\(T∩S)
v({l})− ∑
l∈R\(T∩S∩R)
v({l})
=
∑
l∈S\(R∪(T∩S∩(N\R))
v({l}),
we have
iv) v(S\(T ∩ S))− ∑
l∈S\(T∩S)
v({l}) ≥ v(R\(T ∩R))− ∑
l∈R\(T∩R)
v({l}).
Now, the combination of equations i) to iv) yields (1).
b) H 6⊆ R ∪ {i} and H ⊆ S ∪ {i}. Again, we distinguish two subcases: i /∈ H and i ∈ H.
b.1) i /∈ H. Since
(i) vHT (S ∪ {i})− vHT (S) = v((T ∩ S) ∪ (N\T ) ∪ {i})− v((T ∩ S) ∪ (N\T )),
(ii) vHT (R ∪ {i})− vHT (R) = v((T ∩R) ∪ (N\T ) ∪ {i})− v((T ∩R) ∪ (N\T )), and
(iii) (N, v) is convex,
inequality (7.1) holds.
b.2) i ∈ H. Now,
(i) vHT (S ∪ {i})− vHT (S) = v((T ∩ S) ∪ (N\T ) ∪ {i})− v((T ∩ S) ∪ (N\T ))
+ v(S\(T ∩ S))− ∑
l∈S\(T∩S)
v({l}) and
(ii) vHT (R ∪ {i})− vHT (R) = v((T ∩R) ∪ (N\T ) ∪ {i})− v((T ∩R) ∪ (N\T )).
Since v(S\(T ∩ S))−∑l∈S\(T∩S) v({l}) ≥ 0, the arguments in case a.2) can be adapted.
c) H 6⊆ S ∪ {i}. Since
(i) vHT (S ∪ {i})− vHT (S) = v((T ∩ S) ∪ (N\T ) ∪ {i})− v((T ∩ S) ∪ (N\T )),
(ii) vHT (R ∪ {i})− vHT (R) = v((T ∩R) ∪ (N\T ) ∪ {i})− v((T ∩R) ∪ (N\T )), and
(iii) (N, v) is convex,
inequality (7.1) holds.
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We have discussed all possible cases. Hence, (N, vHT ) ∈ CGn.
7.A.2 Proof of Lemma 7.3
Proof. (i) Let i ∈ N. If (N, v) ∈ CGnn−t, with 0 ≤ t ≤ 2. Then vi can be defined as follows:
vi(S) =


v(N)− v(N\{i}) + v(S\{i}) i ∈ S, |S| ≥ n− 1
v(N)− v(N\{i}) +∑l∈S\{i} v({l}) i ∈ S, |S| < n− 1∑
l∈S v({l}) i /∈ S.
(7.2)
Let σ ∈ Π(N) be such that σ(i) = n. Then, mσi (N, vi) = v(N) −
∑
l∈N\{i} v({l}) and, for each
k 6= i, mσk(N, vi) = v({k}). Let j ∈ N, j 6= i; then, for each σ ∈ Π(N) such that σ(j) = n, we
have mσi (N, vi) = v(N)−v(N\{i}), mσj (N, vi) = v(N\{i})−
∑
l 6=i,j v({l}), and, for each k 6= i, j,
mσk(N, vi) = v({k}). Hence, since (N, vi) is convex, C(N, vi) coincides with the convex hull of
the marginal vectors. Hence, for each i ∈ N , C(N, vi) = I(N, vi). Finally, the ratio between the
volumes follows from Lemma 7.1.
(ii) Let i, j ∈ N, j 6= i. Let (N, vi) ∈ CGnn−t, with 0 ≤ t ≤ 2. For each S ⊆ N such that
|S| ≤ n− 2, we have vi(S) =
∑
l∈S
vi({l}). Hence, following (7.2),
(vi)j(S) =


vi(N)− vi(N\{j}) + vi(S\{j}) j ∈ S, |S| ≥ n− 1
vi(N)− vi(N\{j}) +
∑
l∈S\{j} vi({l}) j ∈ S, |S| < n− 1∑
l∈S vi({l}) j /∈ S.
(7.3)
Now, since |S\{i, j}| = n− 2,
vi(S\{j}) =
{
v(N)− v(N\{i}) +∑l∈S\{i,j} v({l}) i ∈ S∑
l∈S\{j} v({l}) i /∈ S.
(7.4)
Moreover,
vi({l}) =
{
v(N)− v(N\{i}) l = i
v({l}) l 6= i. (7.5)
Hence, using (7.4) and (7.5) in (7.3) we have
(vi)j(S) =


v(N)−∑l∈N\S v({l}) i ∈ S, j ∈ S
v(N)− v(N\{i}) +∑l∈S\{i} v({l}) i ∈ S, j /∈ S
v(N\{i})−∑l∈N\(S∪{i}) v({l}) i /∈ S, j ∈ S∑
l∈S v({l}) i /∈ S, j /∈ S.
Hence, (N, (vi)j) is additive and C
(
N, (vi){j}
)
= mσ(N, v), where σ ∈ Π(N) is such that σ(i) = n
and σ(j) = n− 1.
(iii) We study the two inclusions separately:
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“⊇” It suffices to show that for each i ∈ N , C(N, vi) ⊆ I(N, v). Let i ∈ N and x ∈ C(N, vi).
Then, xi ≥ vi({i}) = v(N)− v(N\{i}) ≥ v({i}) and, for each k ∈ N\{i}, xk ≥ vi({k}) = v({k}).
Hence x ∈ I(N, v).
“⊆” Let x ∈ I(N, v)\C(N, v). We claim that there is i ∈ N such that x ∈ C(N, vi). Since x /∈
C(N, v) and (N, v) ∈ CGnn−2, there is S ( N , |S| = n−1, such that
∑
l∈S xl < v(S). Then, there
is i ∈ N such that∑l∈N\{i} xl < v(N\{i}) and, by the efficiency condition, xi ≥ v(N)−v(N\{i}).
Moreover, since for each j 6= i, xj ≥ v({j}), it is easy to check that x ∈ C(N, vi).
(iv) We prove that for each pair i, j ∈ N , C(N, vi) ∩ C(N, vj) and C(N, v) ∩ C(N, vi) have
volume 0. Then, the result follows from c). Let i, j ∈ N :
Claim 1: For each i ∈ N , Vol(C(N, v) ∩ C(N, vi)) = 0. Let x ∈ C(N, v) ∩ C(N, vi), then
x ∈ C(N, vi) ⇒ xi ≥ vi({i}) = v(N)− v(N\{i}) and
x ∈ C(N, v) ⇒ v({i}) ≤ xi ≤ v(N)− v(N\{i}).
Hence, for each x ∈ C(N, v)∩C(N, vi), xi = v(N)− v(N\{i}). Hence, C(N, v)∩C(N, vi) lies in
an (n− 2)-dimensional space.
Claim 2: For each pair i, j ∈ N , Vol(C(N, vi) ∩ C(N, vj)) = 0. It suffices to show that
C(N, vi)∩C(N, vj) ⊆ C(N, v)∩C(N, vi). Let x ∈ C(N, vi)∩C(N, vj). Suppose that x /∈ C(N, v).
Since x is efficient and xi ≥ v(N)− v(N\{i}), xj ≥ v(N)− v(N\{j}), and for each k ∈ N\{i, j},
xk ≥ v({k}), then, there is S ( N , |S| = n − 1, such that
∑
l∈S xl < v(S). Hence, either i ∈ S
or j ∈ S. Assume, without loss of generality that S = N\{j}. Then
v(N\{j}) >
∑
l∈N\{j}
xl ≥ v(N)− v(N\{i}) +
∑
l∈N\{i,j}
v({l}).
Since (N, v) ∈ Gnn−2, v(N\{i, j}) =
∑
l∈N\{i,j} v({l}). Hence, v(N\{j}) −
∑
l∈N\{i,j} v({l}) =
v(N\{j})− v(N\{i, j}) and we have v(N\{j})− v(N\{i, j}) > v(N)− v(N\{i}), contradicting
the convexity of (N, v).
7.A.3 Proof of Lemma 7.5
Proof. (i) First, we obtain expressions for the marginal vectors associated with (N, v(i,j)):
v(i,j)(S) =


v(N)− v(N\{i, j}) + v(S\{i, j}) i ∈ S, j ∈ S
v(N\{j})− v(N\{i, j}) + v(S\{i}) i ∈ S, j /∈ S
v(N\{i})− v(N\{i, j}) +∑l∈S\{j} v({l}) i /∈ S, j ∈ S∑
l∈S v{l}) i /∈ S, j /∈ S.
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Let Π1(N) = {σ ∈ Π(N) : σ(i) = n}. Then, for each σ ∈ Π1(N),
mσk(N, v(i,j)) =


v(N)− v(N\{i}) + v(N\{i, j})−∑l∈N\{i,j} v({l}) k = i
v(N\{i})− v(N\{i, j}) k = j
v({k}) k 6= i, j.
Note that |Π1(N)| = (n− 1)! and all these marginal vectors coincide.
Let Π2(N) = {σ ∈ Π(N) : σ(j) < σ(i) 6= n}. Let σ ∈ Π2(N). Assume, without loss of
generality that σ(n) = n. Then,
mσk(N, v(i,j)) =


v(N)− v(N\{i}) + v(Pσ(i)\{j})−
∑
l∈Pσ(i)\{j} v({l}) k = i
v(N\{i})− v(N\{i, j}) k = j
v((Pσ(k) ∪ {k})\{i, j})− v((Pσ(k))\{i, j}) k 6= j, σ(k) > σ(i)
v({k}) k 6= j, σ(k) < σ(i).
Since (N, v) ∈ CGnn−3, then, for each coalition S such that |S| ≤ n− 3, v(S) =
∑
l∈S v({l}).
Hence,
mσk(N, v(i,j)) =


v(N)− v(N\{i}) k = i
v(N\{i})− v(N\{i, j}) k = j
v(N\{i, j})−∑l∈N\{i,j,n} v({l}) k = n
v({k}) k 6= i, j, n.
Let σ ∈ Π(N) and k ∈ N be such that σ(j) < σ(i) < σ(k) = n. Then, σ ∈ Π2(N) and there are
(n−1)!
2 such permutations, all of them originating the same marginal vector. Moreover, varying k
within N\{i, j}, we obtain that |Π2(N)| = (n−1)!2 (n− 2). Hence, the marginal vectors associated
to permutations in Π2(N) define, at most, n− 2 different points.
Let Π3(N) = {σ ∈ Π(N) : σ(j) = n and σ(i) = n− 1}. Let σ ∈ Π3(N). Then,
mσk(N, v(i,j)) =


v(N\{j})−∑l∈N\{i,j} v({l}) k = i
v(N)− v(N\{j}) k = j
v({k}) k 6= i, j.
Now, |Π3(N)| = (n− 2)! and all these marginal vectors coincide.
Let Π4a(N) = {σ ∈ Π(N) : σ(i) < σ(j) < n}. Let σ ∈ Π4a(N). Then,
mσk(N, v(i,j)) =


v(N\{j})− v(N\{i, j}) k = i
v(N)− v(N\{j}) k = j
v((Pσ(k) ∪ {k})\{i})−
∑
l∈Pσ(k)\{i} v({l}) σ(i) < σ(k) < σ(j)
v((Pσ(k)) ∪ {k})\{i, j})− v((Pσ(k))\{i, j}) σ(k) > σ(j)
v({k}) σ(k) < σ(i).
132 Chapter 7. The Core-Center and the Shapley Value: A Direct Connection
Again, since (N, v) ∈ CGnn−3, the latter expression can be reduced to
mσk(N, v(i,j)) =


v(N\{j})− v(N\{i, j}) k = i
v(N)− v(N\{j}) k = j
v(N\{i, j})−∑l∈N\{i,j,k} v({l}) σ(k) = n
v({k}) σ(k) < n.
Now, |Π4a(N)| = (n−1)!2 (n− 2) with, at most, n− 2 different marginal vectors.
Let Π4b(N) = {σ ∈ Π(N) : σ(j) = n and σ(i) < n − 1}. Let σ ∈ Π4b(N). Again, the
following expressions for the marginal vectors can be derived:
mσk(N, v(i,j)) =


v(N\{j})− v(N\{i, j}) k = i
v(N)− v(N\{j}) k = j
v(N\{i, j})−∑l∈N\{i,j,k} v({l}) σ(k) = n− 1
v({k}) σ(k) < n− 1.
Now, |Π4b(N)| = (n− 2)!(n− 2) with, at most, n− 2 different marginal vectors.
Let Π4(N) = Π4a(N) ∪ Π4b(N). Then, |Π4(N)| = |Π4a(N)| + |Π4b(N)| = n
2−n−2
2 (n − 2)!.
Moreover, it is easy to check that the permutations in Π4(N) define, at most, n − 2 different
marginal points.
Finally, we have that the permutations in Π(N) define, at most, 2n− 2 different points. For
ease of exposition we assume that these points are different to each other.8
Computation of the Shapley value:
Shi(N, v(i,j)) =
1
n!
∑
σ∈Π(N)
mσi (N, v(i,j)) =
1
n!
4∑
l=1
∑
σ∈Πl(N)
mσi (N, v(i,j)).
Player i
Shi(N, v(i,j)) =
(n− 1)!
n!
(
v(N)− v(N\{i}) + v(N\{i, j})−
∑
l∈N\{i,j} v({l})
)
+
(n− 1)!
2n!
(n− 2)
(
v(N)− v(N\{i})
)
+
(n− 2)!
n!
(
v(N\{j})−
∑
l 6=i,j v({l})
)
+
n2 − n− 2
2n!
(n− 2)!
(
v(N\{j})− v(N\{i, j})
)
.
8This assumption does not affect the algebra used in this proof, but it helps to get a better understanding of
the geometric situation underlying the result.
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Simplifying we have,
Shi(N, v(i,j)) =
v(N) + v(N\{j})− v(N\{i})
2
− 1
n− 1
( (n− 3)
2
v(N\{i, j}) +
∑
l∈N\{i,j}
v({l})).
Player j:
Shj(N, v(i,j)) =
v(N\{i})− v(N\{i, j}) + v(N)− v(N\{j})
2
.
Player k 6= i, j:
Shk(N, v(i,j)) =
(n− 1)!
n!
v({k}
+
(n− 1)!
2n!
(n− 3)v({k}) + (n− 1)!
2n!
(
v(N\{i, j})−
∑
l∈N\{i,j,k} v({l}
)
+
(n− 2)!
n!
v({k})
+
n2 − n− 2
2n!
(n− 3)!
(
(n− 3)v({k}) + v(N\{i, j})−
∑
l∈N\{i,j,k} v({l}
)
.
Simplifying we have,
Shk(N, v(i,j)) = v({k}+ 1
n− 1
(
v(N\{i, j})−
∑
l∈N\{i,j}
v({l})
)
.
Computation of the core-center:
First, we describe the geometry of C(N, v(i,j)) (Figure 7.6 illustrates the geometry of the core
in an example with four players). Note that, for player j,
1
2
4
3
Figure 7.6: The core of the game (N, v(i,j))
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mσj (N, v(i,j)) =
{
v(N\{i})− v(N\{i, j}) σ ∈ Π1(N) ∪Π2(N)
v(N)− v(N\{j}) σ ∈ Π3(N) ∪Π4(N).
Hence, the marginal vectors lie either in the hyperplane xj = v(N) − v(N\{j}) or in the
hyperplane xj = v(N\{i})− v(N\{i, j}) and there are, at most, n− 1 different marginal vectors
in each one of the two hyperplanes. Now, if there is a pair of coincident points in one of the two
hyperplanes, then there is also a pair of coincident points in the other one; inducing a degeneracy
in the core. Hence, since C(N, v(i,j)) is full dimensional, these n − 1 points in each hyperplane
have to be different.
Let k ∈ N\{i, j} and σ ∈ Π(N). We have already shown that either mσk(N, v(i,j)) = v({k})
or mσk(N, v(i,j)) = v(N\{i, j}) −
∑
l∈N\{i,j,k} v({l}). Now, let σ ∈ Π3(N) ∪ Π4(N). Then,
mσ(N, v(i,j)) lies in the hyperplane v(N)−v(N\{j}). Moreover, there are σ1, σ2 ∈ Π3(N)∪Π4(N)
such that (i) mσ1k (N, v(i,j)) = v({k}) and (ii) mσ2k (N, v(i,j)) = v(N\{i, j}) −
∑
l∈N\{i,j,k} v({l}).
An analogous observation is true for the hyperplane xj = v(N\{i}) − v(N\{i, j}) and a pair of
permutations σ′1, σ
′
2 ∈ Π1(N) ∪Π2(N).
Next, we take the n − 1 marginal vectors in the hyperplane xj = v(N) − v(N\{j}) and
we show that they span an (n − 2)-simplex. The same can be done for the n − 1 points in
xj = v(N\{i})− v(N\{i, j}).
Let k ∈ N\{i, j}) and let uk be the marginal vector lying on the hyperplane xj = v(N) −
v(N\{j}) in which player k is better off. The coordinates of each uk are the following:
(uk)l =


v(N\{j})− v(N\{i, j}) l = i
v(N)− v(N\{j}) l = j
v(N\{i, j})−∑l∈N\{i,j,k} v({l}) l = k.
v({l}) l 6= i, j, k.
Besides, let u0 be the remaining marginal vector in xj = v(N)− v(N\{j}):
(u0)l =


v(N\{j})−∑l∈N\{i,j} v({l}) l = i
v(N)− v(N\{j}) l = j
v({l}) l 6= i, j.
Now, since the vectors uk − u0 are linearly independent, the n − 1 marginal vectors in xj =
v(N) − v(N\{j}) define a geometrically independent set in Rn. Hence, they span an (n − 2)-
simplex.
Now, for the hyperplane xj = v(N\{i}) − v(N\{i, j}) we define the same n − 1 points but
with the following differences: (i) the j-th coordinate is v(N\{i}) − v(N\{i, j}) and (ii) the i-
th coordinate is changed to recover efficiency (iii) the remaining coordinates remain unchanged.
Now, since (N, v(i,j)) is convex, C(N, v(i,j)) = co{mσ(N, v) : σ ∈ Π(N)}. Hence, there is an
(n − 2)-simplex ∆n−2 such that, for each t ∈ R, either the intersection of C(N, v(i,j)) with the
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hyperplane xj = t is empty or it is a translation of ∆
n−2. Hence,
µj(N, v(i,j)) =
v(N\{i})− v(N\{i, j}) + v(N)− v(N\{j})
2
,
and it coincides with the corresponding coordinate of the Shapley value.
Now, because of the symmetries in C(N, v(i,j)), to compute the core-center it suffices to
compute the barycenter of the simplex generated by the n − 1 points on the hyperplane xj =
µj(N, v(i,j)). Hence, for each k ∈ N\{i, j},
µk(N, v(i,j)) = v({k}) + 1
n− 1
(
v(N\{i, j})−
∑
l∈N\{i,j}
v({l})
)
= Shk(N, v(i,j)).
Finally, because of the efficiency property of both the Shapley value and the core-center, we
have Shi(N, v(i,j)) = µi(N, v(i,j)).
(ii) Immediate from the description of C(N, v(i,j)) we have made above.
7.A.4 Proof of Lemma 7.6
Proof. (i) Since
vj(S) =
{
v(N)− v(N\{j}) + v(S\{j}) if j ∈ S∑
l∈S v({l}) if j /∈ S
and
v(i,j)(S) =


v(N)− v(N\{i, j}) + v(S\{i, j}) i ∈ S, j ∈ S
v(N\{j})− v(N\{i, j}) + v(S\{i}) i ∈ S, j /∈ S
v(N\{i})− v(N\{i, j}) +∑l∈S\{j} v({l}) i /∈ S, j ∈ S∑
l∈S v({l}) i /∈ S, j /∈ S.
Then,
(v(i,j))j(S) =
{
v{i,j}(N)− v{i,j}(N\{j}) + v{i,j}(S\{j}) j ∈ S∑
l∈S v{i,j}({l}) j /∈ S
=


v(N)− v(N\{i, j}) + v(S\{i, j}) i ∈ S, j ∈ S
v(N)− v(N\{j}) +∑l∈S\{j} v({l}) i /∈ S, j ∈ S
v(N\{j})− v(N\{i, j}) +∑l∈S\{j,i} v({l}) i ∈ S, j /∈ S∑
l∈S v({l}) i /∈ S, j /∈ S.
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Finally,
(vj)i)(S) =
{
vj(N)− vj(N\{i}) + vj(S\{i}) i ∈ S∑
l∈S vj({l}) i /∈ S.
=


v(N)− v(N\{i, j}) + v(S\{i, j}) i ∈ S, j ∈ S
v(N\{j})− v(N\{i, j}) +∑l∈S\{i} v({l}) i ∈ S, j 6∈ S
v(N)− v(N\{j}) +∑l∈S\{j} v({l}) i /∈ S, j ∈ S∑
l∈S v({l}) i /∈ S, j 6∈ S.
(ii) It follows from the combination of (i) and Lemma 7.4.
The proofs of (iii) follow similar lines to the proofs of their counterparts in Lemma 7.3.
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8.1 Introduction
Most game-theoretic solution concepts that have been proposed in the literature are defined on
the basis of or characterized by properties. These properties are usually formulated in terms of
individual payoffs and reflect notions like monotonicity and rationality. For some values, there
exist additional characterizations in terms of geometry. The best-known example is the Shapley
value (Shapley, 1953), which is the barycenter of the vectors of marginal contributions.
For some classes of games, there exist nice geometric expressions for the compromise or τ
value (Tijs, 1981). In particular, the compromise value is the barycenter of the extreme points of
the core cover in big boss games (Muto et al., 1988) and 1-convex games (Driessen, 1988).
In this Chapter, we extend the APROP rule for bankruptcy problems (Curiel et al., 1987) to
the whole class of compromise admissible (or quasi-balanced) games (Tijs, 1981). This extended
rule, which we call τ∗, turns out to be the barycenter of the edges of the core cover, which is our
main result. Moreover, τ∗ and the compromise value coincide for most of quasi-balanced games.
This Chapter is organized as follows. In Section 8.2, we extend the APROP rule and define
the barycenter ζ of the edges of the core cover. In Section 8.3, we state our main result and give
an overview of the proof, which consists of six steps. Finally, in Section 8.4, we prove our main
result.
8.2 The τ ∗ Value
A transferable utility or TU game is a pair (N, v), where N = {1, . . . , n} is a set of players and
v : 2N → R is a function assigning to every coalition S ⊆ N a payoff v(S). By convention,
v(∅) = 0.
Following Tijs and Lipperts (1982), the utopia vector of a game (N, v),M(v) ∈ RN , is defined,
for each i ∈ N ,by
Mi(v) := v(N)− v(N\{i}).
The minimum right vector mi(v) ∈ RN is defined, for each i ∈ N , by
mi(v) := max
S⊆N,i∈S
{v(S)−
∑
j∈S\{i}
Mj(v)}.
The core cover of a game (N, v) consists of those allocations of v(N) according to which every
player receives at most his utopia payoff and at least his minimal right:
CC(v) := {x ∈ RN :
∑
i∈N
xi = v(N), m(v) ≤ x ≤M(v)}.
A game is compromise admissible if it has a nonempty core cover. We denote the class of
compromise admissible games with player set N by CAN . An allocation rule on a subclass
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A ⊆ CAN is a function ϕ : A → RN assigning to each v ∈ A a payoff vector ϕ(v) ∈ RN .
Moreover, we say that ϕ is efficient if
∑
i∈N ϕi(v) = v(N).
The compromise value or τ value (Tijs, 1981) is the rule on CAN defined as the point on the
line segment between m(v) and M(v) that is efficient:
τ(v) := λm(v) + (1− λ)M(v),
where λ ∈ [0, 1] is such that ∑i∈N τi = v(N).
A bankruptcy problem is a triple (N,E, c), where E ≥ 0 is the estate to be divided and
c ∈ RN+ with
∑
i∈N ci ≥ E is the vector of claims. The corresponding cooperative bankruptcy
game (N, vE,c) is defined, for each S ⊆ N , by vE,c(S) = max{E −
∑
i∈N\S ci, 0}. We denote the
class of bankruptcy problems with player set N by BRN . The class of corresponding games is
a proper subclass of CAN . A bankruptcy rule is a function f : BRN → RN assigning to every
bankruptcy problem (N,E, c) ∈ BRN a payoff vector f(E, c) ∈ RN+ such that
∑
i∈N fi(E, c) = E.
In the literature, many bankruptcy rules have been proposed. One interesting question is how
these can be extended in a natural way to the whole class of compromise admissible games. In
this Chapter, we consider the proportional rule and the adjusted proportional rule (Curiel et al.,
1987). The proportional rule PROP simply divides the estate proportional to the claims, i.e.,
for each (N,E, c) ∈ BRN and each i ∈ N ,
PROPi(E, c) =
ci∑
j∈N cj
E.
The adjusted proportional rule APROP first gives each player i ∈ N his minimal rightmi(E, c) =
max{E −∑j∈N\{i} cj , 0} and the remainder is divided using the proportional rule, where each
player’s claim is truncated to the estate left:
APROP (E, c) = m(E, c) + PROP (E′, c′),
where E′ = E −∑i∈N mi(E, c) and for each i ∈ N , c′i = min{ci −mi(E, c), E′}.
The compromise value can be seen as an extension of the PROP rule:
τ(v) = m(v) + PROP (v(N)−
∑
i∈N
mi(v),M(v)−m(v)).
Note that it follows from the definition of compromise admissibility that the argument of PROP
is indeed a bankruptcy problem.
Similarly, we can extend the APROP rule:
τ∗(v) = m(v) +APROP (v(N)−
∑
i∈N
mi(v),M(v)−m(v)).
To simplify the expression for τ∗, we show that the minimum rights in the associated bankruptcy
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problem equal 0. Let v ∈ CAN , E = v(N)−∑i∈N mi(v), c =M(v)−m(v), and i ∈ N . Then,
E −
∑
j∈N\{i}
cj = v(N)−
∑
i∈N
mi(v)−
∑
j∈N\{i}
(Mj(v)−mj(v))
= v(N)−
∑
j∈N\{i}
Mj(v)−mi(v)
≤ 0,
since mi(v) ≥ v(N) −
∑
j∈N\{i}Mj(v). Hence, mi(E, c) = max{E −
∑
j∈N\{i} cj , 0} = 0. As a
result, we have
τ∗(v) = m(v) + PROP (E′, c′), (8.1)
where E′ = v(N)−∑i∈N mi(v) and for each i ∈ N , c′i = min{Mi(v)−mi(v), E′}.
It follows that for a game v ∈ CAN such that for each i ∈ N , Mi(v) − mi(v) ≤ v(N) −∑
j∈N mj(v), τ
∗ coincides with the compromise value τ . The requirement involved in the former
inequality is quite natural: it says that if we give all the players their minimum rights, then
the adjusted utopia value of a player i, Mi(v)−mi(v), cannot exceed the state left, i.e., v(N)−∑
j∈N mj(v). Moreover, this natural requirement is usually met when dealing with quasi-balanced
games, and hence, the τ and τ∗ values coincide for a relevant subclass of the class quasi-balanced
games.
The extended rule τ∗ turns out to be a kind of barycenter of the core cover, which is the main
result of this Chapter. To define this barycenter rule ζ, we need to introduce some more concepts.
A permutation on N is a bijection σ : {1, . . . , n} → N , where σ(p) denotes the player at position
p, and consequently, σ−1(i) denotes the position of player i. The set of all permutations on N is
denoted by Π(N). σi,j denotes the permutation obtained from σ by switching players i and j.
Two permutations σ and σσ(p),σ(p+1) are called permutation neighbors. The set of permutation
neighbors of σ is denoted by Πσ(N).
The core cover is a polytope whose extreme points are called larginal vectors or larginals. The
larginal ℓσ ∈ RN associated with the ordering σ ∈ Π(N) (Quant et al., 2003) is defined, for each
p ∈ {1, . . . , n}, by
ℓσσ(p)(v) :=


Mσ(p)(v) if
∑p
k=1Mσ(k)(v) +
∑n
k=p+1mσ(k)(v) ≤ v(N),
mσ(p)(v) if
∑p−1
k=1Mσ(k)(v) +
∑n
k=pmσ(k)(v) > v(N),
v(N)−∑p−1k=1Mσ(k)(v)−∑nk=1mσ(k)(v) otherwise.
Note that two permutations that are neighbors yield larginals which are adjacent extreme
points of the core cover (possibly coinciding), which we also call permutation neighbors.
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We define the ζ rule as the following weighted average of the larginal vectors:1
ζ(v) =
∑
σ∈Π(N) w
σ(v)ℓσ(v)∑
σ∈Π(N) wσ(v)
, (8.2)
where
wσ(v) =
1√
2
∑
τ∈Πσ(N)
d(ℓσ(v), ℓτ (v))
equals the sum of the euclidean distances between ℓσ(v) and all its permutation neighbors, divided
by the common factor
√
2. Now, we claim that the ζ value can be viewed as the barycenter of
the edges of the core cover, taking the multiplicities into account. Next, we briefly discuss former
statement. The constant 1√
2
is a common factor in both the numerator and the denominator of
Equation 8.2, hence, for the forthcoming arguments we can forget about it. Now, note that the
weight associated with each larginal, namely lσ, corresponds with the sum of the distances from
lσ to each of its neighbors (many of this distances can be 0). In particular, if lτ is a neighbor of lσ,
we are computing the product d(lσ, lτ )lσ and, similarly, we are also computing d(lσ, lτ )lτ . Hence,
we are counting twice the length of each edge. Now, recall that we can compute the barycenter
of the edges of the core cover (taking multiplicities into account) just by the weighted average
the midpoints of the edges, where the weight of each midpoint corresponds with the length of the
original edge. Suppose now that we divide the numerator and the denominator of Equation 8.2
by 2. Now, for the edge joining lσ and lτ we have d(lσ, lτ ) l
σ+lτ
2 , i.e., we have reduced the edge
to its midpoint and the weight is the length of the edge. Since we can repeat the same argument
for each pair of neighboring larginals, we have already provided a justification for the claim we
made above for the ζ value.
To simplify the proofs later on, we first show that both τ∗ and ζ satisfy the properties (SEQ)
and (RTRUNC). Two games v and vˆ are strategically equivalent if there exists a real number
k > 0 and a vector α ∈ RN such that for each S ⊆ N ,
vˆ(S) = kv(S) +
∑
i∈S
αi. (8.3)
A function ϕ : CAN → RN is relatively invariant with respect to strategic equivalence (SEQ) if
for each pair of games v, vˆ ∈ CAN such that (8.3) holds for some k > 0 and α ∈ RN , we have
ϕ(vˆ) = kϕ(v) + α.
It is well-known that both the utopia vector M and the minimum right vector m satisfy (SEQ).
Proposition 8.1. The τ∗ rule and the ζ rule satisfy (SEQ).
Proof. The proof for τ∗ is straightforward and therefore omitted.
1In the degenerate case where M = m, the core cover consists of a single point, which we define to be ζ.
Otherwise, there are at least two different larginals and the denominator is positive.
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It readily follows from (SEQ) of m and M that for each σ ∈ Π(N), ℓσ also satisfies (SEQ).
Let v, vˆ ∈ CAN , k > 0 and α ∈ RN such that (8.3) holds. Let σ ∈ Π(N). Then,
wσ(vˆ) =
1√
2
∑
τ∈Πσ(N)
d(ℓσ(vˆ), ℓτ (vˆ))
=
1√
2
∑
τ∈Πσ(N)
d(kℓσ(v) + α, kℓτ (v) + α)
= k
1√
2
∑
τ∈Πσ(N)
d(ℓσ(v), ℓτ (v))
= kwσ(v).
Now,
ζ(vˆ) =
∑
σ∈Π(N) w
σ(vˆ)ℓσ(vˆ)∑
σ∈Π(N) wσ(vˆ)
=
k
∑
σ∈Π(N) w
σ(v)(kℓσ(v) + α)
k
∑
σ∈Π(N) wσ(v)
= kζ(v) + α.
Hence, ζ satisfies (SEQ).
A rule ϕ : CAN → RN satisfies the restricted truncation property (RTRUNC) if, for each
v ∈ CAN such that m(v) = 0, it holds that, for each vˆ ∈ CAN such that (i) vˆ(N) = v(N),
(ii) m(vˆ) = 0, and (iii) Mi(vˆ) = min{Mi(v), v(N)}, we have ϕ(vˆ) = ϕ(v). The idea behind
(RTRUNC) is that if a player’s utopia value (or, in bankruptcy terms, his claim) is higher than
the value of the grand coalition (the estate), his payoff according to ϕ should not by influenced
by truncating this claim.
Proposition 8.2. The τ∗ rule and the ζ rule satisfy (RTRUNC).
Proof. Let v ∈ CAN with m(v) = 0. Then (8.1) reduces to
τ∗(v) = PROP (v(N), (min{Mi(v), v(N)})i∈N ).
From this it immediately follows that τ∗ satisfies (RTRUNC).
For the ζ rule, it suffices to note that truncating the utopia vector has no influence on the
larginal vectors.
8.3 Main Result
In this Section, we present our main result: the equality between τ∗ and ζ on CAN . After dealing
with some simple cases, we present a six step outline of the proof, which we give in Section 8.4.
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Theorem 8.1. Let v ∈ CAN . Then
τ∗(v) = ζ(v).
As a result of Proposition 8.1, it suffices to show the equality for each game v ∈ CAN such
that m(v) = 0. Next, we can use Proposition 8.2 and conclude that we have to show that for
each v ∈ CAN such that (i) for each i ∈ N , Mi(v) ≤ v(N) and (ii) m(v) = 0 we have 2,3
PROP (v(N),M(v)) =
∑
σ∈Π(N) w
σ(v)ℓσ(v)∑
σ∈Π(N) wσ(v)
.
In case there are only two players, the equality between τ∗ and ζ follows from M1(v) =M2(v) =
v(N).
If Mi(v) = 0 for a player i ∈ N , then we have τ∗i (v) = ζi(v) = 0. Now, let σN\{i} ∈ Π(N\{i})
be defined, for each h, j ∈ N\{i}, by σ−1N\{i}(h) < σ−1N\{i}(j) ⇔ σ−1(h) < σ−1(j). Then, for
each σ ∈ Π(N), the payoff to the players in N\{i} according to ℓσ(v) equals their payoff in the
situation without player i (i.e., the situation with player set N\{i}, utopia vector MN\{i}(v)
and the same amount v(N) to be distributed) according to the larginal corresponding to the
restricted permutation σN\{i}. It is readily verified that also the total weight of each larginal
(taking multiplicities into account) is the same in the game with and without player i. Hence,
we can omit player i from the game and establish equality between τ∗ and ζ for the remaining
players.4
We establish the equality between τ∗ and ζ by combining the permutations in the numerator
and denominator in (8.2) into so-called chains. In the denominator, these chains allow us to
combine terms in such a way that the total weight can be expressed as a simple function of M(v).
In the numerator, we construct an iterative procedure to find an expression for the weighted
larginals, in which the chains allow us to keep track of changes that occur from one iteration to
the next.
The proof of Theorem 8.1 consists of six steps:
Step 1 We first find an expression for the weight of each permutation. We do this by introducing
the concept of pivot and classifying each permutation in terms of its pivot and its neighbors’
pivots.
Step 2 Using the concept of pivot, we introduce chains, which constitute a partition of the set of
all permutations. Then, we use the results of the previous step to compute the total weight
of each chain.
2Note that the condition Mi(v) ≤ v(N) is necessary and sufficient to have Mi(v) = maxσ∈Π(N) ℓ
σ
i (v). Only
in this case, the utopia vector can be reconstructed from the core cover.
3The denominator is zero if and only if M(v) = 0 (= m(v)). In this degenerate case equality between τ∗ and
ζ is trivial and we therefore assume M(v) > 0.
4Geometrically, the core cover, which lies in the hyperplane Mi(v) = 0, is projected into a space which is one
dimension lower.
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Step 3 We define a family of auxiliary functions f ij and gij . We use them to show that each player
“belongs” to the same number of chains. As a result, we use our expression of the previous
step to compute the total of all the weights, i.e., the denominator in (8.2).
Step 4 In the numerator, we partition the set of chains on the basis of the first player in each
permutation. Within each part, we compute the total weighted payoff to all the players.
For the first player, this total weighted payoff can easily be computed.
Step 5 We prove the expression for the payoffs to the other players using an iterative argument,
varying the utopia vector while keeping v(N) constant. We start with a utopia vector for
which our expression is trivial and lower this vector step by step until we reach M(v). In
each step of the iteration, (generically) only two chains change and using this, we show that
the total weighted payoff to each player who is not first does not change as function of the
utopia vector.
Step 6 Combining the previous three steps, we derive an expression for ζ and show that this equals
τ∗.
8.4 Proof of the Main Result
Throughout this Section, let v ∈ CAN be such that |N | ≥ 3; m(v) = 0; M(v) > 0; and, for each
i ∈ N , v(N) ≥Mi(v). To prove Theorem 8.1 is suffices to show that for this game v we have
PROP (v(N),M(v)) =
∑
σ∈Π(N) w
σ(v)ℓσ(v)∑
σ∈Π(N) wσ(v)
.
Since v is fixed for the rest of the Section, we suppress it as argument and write M rather than
M(v), etc. Moreover, we denote the weight wσ(v) by w(σ).
Step 1: pivots
Let σ ∈ Π(N). Player σ(p) with p ≥ 2 is called the pivot in ℓσ if ℓσσ(p−1) =Mσ(p−1), ℓσσ(p) > 0 and
ℓσσ(p+1) = 0. The pivot of a larginal is the player who gets a lower amount according this larginal
if the amount v(N) is decreased slightly. In the boundary case where Mσ(1) = v(N), v(N) cannot
be decreased without violating the condition Mσ(1) ≤ v(N); in this case, player σ(2) is defined to
be the pivot, being the player who gets a higher amount if v(N) is increased slightly. Note that
m = 0 implies that
∑
j∈N\{i}Mj ≥ v(N) and hence, player σ(n) can never be the pivot.
In the following example, we introduce a game which we use throughout this Chapter to
illustrate the various concepts.
Example 8.1. Consider the game (N, v) with N = {1, . . . , 5}, v(N) = 10, and M = (5, 7, 1, 3, 4).
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For this game, we have τ∗ = ζ = 12M . Take σ1 to be the identity permutation. Then,
ℓσ1 = (5, 5, 0, 0, 0)
and player 2 is the pivot.
For a permutation σ ∈ Π(N), we define pσ to be the position at which the pivot is located.5
We define σL = σσ(pσ−1),σ(pσ) to be the left neighbor of σ and σR = σσ(pσ),σ(pσ+1) to be the right
neighbor of σ. It follows from the definition of pivot that the left and right neighbors of ℓσ are
the only two permutation neighbors that can give rise to a larginal different from ℓσ.
Recall that the weight of ℓσ, w(σ), equals the sum of the (euclidean) distances between ℓσ
and all its permutation neighbors. In line with the previous paragraph, we only have to take the
left and right neighbors into account. Hence,
w(σ) =
1√
2
[
d(ℓσ, ℓσ
L
) + d(ℓσ, ℓσ
R
)
]
.
We classify the larginals into four categories, depending on the pivot in the left and right neighbors.
Let σ = (. . . , h, i, j, . . . ) be a permutation with pivot i. Then the four types are given in the
following table:
Type Pivot in σL Pivot in σ Pivot in σR
PPP i i i
−PP h i i
PP− i i j
−P− h i j
We can now determine the weight of each larginal, depending on its type. Take σ ∈ Π(N) to be
the identity permutation and assume that ℓσ is of type PP− and has pivot i. Then,
ℓσ = (M1, . . . ,Mi−2,Mi−1, v(N)−
i−1∑
j=1
Mj , 0, . . . , 0),
ℓσ
L
= (M1, . . . ,Mi−2, 0, v(N)−
i−2∑
j=1
Mj , 0, . . . , 0), and
ℓσ
R
= (M1, . . . ,Mi−2,Mi−1, 0, v(N)−
i−1∑
j=1
Mj , 0, . . . , 0).
5As with neighbors, we use the term pivot as a property of a permutation as well as a property of the
corresponding larginal.
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Hence,
d(ℓσ, ℓσ
L
) =
√
2M2i−1 =
√
2Mi−1,
d(ℓσ, ℓσ
R
) =
√√√√2(v(N)− i−1∑
j=1
Mj)2 =
√
2(v(N)−
i−1∑
j=1
Mj), and
w(σ) = (v(N)−
i−2∑
j=1
Mj).
Doing these calculations for each type and arbitrary σ ∈ Π(N), we obtain the following weights:
Type w(σ)
PPP Mσ(pσ−1) +Mσ(pσ+1)
−PP ∑pσ+1k=1 Mσ(k) − v(N)
PP− v(N)−∑pσ−2k=1 Mσ(k)
−P− Mσ(pσ)
Example 8.2. Let σ1 be the identity permutation. Then, we have (the player with ˆ is the pivot):
σ1 = (1, 2ˆ, 3, 4, 5) ℓ
σ1 = (5, 5, 0, 0, 0)
σL1 = (2, 1ˆ, 3, 4, 5) ℓ
σL1 = (3, 7, 0, 0, 0)
σR1 = (1, 3, 2ˆ, 4, 5) ℓ
σR1 = (5, 4, 1, 0, 0).
Hence, ℓσ1 is of type −PP . The weight of σ1 equals
w(σ1) =
1√
2
(
d(σ1, σ
L
1 ) + d(σ1, σ
R
1 )
)
= 2 + 1
= 3.
Indeed, we have that w(σ1) =
∑pσ1+1
k=1 Mσ1(k)−v(N) =M1+M2+M3−v(N) = 5+7+1−10 = 3,
as the table shows.
Step 2: chains
A chain of length q and with pivot i is a set of q permutations Γ = {σ1, . . . , σq} such that
(i) for each m ∈ {1, . . . , q − 1}, (σm)R = σm+1;
(ii) for each m ∈ {1, . . . , q}, i is pivot in σm; and
(iii) i is not pivot in σL1 and σ
R
q .
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If q = 1, then it follows from the definitions of the four types that σ1 is of type −P−. If q > 1,
then σ1 is of type −PP , σm is of type PPP for each m ∈ {2, . . . , q− 1}, and σq is of type PP−.
Observe that the set of all chains, which we denote by C, constitutes a partition of the set of
permutations Π(N).
Let σ∗ denote the permutation on the n − 1 players obtained from σ by removing the pivot.
Now, we characterize the chains in the following Lemma.
Lemma 8.1. σ1 ∈ Π(N) and σ2 ∈ Π(N) are in the same chain if and only if σ∗1 = σ∗2 .
Given the weights of the larginal vectors, depending on the type, we can easily compute the
weight of a chain Γ, which is simply defined as the total weight of its elements, i.e., w(Γ) =∑
σ∈Γ w(σ).
Lemma 8.2. Let Γ = {σ1, . . . , σq} ∈ C. Then,
w(Γ) =
pσ1+q−1∑
k=pσ1
Mσ1(k).
Proof. Let p = pσ1 . We have (for q ≥ 5; for smaller chains the proof is similar):
w(σ1) =
∑p−1
k=1Mσ1(k) − v(N) + Mσ1(p) + Mσ1(p+1)
w(σ2) = + Mσ1(p+1) + Mσ1(p+2)
w(σ3) = + Mσ1(p+2) + Mσ1(p+3)
... =
...
...
w(σq−1) = + Mσ1(p+q−2) + Mσ1(p+q−1)
w(σq) = −
∑p−1
k=1Mσ1(k) + v(N) −
∑p+q−2
k=p+1Mσ1(k) +
w(Γ) =
∑p+q−1
k=p Mσ1(k)
We say that player i ∈ N belongs to chain Γ = {σ1, . . . , σq} if i ∈ {σ1(pσ1), . . . , σ1(pσ1+q−1)},
i.e., if his position is not constant throughout the chain. Note that if a player does belong to a
chain, his utopia payoff contributes to its weight. We define C(i) to be the set of chains to which
i belongs. By P (i) ⊆ C(i) we denote the set of chains in which i is pivot and by P¯ (i) = C(i)\P (i)
its complement. For each Λ ∈ P¯ (i), we denote the permutation in Λ in which i is immediately
before the pivot by λbi and the permutation in which i is immediately after the pivot by λai.
Example 8.3. Since player 2 is not the pivot in σL1 , σ1 is the first permutation of a chain. This
chain Γ consists of σ1, σ2 = σR1 and σ3 = σ
R
2 , all having player 2 as pivot. In line of Lemma 8.1,
we have σ∗1 = σ
∗
2 = σ
∗
3 = (1, 3, 4, 5). Players 2, 3 and 4 belong to Γ and w(Γ) =M2+M3+M4 =
11.
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Step 3: denominator
In this step, we derive an expression for the denominator in ζ. We do this by showing that each
player belongs to the same number of chains, i.e., for each i, j ∈ N ,
|C(i)| = |C(j)|. (8.4)
If Mi = Mj , then this is trivial, so throughout this step, let i, j ∈ N be such that Mi > Mj . We
prove only one part of (8.4):
|P (j)|+ |P¯ (j)| ≤ |P (i)|+ |P¯ (i)|. (8.5)
The proof of the reverse inequality goes along similar lines, as we indicate later on.
An immediate consequence of Lemma 8.4 is that it follows from Mi > Mj that |P (i)| ≥ |P (j)|
and |P¯ (j)| ≥ |P¯ (i)|. We establish (8.5) in Proposition 8.3 by partnering all the chains in P (j) to
some of the chains in P (i) and partnering all the chains P¯ (i) to some of the chains in P¯ (j). We
then show that for every chain in P¯ (j) which has no partner in P¯ (i), we can find a chain in P (i)
which has no partner in P (j).
To partner the various chains, we define two functions. First, we define f ij :
P (j)
fij→ P (i)
∆ 7→ f(∆) = Λ,
where ∆ = {δ1, . . . , δq} and Λ is the chain to which δi,j1 belongs. Note that the function f ij is
well-defined: since Mi > Mj , player i is indeed the pivot in δ
i,j
1 and hence, in Λ.
Similarly, we define the function gij :
P¯ (i)
gij→ P¯ (j)
Λ 7→ g(Λ) = ∆,
where for each Λ ∈ P¯ (i), ∆ is the chain containing λi,jbi .6
In the following Lemma, we show that gij is well-defined, i.e., that the chain ∆ thus con-
structed is indeed an element of the range of gij , P¯ (j).
Lemma 8.3. The function gij is well-defined.
Proof. Denote the pivot player in λbi (and hence, λai) by h. Observe that as a result ofMi > Mj ,
player h cannot coincide with j. Distinguish between the following two cases:
6By λi,jbi we mean (λbi)
i,j , i.e., the permutation which is obtained by switching i and j in the permutation in
Λ where i is immediately before the pivot.
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i is before j in λbi:
λai = (. . . , hˆ, i, . . . , j, . . . ) λ
i,j
ai = (. . . , hˆ, j, . . . , i, . . . )
λbi = (. . . , i, hˆ, . . . , j, . . . ) λ
i,j
bi = (. . . , j, hˆ, . . . , i, . . . ).
Since h is pivot in λai, it immediately follows that h is also pivot in λ
i,j
ai . Player j cannot
be the pivot in λi,jbi , because i is before the pivot in λbi and Mi > Mj . Combining this with
the fact that h is pivot in λi,jai , h is also pivot in λ
i,j
bi . But then λ
i,j
ai belongs to the same
chain ∆ as λi,jbi . From this, ∆ ∈ C(j), and because j is not the pivot in ∆, ∆ ∈ P¯ (j).
j is before i in λbi:
λai = (. . . , j, . . . , hˆ, i, . . . ) λ
i,j
ai = (. . . , i, . . . , hˆ, j, . . . )
λbi = (. . . , j, . . . , i, hˆ, . . . ) λ
i,j
bi = (. . . , i, . . . , j, hˆ, . . . ).
Since h is pivot in λbi, we immediately have that h is pivot in λ
i,j
bi . Because of this, the
pivot in λi,jai cannot be before h. It can also not be after h, because h is pivot in λai and
Mi > Mj . By the same argument as in the first case, ∆ ∈ P¯ (j).
From these two cases, we conclude that gij is well-defined.
For our partnering argument to hold, we need that the functions f ij and gij are injective.
This is shown in the following Lemma.
Lemma 8.4. The functions f ij and gij are injective.
Proof. To see that f ij is injective, let∆, ∆˜ ∈ P (j) be such that f ij(∆) = f ij(∆˜). By construction,
i is pivot in both f ij(∆) and f ij(∆˜), so i is pivot in both δi,j1 and δ˜
i,j
1 . Since by assumption these
permutations are in the same chain, by Lemma 8.1 we have (δi,j1 )
∗ = (δ˜i,j1 )
∗. But since j is pivot
in both δ1 and δ˜1, it follows that δ
∗
1 = δ˜
∗
1 . So, δ1 and δ˜1 are in the same chain and ∆ = ∆˜.
For injectivity of gij , let Λ, Λ˜ ∈ P¯ (i) be such that gij(Λ) = gij(Λ˜). Then λi,jbi and λ˜i,jbi are
in the same chain. By the same arguments as used before, j is just before the pivot in both
permutations and hence, λi,jbi = λ˜
i,j
bi . From this, we conclude λbi = λ˜bi and Λ = Λ˜.
From Lemma 8.4, we conclude
|P (j)| ≤ |P (i)|
and
|P¯ (i)| ≤ |P¯ (j)|.
With these inequalities, we can now apply our partnering argument to prove that each player
belongs to the same number of chains.
Proposition 8.3. Let i, j ∈ N . Then |C(i)| = |C(j)|.
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Proof. If Mi = Mj , then the statement is trivial. Hence, assume without loss of generality that
Mi > Mj .
We only show (8.5). Let ∆ ∈ P¯ (j) be such that there exists no Λ ∈ P¯ (i) with gij(Λ) = ∆.
Denote the pivot in ∆ by h and distinguish between the following three cases:
h 6= i and i is after j in δbj :
δaj = (. . . , hˆ, j, . . . , i, . . . ) δ
i,j
aj = (. . . , hˆ, i, . . . , j, . . . )
δbj = (. . . , j, hˆ, . . . , i, . . . ) δ
i,j
bj = (. . . , iˆ, h, . . . , j, . . . ).
Of course, h is also the pivot in δi,jaj . If h were the pivot in δ
i,j
bj , then δ
i,j
aj and δ
i,j
bj would belong
to the same chain Λ ∈ P¯ (i). But then gij(Λ) = ∆, which is impossible by assumption. Since
Mi > Mj , player i must be the pivot in δ
i,j
bj . The chain to which δ
i,j
bj belongs cannot be an
image under f ij , since it is obtained by switching i and j in a permutation in which j is not
the pivot. Furthermore, two different starting chains ∆, ∆˜ ∈ P¯ (j) cannot give rise to one
single chain containing δi,jbj and δ˜
i,j
bj , because both permutations are of type PP− or −P−
and there can be only one such permutation in a chain.
h 6= i and i is before j in δbj :
δaj = (. . . , i, . . . , hˆ, j, . . . ) δ
i,j
aj = (. . . , j, . . . , h, iˆ, . . . )
δbj = (. . . , i, . . . , j, hˆ, . . . ) δ
i,j
bj = (. . . , j, . . . , i, hˆ, . . . ).
Again, it easily follows that h is pivot in δi,jbj and by the same argument as in the first case,
i must be pivot in δi,jaj . Also, the chain to which δ
i,j
aj belongs cannot be an image under f
ij
and two different starting chains ∆, ∆˜ ∈ P¯ (j) cannot give rise to one single chain containing
δi,jaj and δ˜
i,j
aj , because both permutations are of type −PP or −P−. Moreover, the chains
constructed in this second case, containing δi,jaj , must differ from the chains constructed in
the first case, containing δi,jbj , as a result of the relative positions of h and j.
h = i:
δaj = (. . . , iˆ, j, . . . ) δ
i,j
aj = (. . . , j, iˆ, . . . )
δbj = (. . . , j, iˆ, . . . ) δ
i,j
bj = (. . . , iˆ, j, . . . ).
Obviously, i is pivot in both δi,jaj and δ
i,j
bj . So, these two permutations belong to the same
chain Λ ∈ P (i). Again Λ cannot be an image under f ij , and since Λ = ∆, different starting
chains give rise to different Λ’s. Finally, since j belongs to the “new” chains constructed in
this case, they must differ from the chains in the first two cases.
Combining the three cases, for every element of P¯ (j) that is not an image under gij of any chain
in P¯ (i), we have found a different element of P (i) that is not an image under f ij of any chain in
P (j). Together with Lemma 8.4, |P (j)|+ |P¯ (j)| ≤ |P (i)|+ |P¯ (i)|.
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Similarly, by taking Λ ∈ P (i) such that there exists no ∆ ∈ P (j) with Λ = f ij(∆), one
can prove the reverse inequality of (8.5). Combining the two inequalities, we obtain |C(i)| =
|C(j)|.
Using the previous proposition, we can compute the total weight of all larginals.
Proposition 8.4.
∑
σ∈Π(N) w(σ) = (n− 1)!
∑
i∈N Mi.
Proof. Since each of the n players belongs to the same number of chains and there are n! permu-
tations making up the chains, each player belongs to n!n = (n−1)! chains. But then the statement
immediately follows from Lemma 8.2.
Step 4: numerator, first player
Now we turn our attention to the numerator of ζ. For this, we partition the set of chains into
subsets with the same starting player:
Ck = {{σ1, . . . , σq} ∈ C : σ1(1) = k}.
Note that since player k is by definition never the pivot in σ1, he is also the first player in
σ2, . . . , σq. It is easily verified that {Ck}k∈N is indeed a partition of C.
For a chain Γ = {σ1, . . . , σq} ∈ C, we define LΓ to be the weighted sum of its corresponding
larginals:
LΓ =
q∑
k=1
w(σk)ℓ
σk .
We compute the numerator in (8.2) by combining the permutations that belong to the same Ck,
k ∈ N . We derive, for each player i ∈ N , an expression for ∑Γ∈Ck LΓi . In this step, we consider
the special case where i = k, while in the next step we compute the payoff to the other players.
Lemma 8.5. For each i ∈ N , ∑Γ∈Ci LΓi = (n− 2)!Mi∑j∈N\{i}Mj.
Proof. In a similar way as in Proposition 8.3, we can show that for each j, k ∈ N\{i}, |Ci ∩
C(j)| = |Ci ∩ C(k)|. Analogous to Proposition 8.4, we then have
∑
σ∈Π(N):σ(1)=i w(σ) = (n −
2)!
∑
j∈N\{i}Mj . Since player i always gets Mi at the first position, the statement follows.
Step 5: numerator, other players
In this step, we finish the expression for the numerator in ζ by computing, for each i ∈ N , i 6= k,∑
Γ∈Ck L
Γ
i . First, in a similar way as in Lemma 8.2, one can compute the total weighted larginal
for each chain, as is done in the next Lemma.
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Lemma 8.6. Let Γ = {σ1, . . . , σq} ∈ P (i). Then for j = σ(s) we have
LΓj =


w(Γ)Mj if s < pσ1 ,
(v(N)−∑pσ1−1k=1 Mσ1(k))Mj if j = i,
(v(N)−∑s−1k=1,k 6=pσ1 Mσ1(k) +∑pσ1+q−1k=s+1 Mσ1(k))Mj if Γ ∈ P¯ (j),
0 if s > pσ1 + q − 1.
Example 8.4. Of course, LΓ1 = w(Γ)M1 = 11 · 5 = 55 and LΓ5 = 0. For player 2, the pivot, we
have
LΓ2 = w(σ1)(v(N)−M1) + w(σ2)(v(N)−M1 −M3)
+w(σ3)(v(N)−M1 −M3 −M4)
= 3 · (10− 5) + 4 · (10− 5− 1) + 4 · (10− 5− 1− 3)
= 35.
Indeed, this equals (v(N)−∑pσ1−1k=1 Mσ1(k))M2 = (10− 5) · 2, as stated in Lemma 8.6.
For player 3, which belongs to Γ but is not the pivot, we have
LΓ3 = w(σ1) · 0 + w(σ2)M3 + w(σ3)M3
= 0 + 4 · 1 + 4 · 1
= 8,
which equals the expression in Lemma 8.6. For player 4, the computation is similar.
Lemma 8.7. For each i, k ∈ N, i 6= k, we have ∑Γ∈Ck LΓi = (n− 2)!(v(N)−Mk)Mi.
Proof. We prove the assertion using an iterative procedure, varying the utopia payoffs while
keeping v(N) constant. We denote the utopia vector in iteration t by M t and throughout the
procedure, this vector satisfies all our assumptions. We first show that the statement holds for
M1 = (v(N), . . . , v(N)) ≥ M . Then we iteratively reduce the components of the utopia vector
one by one until we, after finitely many steps, end up in M . For every M t, we show that for the
corresponding (induced) set of chains, the total weighted payoff to i is as stated, as function of
the utopia vector.
Step 1
Take M1 = (v(N), . . . , v(N)). Then all chains consist of one permutation, in which the
second player is the pivot. Player i gets 0 if he is after the pivot and v(N) −M1k if he is the
pivot. There are (n − 2)! chains in which the latter occurs, each having weight M1i . Hence,∑
Γ∈Ck L
Γ
i = (n− 2)!(v(N)−M1k )M1i .
Step t
Suppose that the statement holds for utopia vectorM t−1. IfM t−1 =M , then we are finished.
Otherwise, there exists a j ∈ N such that M t−1j > Mj . We now reduce j’s utopia payoff until
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one of the chains changes, or until Mj is reached.
A chain changes if in one of its permutations, the pivot changes. Obviously, this can only
happen if player j is before the pivot. Because in the first permutation of each chain the gap
between what the pivot gets and his utopia payoff is smallest, this permutation is the first to
change. Denoting this gap corresponding to σ ∈ Π(N) by γ(σ), i.e.,
γ(σ) =M t−1σ(pσ) − (v(N)−
pσ−1∑
k=1
M t−1σ(k)),
the first chain changes when j’s utopia payoff is decreased by
γ = min{γ(σ1) : {σ1, . . . , σq} ∈ Ck, σ−11 (j) ≤ pσ1}. (8.6)
Assume, for the moment, that the corresponding argmin is unique and denote its first permutation
by σˆ.
If γ ≥M t−1j −Mj , then decreasing j’s utopia payoff from M t−1j to Mj does not result in any
change in the chains. In this case, the statement holds for M tj defined, for each h ∈ N\{j}, by
M tj =Mj ,M
t
h =M
t−1
h . Proceed to step t+ 1.
Otherwise, define the second-highest gap γ˜ by
γ˜ = min{γ(σ1) : {σ1, . . . , σq} ∈ Ck, σ−11 (j) ≤ pσ1 , γ(σ1) > γ(σˆ)}
and take M tj = M
t−1
j − (γ + ε), where ε ∈ (0, γ˜ − γ) and for each h ∈ N\{j}, M th = M t−1h . We
show that the statement holds for this new utopia vector.
As mentioned before, σˆ is the first in a chain, say Γ ∈ Ck. So, σˆ must be either of type −P−
or −PP . Define s = σˆ−1(i) and distinguish between the two cases:
σˆ is of type −P−:
σˆR belongs to another chain, say ∆ ∈ Ck with length q. Note that the players σˆ(pσˆ − q +
1), . . . , σˆ(pσˆ−1) and σˆ(pσˆ+1) belong to ∆. When the pivot changes in σˆ, this permutation
joins ∆, as type PP−, forming chain ∆∪{σˆ}. Hence, chain Γ disappears and the length of
∆ is increased by one, while the other chains are not affected. So, it suffices to show that
LΓ,t−1i +L
∆,t−1
i as function of M
t−1 equals L∆∪{σˆ},ti as function of M
t. Using Lemma 8.6,
we have:
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– 1 < s < pσˆ − q + 1:
LΓ,t−1i = M
t−1
σˆ(pσˆ)
M t−1i (i is before Γ),
L∆,t−1i = (M
t−1
σˆ(pσˆ+1)
+
pσˆ−1∑
k=pσˆ−q+1
M t−1σˆ(k))M
t−1
i (i is before ∆),
L
∆∪{σˆ},t
i = (
pσˆ+1∑
k=pσˆ−q+1
M tσˆ(k))M
t
i (i is before ∆ ∪ {σˆ}).
– s = pσˆ:
LΓ,t−1i = (v(N)−
pσˆ−1∑
k=1
M t−1σˆ(k))M
t−1
i (Γ ∈ P (i)),
L∆,t−1i = 0 (i is after ∆),
L
∆∪{σˆ},t
i = (v(N)−
pσˆ−1∑
k=1
M tσˆ(k))M
t
i (i is last in ∆ ∪ {σˆ}).
– pσˆ − q + 1 ≤ s < pσˆ:
LΓ,t−1i = M
t−1
σˆ(pσˆ)
M t−1i (i is before Γ),
L∆,t−1i = (v(N)−
s−1∑
k=1
M t−1σˆ(k) +
pσˆ−1∑
k=s+1
M t−1σˆ(k))M
t−1
i (∆ ∈ P¯ (i)),
L
∆∪{σˆ},t
i = (v(N)−
s−1∑
k=1
M tσˆ(k) +
pσˆ∑
k=s+1
M tσˆ(k))M
t
i (∆ ∪ {σˆ} ∈ P¯ (i)).
– s = pσˆ + 1:
LΓ,t−1i = 0 (i is after Γ),
L∆,t−1i = (v(N)−
pσˆ−q∑
k=1
M t−1σˆ(k))M
t−1
i , (∆ ∈ P (i)),
L
∆∪{σˆ},t
i = (v(N)−
pσˆ−q∑
k=1
M tσˆ(k))M
t
i (∆ ∪ {σˆ} ∈ P (i)).
– s > pσˆ + 1:
LΓ,t−1i = L
∆,t−1
i = L
∆∪{σˆ},t
i = 0 (i is after all three chains).
It is readily checked that in all cases, LΓ,t−1i + L
∆,t−1
i as function of M
t−1 equals L∆∪{σˆ},ti
as function of M t.
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σˆ is −PP :
σˆR belongs to the same chain as σˆ. When the pivot changes in σˆ, this permutation forms
a new chain of length one. In the same manner as in the previous case, we can show that
the total weighted payoff to i as function of the utopia vector in these two chains remains
the same.
So, from these two cases, we conclude that the statement holds for the new set of chains induced
by the (lower) utopia vector M t. Proceed to step t+ 1.
We assumed that the minimal gap in (8.6) is obtained for a unique permutation, σˆ. Suppose
now that there exists another permutation, σ˜, with this minimal gap. Since both σˆ and σ˜ are of
type −P− or −PP , they must belong to different chains Γ and Γ˜. Also the two corresponding
“neighboring” chains ∆ and ∆˜ are different, and different from Γ and Γ˜. Hence, we can consider
the analysis in step t for σˆ and σ˜ separately to prove the statement.
Finally, our procedure stops after finitely many steps, because in all the changes, the pivot
concerned moves towards the back of a permutation.
Step 6: final
In this final step, we combine our previous results to prove the main theorem.
Proof of Theorem 8.1: Let i ∈ N . Then applying Lemmas 8.5 and 8.7 yields
∑
σ∈Π(N)
w(σ)ℓσi =
∑
Γ∈C
LΓi
=
∑
j∈N\{i}
∑
Γ∈Ck
LΓi +
∑
Γ∈Ci
LΓi
=
∑
k∈N\{i}
(n− 2)!(v(N)−Mk)Mi + (n− 2)!Mi
∑
k∈N\{i}
Mk
= (n− 1)!v(N)Mi.
Then, using Proposition 8.4, we have
ζi =
∑
σ∈Π(N) w(σ)ℓ
σ
i∑
σ∈Π(N) w(σ)
=
(n− 1)!v(N)Mi
(n− 1)!∑j∈N Mj
=
v(N)∑
j∈N Mj
Mi.
Hence, τ∗ = ζ. 2
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8.5 Concluding Remarks
As we already stated in Section 8.2, for the class of compromise admissible games in which for
each i ∈ N , Mi(v) −mi(v) ≤ v(N) −
∑
j∈N mj(v), τ
∗ coincides with the compromise value τ .
As a result, Theorem 8.1 gives a geometric characterization of the latter on this class of games.
Moreover, in Section 8.2 we also provided a motivation for the previous requirement, showing
that it is quite natural.
This geometric property of the compromise value with respect to the core-cover can be added
to the already existing ones in TU games. Hence, we have the following results: the Shapley value
is the center of gravity of the vectors of marginal contributions, besides, for convex games it is
the center of gravity of the extreme points of the core (now multiplicities have to be taken into
account); the nucleolus is the lexicographic center of the core; the core-center is, by definition,
the center of gravity of the core; and now, for the class of games we have mentioned above, the
compromise value is the center of gravity of the edges of the core-cover (again, multiplicities have
to be taken into account).
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Resumen en Castellano
La teoría de juegos se ha dedicado, desde sus orígenes en los años 20 del siglo pasado, a dotar de
estructura matemática a aquellas situaciones de la vida real en las que varios agentes (jugadores),
entre los cuales existe un conflicto de intereses, compiten (juegan) estratégicamente. Situaciones
como las que acabamos de comentar se repiten continuamente en la vida real; esto explica el
impacto de la teoría de juegos en campos tan diversos como las ciencias políticas, la psicología, la
biología, la inteligencia militar,. . . y, sobre todo, la economía. Los primeros trabajos en teoría de
juegos se deben al matemático francés Emile Borel, quien, en 1921, publicó una serie de trabajos
acerca de este tema. Sin embargo, serían John von Neumann y Oskar Morgenstern quienes en
su libro Theory of Games and Economic Behavior revolucionaron la forma de estudiar teoría
económica. Años después, en 1950, John Nash introdujo un nuevo concepto de equilibrio en
teoría de juegos. Este nuevo concepto permitió, junto con otras herramientas desarrolladas en
teoría de juegos, dotar a la teoría económica de un rigor del que había carecido hasta entonces.
Los teoremas de punto fijo usados en los resultados de Nash fueron aplicados para obtener nuevos
resultados relativos al equilibrio general, piedra angular de los estudios microeconómicos.
El propio John Nash fue el primero en establecer formalmente las diferencias entre juegos no
cooperativos y juegos cooperativos; siendo la principal diferencia entre ambos que, en los modelos
cooperativos, los jugadores pueden realizar acuerdos vinculantes y firmar contratos que después
han de ser respetados. Esta misma separación la hemos adoptado en esta tesis, dedicando la
primera parte de la misma a estudiar modelos no cooperativos y la segunda a los cooperativos.
Juegos No Cooperativos
En esta primera parte de la tesis, que comprende los Capítulos del 1 al 4, describimos y estudiamos
varios modelos no cooperativos.
En el Capítulo 1 estudiamos una famila especial de juegos no cooperativos. Los conocidos como
“timing games” (Karlin, 1959) modelan situaciones en las que no sólo las estrategias elegidas son
importantes, sino también el momento en el que se juegan ha de ser tenido en cuenta. Muchos
modelos conocidos en teoría de juegos pertenecen a esta familia. De entre ellos destacan los
modelos de “war of attrition” o guerras de desgaste (Smith, 1974). El ejemplo más conocido, y al
que deben el nombre, es el de dos depredadores peleando por la misma presa: en cuanto uno se
retire de la pelea, la presa será para el otro, de modo que la estrategia consiste en elegir el momento
en el que abandonar la lucha. La mayoría de los modelos de esta clase estudian situaciones en las
que, una vez que uno de los agentes “actúa” (en el ejemplo anterior abandona la lucha), el otro
es inmediatamente informado. Nosotros discutimos un modelo en el que suponemos que éste no
es el caso. Consideremos una situación en la que dos empresas rivales están investigando para
hacer el mismo descubrimiento patentable (véase, por ejemplo, Fudenberg et al. (1983)): sólo una
de las dos conseguirá la patente, y toda la inversión realizada por la otra habrá sido en balde.
En este caso, la estrategia en cada instante del tiempo consiste en seguir invirtiendo o abortar la
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investigación. En este modelo parece natural que una vez que una de las empresas abandona la
investigación la otra no sea informada. Esto es importante en situaciones en las que las empresas
en cuestión compiten en varios frentes al mismo tiempo. En este caso, si una de las empresas deja
de invertir en uno de los frentes, entonces no va a querer que la otra firma pueda redistribuir su
presupuesto para ser más competitiva en los frentes aún abiertos.
En este Capítulo, basado en el trabajo González-Díaz et al. (2004), presentamos una nueva
clase de timing games y, siguiendo la motivación anterior, los llamamos “silent timing games”.
Esta primera aproximación a esta nueva clase de juegos la realizamos a través de los “cake sharing
games”, en los cuales la división de un pastel entre varios jugadores es modelada como un timing
game. La idea es la siguiente. Supongamos que tenemos dos jugadores, cada uno de los cuales
con derecho a un cuarto del pastel. El juego consiste en decir en qué instante del tiempo se desea
recibir el pastel; el jugador más paciente recibirá su parte de pastel y, a mayores, la parte sobrante
después de haberle dado al otro la parte a la que tenía derecho en el momento en el que la pidió.
Esto es hecho de un modo silencioso, es decir, un jugador no tiene nunca información de lo que ha
hecho el otro. Una vez que se introducen descuentos en el modelo, el dilema de los jugadores será
cuánto arriesgar de su derecho inicial para conseguir la parte sobrante del pastel. Los principales
resultados de este Capítulo extienden los obtenidos para juegos bipersonales en Hamers (1993)
al caso general en el que hay n-jugadores. Más concretamente, probamos la existencia y unicidad
del equilibrio de Nash para estos juegos.
En el Capítulo 2 realizamos un giro dentro de los juegos no cooperativos. Este Capítulo se
enmarca dentro del campo de los juegos repetidos con información completa. Durante los últimos
treinta años, se han publicado multitud de condiciones necesarias y suficientes para los llamados
“folk theorems”. Estos resultados aseguran que, bajo ciertas condiciones, todos los pagos factibles
e individualmente racionales del juego de partida pueden ser obtenidos en equilibrio, de Nash o
perfecto en subjuegos, en el juego repetido (ya sea una cantidad finita o infinita de veces). En el
primero de estos “folk theorems” se probó que para juegos infinitamente repetidos no se necesita
ninguna hipótesis para poder sustentar cualquier pago factible e individualmente racional en
equilibrio de Nash (este resultado puede encontrarse en Fudenberg y Maskin (1986)). Impulsados
por este resultado inicial, se siguieron buscando nuevos “folk theorems”, ya fuese cambiando el
horizonte infinito por el finito o bien reemplazando el concepto de equilibrio de Nash por el de
equilibrio perfecto en subjuegos. Una buena recopilación de todos estos trabajos puede encontrarse
en Benoît y Krishna (1996).
En este Capítulo, nosotros nos centramos en juegos finitamente repetidos con información
completa y en el equilibrio de Nash. El resultado clásico en este contexto fue obtenido en Benoît
y Krishna (1987), donde prueban una condición suficiente para el “Nash folk theorem”: que el juego
de partida tenga, para cada jugador, al menos dos pagos de Nash distintos. En este Capítulo,
basado en el trabajo González-Díaz (2003), presentamos una nueva condición: que el juego se
pueda descomponer como una “complete minimax-bettering ladder”. Esta condición es más débil
que la introducida en Benoît y Krishna (1987). Probamos, además, que no sólo es suficiente
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para el “folk theorem” en equilibrio de Nash, sino que también es necesaria. Además, también
caracterizamos el conjunto de pagos que se pueden obtener en equilibrio de Nash en el caso de
que la condición antes mencionada no se cumpla. Este último enfoque es nuevo en esta literatura
ya que, tradicionalmente, los resultados se han centrado en buscar condiciones bajo las cuales
todos los pagos factibles e individualmente racionales pueden obtenerse en equilibrio en el juego
repetido. Nosotros, además de hacer eso, estudiamos cuáles serán los pagos que se pueden obtener
en equilibrio cuando esas condiciones no se cumplen.
En el Capítulo 3, aunque seguimos dentro del marco de los juegos repetidos, nos alejamos
ligeramente del enfoque clásico. Introducimos, dentro de este marco, el concepto de compromiso.
El impacto de diferentes tipos de compromisos en modelos no cooperativos ha sido ampliamente
estudiado y, de entre estos estudios, destacan los juegos de delegación. En estos modelos se estu-
dian aquellas situaciones en las que los jugadores pueden “contratar” agentes para que participen
en el juego en su lugar. Estos juegos fueron discutidos inicialmente en Schelling (1960), donde se
pueden encontrar diversas motivaciones para los mismos. El tipo de compromisos que nosotros
introducimos es formalmente distinto de los modelos de delegación, pero la idea subyacente es
la misma. El interés de estos modelos con compromisos radica en estudiar hasta qué punto se
pueden conseguir en equilibrio pagos que, sin la ayuda de estos compromisos, serían inestables.
Nosotros discutimos el concepto de compromisos unilaterales, concepto introducido inicialmente
en García-Jurado et al. (2000) y cuya idea es la siguiente: en una primera etapa del juego los
jugadores pueden deshacerse, simultánea e independientemente, de algunas de sus estrategias en
el juego repetido. Después, estos compromisos se hacen públicos y el juego repetido comienza. En
otras palabras, antes de empezar a jugar, los jugadores realizan una serie de compromisos que
después han de respetar durante el desarrollo del juego.
En este Capítulo, basado en el trabajo García-Jurado y González-Díaz (2005), inicialmente
discutimos la relación entre los compromisos unilaterales y los modelos de delegación. Después,
obtenemos una serie de “folk theorems” para juegos repetidos con compromisos unilaterales. Fi-
nalmente, realizamos un análisis comparativo de nuestros resultados con los resultados clásicos
en juegos repetidos para evaluar el impacto de los compromisos a la hora de obtener equilibrios
del juego repetido que sustenten pagos “cooperativos” del juego original. Del mismo modo, tam-
bién discutimos brevemente nuestros resultados en comparación con los obtenidos para juegos de
delegación y damos una posible aplicación de los compromisos unilaterales dentro de la literatura
de los modelos de delegación.
En el Capítulo 4 realizamos un nuevo giro y estudiamos problemas de bancarrota (O’Neill,
1982) con un enfoque no cooperativo. Los problemas de bancarrota surgieron para modelar situa-
ciones en las que una empresa se declara en quiebra y hay que repartirse el dinero que queda entre
los acreedores. Por supuesto, la propia naturaleza del problema implica que el dinero restante no
es suficiente para satisfacer las demandas de los acreedores. A pesar de la sencillez del problema
y de su aparente simplicidad matemática, la literatura en problemas de bancarrota ha crecido
tremendamente en los últimos 20 años. También el enfoque de estos problemas desde el punto
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de vista no cooperativo ha sido ampliamente abordado en esta literatura (veánse, por ejemplo,
Thomson (2003); Dagan et al. (1997); Sonn (1992)).
En este Capítulo, basado en García-Jurado et al. (2004), definimos una familia de juegos no
cooperativos de tal manera que a cada problema de bancarrota podemos asignarle juegos dentro
de esta familia. En una primera parte demostramos que todos los equilibrios de Nash de cada
uno de estos juegos tienen el mismo pago y que, además, dicho equilibrio de Nash es también
un equilibrio fuerte. Después, demostramos que, dados un problema y una regla de bancarrota,
podemos encontrar un juego dentro de nuestra familia cuyo pago en equilibrio se corresponde con
la propuesta de la regla para el citado problema.
Juegos Cooperativos
La segunda parte de la Tesis está dedicada a estudiar situaciones en las que los distintos jugadores
pueden firmar entre ellos contratos y realizar acuerdos vinculantes. Esto hace que, a diferencia
de lo que pasaba en los juegos no cooperativos, el concepto de equilibrio no sea relevante, la
estabilidad de las soluciones vendrá garantizada por el carácter vinculante de los acuerdos y la
obligatoriedad de cumplir los contratos. La subclase más estudiada dentro de los modelos de
juegos cooperativos se corresponde con los juegos con utilidad transferible (TU). Los juegos TU
modelan situaciones en las que los contratos y acuerdos contemplan la posibilidad de transferir
dinero (u otra variable que actúe como numeraria) entre los distintos agentes.
Nuestro estudio en esta parte de la Tesis se centra, principalmente, en estudiar la geometría
que subyace bajo algunos de los conceptos de solución más relevantes en la literatura de juegos
TU. Los tres primeros Capítulos de esta segunda parte se basan en los trabajos González-Díaz
y Sánchez-Rodríguez (2003a,b). Dichos trabajos se centran en el estudio del core de un juego
TU (Gillies, 1953); del core-center, un nuevo concepto de solución introducido en esta tesis; y,
finalmente, de su relación con el valor de Shapley (Shapley, 1953). En el Capítulo 5 se introdu-
ce formalmente el core-center, un nuevo concepto de solución para juegos equilibrados, definido
como el centro de gravedad del core de un juego TU. El core es, con el permiso del valor de
Shapley, el concepto de solución más importante en juegos cooperativos. La idea detrás de este
concepto de solución está centrada en la estabilidad y la eficiencia: hay que proponer un reparto
que, siendo eficiente, proponga una asignación que ninguna de las coaliciones pueda bloquear, es
decir, que ninguna coalición pueda irse por su cuenta y salir ganando con respecto a la asigna-
ción propuesta. Una vez aceptado que el core es un concepto de solución muy natural, nosotros
planteamos el siguiente razonamiento: si estamos de acuerdo en que hay que elegir una asignación
dentro del core (es decir, estable y eficiente), y dado que el core de un juego TU es un con-
junto convexo, ¿por qué no quedarnos con su centro de gravedad?. En este capítulo discutimos
diversas motivaciones para esta solución y llevamos a cabo un estudio de las propiedades que
verifica. De entre estas propiedades destacan las propiedades de monotonía, cuyo estudio está
fuertemente marcado por los resultados negativos de los trabajos de Young (1985) y de Housman
y Clark (1998); trabajos en los que se prueba una fuerte incompatibilidad entre las propiedades
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de monotonía y las reglas de asignación que siempre escogen elementos del core. Por otro lado,
también juega un papel importante la continuidad, ya que una buena parte del Capítulo 5 está
dedicada a probar que, efectivamente, el core-center es una regla de asignación continua. El Ca-
pítulo 6 está íntegramente dedicado a la caracterización axiomática del core-center. Para ello se
introduce una nueva propiedad, llamada “fair additivity”; esta es una aditividad ponderada, en
la que aparecen unos coeficientes que miden la importancia de los juegos teniendo en cuenta la
estructura de sus cores. Posteriormente, combinando esta propiedad de aditividad con algunas de
las propiedades discutidas en el capítulo anterior, obtenemos una caracterización axiomática del
core-center. Estas propiedades son: fair additivity, simetría, continuidad, y eficiencia. Además,
la demostración de este resultado guarda un cierto paralelismo con la caracterización del valor
de Shapley utilizando la propiedad de aditividad. En una primera parte de la demostración se
prueba el resultado para juegos cuyo core en un simplex; estos juegos tienen un papel similar al
de los juegos de unanimidad en la caracterización del valor de Shapley, y son usados posterior-
mente para probar el resultado para juegos cuyos cores son polítopos arbitrarios. Finalmente, en
el Capítulo 7 se estudia, ya dentro de la clase de juegos convexos, la relación entre el valor de
Shapley y el core-center. En este Capítulo juegan un papel muy importante los llamados juegos
de utopía. Primero describimos el proceso de formación del core de un juego TU como un proceso
dinámico entre las distintas coaliciones de jugadores. Después, basados en esta interpretación,
definimos una serie de juegos, los juegos de utopía, que surgen de un modo natural de la motiva-
ción anterior. Posteriormente, probamos que, para ciertas subclases de juegos, el core-center y el
valor de Shapley de los juegos de utopía coinciden. Este primer resultado nos permite probar un
resultado más general que establece una conexión bastante directa entre el valor de Shapley y el
core-center.
Finalmente, en el Capítulo 8 nos alejamos un poco de lo estudiado en el resto de capítulos de
esta parte. Aunque seguimos estudiando la geometría de los juegos TU, el concepto de solución con
el que trabajamos es el τ valor (Tijs, 1981). Esta regla de asignación pretende ser un compromiso
entre lo mínimo que se debe conceder a cada jugador de acuerdo a la situación dada y lo máximo
a lo que éste puede aspirar. Una vez que estos valores se definen para cada jugador tenemos dos
vectores, el de mínimos derechos y el de máximas aspiraciones. El τ valor se define como la única
asignación eficiente en la recta que une estos dos puntos. También a partir del vector de mínimos
derechos y el de máximas aspiraciones se define el core-cover: un conjunto que juega para el τ
valor un papel similar al que juega el conjunto de Weber con respecto del valor de Shapley. En este
Capítulo demostramos que hay una fuerte relación entre el τ valor y la geometría del core-cover.
Más específicamente, probamos que, para la mayoría de los juegos para los que está definido, el τ
valor es el centro de gravedad de las aristas del core-cover, teniendo en cuenta las multiplicidades
de las mismas. Este resultado recuerda al que relaciona a los vectores de contribuciones marginales
con el valor de Shapley, ya que este último es el centro de gravedad de los mismos (teniendo en
cuenta las multiplicidades). Llamemos ahora τ∗ valor a la solución que consiste en seleccionar el
centro de gravedad de las aristas del core-cover. Entonces, como ya hemos dicho, esta solución
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coincidirá casi siempre con el τ valor. Pero además, si estudiamos el juego de bancarrota asociado
con cada juego TU, nos encontramos con que el τ valor del juego original se corresponde con la
asignación propuesta por la regla proporcional y, por otro lado, el τ∗ valor se corresponde con la
regla proporcional ajustada (Curiel et al., 1987).
Conclusiones
En la primera parte de esta tesis hemos discutido distintos modelos no cooperativos. Para ellos
hemos encontrado resultados relativos, principalmente, a la existencia y unicidad de equilibrios
de Nash en las distintas situaciones. En el Capítulo 1 hemos obtenido un teorema de existencia
y unicidad de equilibrio de Nash en una clase de “timing games” que generaliza la discutida en
Hamers (1993). En el Capítulo 2 hemos obtenido una condición necesaria y suficiente para el
“Nash folk theorem” para juegos finitamente repetidos con información completa. Este resultado
refina el obtenido en Benoît y Krishna (1987). Además, nuestro resultado es más general que los
habituales en esta literatura. Esto es porque no sólo busca condiciones necesarias y suficientes
para que todos los pagos factibles e individualmente racionales puedan ser obtenidos en equilibrio,
sino que también caracterizamos el conjunto de pagos que se pueden obtener en equilibrio de Nash
en el caso de que tales condiciones no se cumplan. El Capítulo 3 también ha girado en torno a
los juegos repetidos. En él hemos estudiado los distintos “folk theorems” cuando al juego repetido
se le añade una etapa inicial en la que los jugadores pueden adoptar compromisos unilaterales.
En el Capítulo 4, último de la primera parte de la tesis, hemos presentado una aproximación no
cooperativa a los modelos de bancarrota. En ella hemos presentado una familia de juegos que se
pueden asociar a cada problema de bancarrota y que nos permiten obtener en equilibrio el reparto
propuesto por cualquier regla de asignación.
La segunda parte de la tesis ha tratado sobre juegos cooperativos. La mayor parte de esta
segunda parte la hemos centrado en el estudio de una nueva regla de asignación para juegos TU,
el core-center. En el Capítulo 5 hemos realizado un estudio en profundidad de las propiedades
que verifica el core-center; en el Capítulo 6 hemos presentado una caracterización axiomática;
finalmente, en el Capítulo 7 hemos llevado a cabo un análisis que nos ha permitido establecer una
conexión entre el core-center y el valor de Shapley para juegos convexos. Además, en el Capítulo 8
hemos obtenido una caracterización geométrica del τ valor. Finalemte, destacar también que
hemos profundizado en la geometría de los juegos TU. Lo hemos hecho estableciendo conexiones
entre varias reglas de asignación y varios conceptos de solución multivaluadas. Es muy conocido
que, por un lado, el valor de Shapley ocupa una posición central dentro del conjunto de Weber
y, por otro, que el nucleolo se conoce también como el centro lexicográfico del core. A estas
relaciones nosotros hemos añadido la relación entre el core y el core-center, definido como el
centro de gravedad del primero y, por otro lado, hemos demostrado que el τ valor ocupa, en
general, una posición central en el core-cover de un juego quasi-equilibrado.
Resumen en Castellano 169
Líneas abiertas
Finalmente, destacamos las siguientes líneas de investigación que serían una continuación natural
de los distintos capítulos presentados en esta tesis:
Profundizar en la literatura de los “timing games” para estudiar las posibles implicaciones
y aplicaciones de los resultados presentados en el Capítulo 1.
Estudiar si es posible aplicar las ideas del Capítulo 2 para afinar/extender otros “folk theo-
rems” en juegos repetidos.
Seguir estudiando el impacto de los compromisos unilaterales en las hipótesis necesarias
para los “folk theorems”.
Ampliar el horizonte de estudio dentro de los juegos repetidos a aquellos con información
incompleta.
Siguiendo con las ideas presentadas en el Capítulo 4, buscar algún modelo de implementación
descentralizado.
Seguir estudiando la geometría del core de un juego TU y profundizar en las propiedades
del core-center.
Buscar otras caracterizaciones del core-center.
Analizar las conexiones entre soluciones tipo conjunto y soluciones puntuales mediante el
uso de centroides.
Seguir analizando las relaciones existentes entre core-center y las demás soluciones clásicas
para juegos TU.
Estudiar el problema de la computación del core-center.
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